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This thesis examines why the United States became a founder signatory
to the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. The enquiry suggests that
the perception of a Soviet challenge to Western Europe was a necessary
condition for the Americans helping to create the postwar Atlantic
Alliance but an historically inadequate explanation of the reasons
they did so.
The central conclusion reached in this thesis is that the Truman
Administration planned beyond the short-term need to reassure the
West Europeans and had its sights set on a longer-term objective.
U.S. policy-makers sought to alter the political, economic and
military status quo in Western Europe so as virtually to guarantee
that the United States would not again be drawn into another world
war centred on Europe. Crucial to this American policy objective
was the inter-relationship between the temporary purposes of the North
Atlantic Treaty and the unformulated but potent idea of West European
unity.
Contemporary documents make clear that the American concept of -
and enthusiasm for - West European integration a) formed an essential
part of security deliberations in Washington, including military
planning, during the late 1940s; b) gave coherence to domestic,
diplomatic, economic and military aspects of U.S. foreign policy; and
c) governed the style, content and tone of transatlantic exchanges,
ironically limiting the scope for independent U.S. initiatives while
giving the war-weakened states of Western Europe a certain, but never
decisive, influence over American policy towards themselves.
By helping create conditions during the late 1940s in which a militarily
self-sustaining Western Europe could emerge, the United States hoped
eventually - possibly as early as the 1950s - to withdraw from Europe
altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has proved to be an
alliance of some durability. Formed before the advent of thermonuclear
weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, it has survived more
or less intact in a world different in important respects from that
which existed at its birth. The most common explanation for this
longevity is that, despite altered circumstances, one overriding factor
has remained constant: the perceived need to provide a counterweight
to Soviet military power in Eastern Europe. For a generation, con¬
tinuing uncertainty about Soviet intentions has reinforced that
opinion.
But common perceptions can be misleading. The Atlantic Alliance
which survives today may conform to the expectations invested in it
by its West European members from the outset. It may also serve the
purposes for which Americans came to regard it as necessary after the
outbreak of the Korean War. What NATO does not resemble in the 1980s -
and has never resembled - is the security arrangement that the United
States envisaged when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April
1949. That set of objectives has been obscured by subsequent develop¬
ments, NATO's own information programme, debates about who 'caused'
the cold war, and the non-availability of the relevant primary sources
until the late-1970s. Since then, what had been a trickle of infor¬
mation has turned into a flood and all but swamped historians ana
political scientists studying one or more aspects of the cold war.^
It is only just beginning to become apparent that this new material,
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available now on both sides of the Atlantic, compels scholars to
revise earlier judgements and assumptions.
This thesis is a contribution to that process. In the light of the
new documentary evidence as well as the old, it seeks an answer to
the question: What led the United States to become a party to the
North Atlantic Treaty? As will be demonstrated, the answer has less
to do with the Soviet 'threat' than is commonly supposed. The post¬
war Atlantic Alliance came into being in large part because of the
deeply felt American abhorrence of being drawn into another world
war centred on Europe. This view would have been held even if no
Soviet challenge emerged after 1945. As it was, the West European
fear of communist expansion became the focus of traditional American
anxieties about what Thomas Jefferson called 'the exterminating havoc
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of one quarter of the globe'. It will be argued here, however,
that the United States had no intention of becoming permanently
'entangled' in Europe's affairs; that the American prescription for
West European security was different from that of the Allies, and
that NATO itself was built upon a basic misunderstanding, the possible
consequences of which have yet to be seen. For if the Americans have
been ambivalent about NATO from the beginning, a major cause has been
Washington's constant disappointment that the West Europeans failed -
and continued to fail - to take the very steps which U.S. policy-
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makers thought imminent in 1949.
* * *
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Fundamental to the interpretation contained in this study are the
Truman Administration's perceptions of U.S. security interests and
the way in which Americans regarded the formation of a united Western
Europe as serving those interests. While West Europeans dreaded a
Soviet blitzkrieg and feared economic and social chaos, Americans
thought the problems were either exaggerated or readily solvable.
While the Europeans turned to the United States for long-term assis¬
tance, Americans refused to consider themselves as an inexhaustible
reservoir of charity. Consequently, the United States insisted that
any aid - whether economic, military or diplomatic - should be both
short-term and contribute directly to Western Europe's self-reliance
and political unity. To Americans, the North Atlantic Treaty and
the organisation which it spawned were intended as the devices whereby
the European and American positions, as well as the time-scales that
separated them, could be reconciled. At no stage prior to April 1949
would the Truman Administration have considered that the steps it took in
that month did violence to George Washington's warning about remaining
outside 'the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour and
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caprice'. On the contrary, the aim was to redeem these acknowledged
evils by creating a new Europe, the raison d'etre of which, from an
American viewpoint, was to reduce the strain on U.S. economic and other
resources brought on by the cold war responsibility of being the
leader of the free world. It was an aim for which the Europeans,
the intended beneficiaries, had little sympathy.
Historians have been reluctant to concede that internal stress was a
feature of NATO from the beginning. In contrast, the argument of this
thesis accepts intra-alliance tension as the principal explanation of
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why the North Atlantic Treaty took the shape it did. Indeed it might
even be said that the Alliance was created because there were dif¬
ferences of view between the Americans and Europeans. If the interests
of both had been self-evidently identical there would be little to
explain about NATO's origins, though much to describe. A joint
recognition of the need to contain Soviet expansionism did not pre¬
suppose agreement on how this was to be achieved. In the immediate
aftermath of World War II there was an obvious asymmetry of fear
among the nations later to form NATO. Americans and Canadians, on
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the one hand, saw no strategic threat to themselves. The West Europeans,
on the other, did feel vulnerable and were conscious that the rejection
of isolationism - occasioned by the attack on Pearl Harbor, and con¬
firmed by the American signature on the U.N. Charter - did not mean
that Europe was automatically to receive American military largesse.
West Europeans thus found that their interests were vested in saying
that American interests were vested in Europe. They waged an un¬
remitting campaign from 1947 to extract from the United States that
unprecedented guarantee of security, without which, they argued,
transatlantic ties of trade, culture, political tradition and common
values could have no substance in the postwar world.
From an American perspective, the North Atlantic Treaty - as signed
in 1949 - represented only a partial concession to the Europeans' views.
Of greater importance to the Truman Administration was the fact that
the treaty marked a decisive shift away from the onen-ended commitment
of the kind enunciated two years earlier, known as the Truman Doctrine.
That policy promised U.S. military help to European countries
threatened by communist takeover from either within or without. It
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amounted to an invitation to the West Europeans to turn to the
Americans at the initial sign of trouble. The Marshall Plan was the
first departure from that approach. As the U.S. Departments of State
and Defense recognised, the United States simply did not have either
the diplomatic or military wherewithal to make the Truman Doctrine
credible, other than for the two countries on whose behalf it was
originally promulgated, Greece and Turkey. To get over the problem,
the Marshall Plan was designed to build strength in Western Europe
so that by the end of the aid programme American economic assistance
would be looked for only as a last resort. For the United States
Government, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty was a continua¬
tion of this policy, now couched in military-diplomatic terms. (The
process of replacing the Truman Doctrine, and the ideas on which it
rested, was completed when Greece and Turkey themselves signed the
North Atlantic Treaty in 1951).
The American objective was to create the conditions in which the
Europeans could generate the resources with which to defend themselves.
In the process, the West Europeans would be relieving the United States
of the responsibility of defending its own vital strategic, economic
and other interests in their part of the world. This was why the
Truman Administration considered that the cause of American self-
interest was well served if the West Europeans were helped to help
themselves. To be fully successful this required, according to the
U.S. view, wholesale systemic and structural change in Western Europe.
The extremely modest steps taken during the 1950s in the direction of
West European unity suggest the extent to which this view was unrealistic.
But in 1949 the problems were made light of: unity, integration, federation -
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the words were interchangeable in postwar American parlance - seemed
just around the corner. It was an impression assiduously cultivated
by some European officials. As a result, the Truman Administration
felt confident the United States could meet the two basic but com¬
peting requirements of the postwar world: a sound material base and
adequate security. For those who made the decisions in Washington,
the elusive goal of statecraft was to provide a security framework
for the West as a whole but without prejudicing the vitality of the
U.S. economy. What Americans did not blush to call 'the United
States of Europe' seemed an essential element of that framework.
Unity in Western Europe was supposed to be the ineluctable consequence
of the North Atlantic Treaty. The two together would form the basis
of American security, not immediately but over the longer run, at
the lowest possible cost to the U.S. taxpayer. Paradoxically,
although the aim was to maximise American freedom of action, the success
of this strategy depended upon West European acquiescence and co¬
operation, and this reduced considerably the scope for American
diplomatic initiatives. The reason for this was the gap between
U.S. diplomatic and security commitments on the one hand and political
and military resources on the other. The difference between declaratory
policy and actual capabilities compelled the Truman Administration to
adopt a strategy of containment (of the Soviet Union) which rested on
the assumption that the West Europeans could and would bear the lion's
share of the security burden on the European land mass and surrounding
seas.
Another way of putting this is to say that American policy decisions
about Western Europe in the period between 1947 and 1949 were taken
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in part because constraints placed upon the Truman Administration by
the West Europeans left it with little choice, and partly because
the United States was inhibited by a variety of American factors
0
from doing anything substantially different. The Atlantic Alliance
which the U.S. Government thought was created in 1949 was a no cost-
low cost solution to such pressures. Before the intensification of
the cold war with the opening of the Korean hostilities, the formation
of NATO seemed the low-cost answer to a number of specific problems
which had been troubling the United States since 1945. These are
readily summarized: reassuring West Europeans that they would not be
abruptly abandoned; neutralizing European demands for a more definite
military commitment; boosting confidence generally, thus helping ensure
the success of the Marshall Plan; providing a system within which the
British (and, to a lesser extent, the other European colonial powers)
could reconcile their new European role with their older, and waning,
world role; and enabling the 'new' Italy and Germany to join the Free
World family again. Conditioned by the war to think in apocalyptic
terms about the world and its problems, U.S. policy-makers saw nothing
strange in connecting each of these objectives to the idea of West
European unity, once it became clear that the United Nations was not
going to fulfil the function originally envisaged for it.
All of these policy objectives were designed to hasten the day when
the United States could begin to reduce its commitments in Europe.
The date provisionally set for- this -as 1952, the year Marshall aid
was due to end. By then, U.S. policy-makers hoped an Atlantic security
arrangement would bring specific benefits to the United States. These
too can be summarized: strengthening the U.S. ability to influence the
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development and expansion of the Western Union (the European alliance
created by the Brussels Treaty of 1948) so that American interests
in Europe would be militarily safeguarded by the Europeans; establishing,
or renewing, base rights in Western Europe and further afield, notably
in North Africa and Southwest Asia, thereby enhancing U.S. worldwide
military capabilities; saving American taxpayers' money by minimising
the need to allocate more of the national wealth to defence; providing
the means by which to exert leverage on the Allies once the European
Recovery Programme ceased; and giving the U.S. public a sense that
something was being done to give some substance to the anti-communist
rhetoric which had passed for public debate on foreign policy since 1947.
Fundamental to the Truman Administration's vision for NATO was the
strategic notion of leaving the Allies to provide internal and per¬
imeter security in their region. They were to build on the Marshall
Plan so as to lessen the causes of domestic unrest. They were also
to provide the first and most important military demonstration to the
Soviet Union that the certain costs of an attack would be unacceptably
high to the aggressor, thereby deterring him and keeping the eastern
borders of Western Europe inviolate. The role which the United States
intended to play was quite different. It was to provide a second and
subsidiary layer of deterrence. Although partially involved in keeping
entry costs high because of the U.S. ground force presence in West
Germany, America's real contribution to deterrence was to make the
residency costs of an occupying power in Western Europe militarily
and politically intolerable. There were few illusions in Washington
that the armed forces of the Western Union countries - Britain, France
and the Benelux nations - could actually defeat a full-scale Soviet
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blitzkrieg, should that level of deterrence fail. What the United
States offered was the assurance that the mobilisation of its
industrial, technological and manpower resources, together with the
opening of an atomic offensive from airfields outside continental
Europe, would force a Soviet withdrawal. Because this response was
known in advance to be probable, no attack would take place.
The United States was holding itself back from the front line in
order to keep its striking power concentrated. At the same time,
the refusal of total and immediate commitment would encourage the
West Europeans to exploit their own military strength and potential
to the utmost. They would integrate their defence efforts, thus
helping ensure that the first level of deterrence did not fail. After
the outbreak of the war in Korea, and following the increase in U.S.
troop numbers in Germany and the appointment of General Dwight D.
Eisenhower as NATO's first supreme commander, this double layer of
deterrence was fused into one. It was known as the alliance's shield
and sword: the Europeans (and Canadians) provided the conventional
forces forming the shield, while the Americans' offensive nuclear
capability represented the sword. Unlike the original U.S. con¬
ception of how deterrence should work, this meant that the threats
of conventional and nuclear retaliation were to be carried out simul¬
taneously. It was just this sort of automatic involvement which
the Truman Administration had resisted in 1949. That the change was
accepted by the same Administration, and its Republican successor,
is a measure of how the cold war rivalry with the Soviet Union had
come to dominate U.S. foreign policy decisions. The failure to
appreciate the importance of this early alteration in NATO's strategy
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has confused perceptions of why George C. Marshall, the U.S. Secretary
of State, agreed to negotiate an Atlantic Pact and why the North
Atlantic Treaty reflected American rather than West European security
requirements.
The change in strategic doctrine did not mean abandoning the notion
of coercing the Europeans to do more for themselves - and thus more
for the Americans - which had characterised U.S. thinking in 1947-1949.
John Foster Dulles, for example, threatened the Allies with an
'agonizing reappraisal' of the United States' commitment if they failed
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to make the European Defence Community (EDC) a going concern. How¬
ever, as that episode demonstrated, the West Europeans were not pre¬
pared to accept U.S. prescriptions. This too was a continuation of
attitudes first adopted in the period before the North Atlantic
Treaty was signed. For the American design to work a West German
g
army would have to be created. Europeans were not ready for that,
especially the French, and would accept the idea only on condition
that U.S. force levels were increased on the inner German border.
This in turn would involve the United States more than ever in the
first layer of deterrence, thus limiting the leverage which could be
used to encourage the Allies' movement towards military and economic -
and, eventually, political - unity in Western Europe.
In brief, NATO was bedevilled by transatlantic differences from the
beginning. The separa .e geostrategic concerns of the two wings of
the Alliance could only be covered over, not eliminated. The treaty
represented one stage in the evolution of a complex arrangement between
parties who did not share common perceptions about the way mutually
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beneficial objectives were to be achieved. Stalinist Russia, if it
was expansionist by nature, had clearly to be contained. About this
there was no argument. (It was suggested by one of the European
drafters of the treaty that the preamble consist of just two words:
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'Dear Joe'.). But the means by which that desirable end was to be
achieved were matters of substantial difference within the Atlantic
partnership. It is this conclusion which differentiates the argument
of this thesis from the work on NATO's origins by historians on both
sides of the Atlantic.
* * *
The literature on the founding of NATO is comparatively sparse. There
are a number of reasons for this. First, much of the general work on
the causes of the cold war has been about East-West (meaning Soviet-
American) relations in general and Eastern Europe in particular.
NATO's creation was an issue in West-West relations; the Soviet Union
did not seek to 'match' it until 1955 when the Warsaw Pact alliance
was founded. Consequently, most studies include little material on
NATO. Secondly, when references are made, it is in the context of
conclusions reached already about American foreign policy in the period
1945-1947. (Some studies, such as D.W. Fleming's two volume The Cold
War and its Origins 1917-1960, go back to the Bolshevik Revolution).^
This means that the American involvement in NATO's foundation is
usually seen against the background of a series of developments which
includes the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Truman's accession to the
Presidency, the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the Truman Doctrine,
the Marshall Plan, and the Berlin blockade. While this is good historical
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practice as a general rule, interpretations have rested on the
questionable assumption that U.S. foreign policy displayed a degree
of consistency as to both the political objective - containment of
Soviet power and influence - and the division of labour within the
Atlantic community as to how that objective was to be achieved.
Finally, because of the thirty-year rule on the release of government
papers in Britain and the United States, most studies of the cold
war were prepared without the benefit of access to official archives.
Since the late-1970s there has been a cautious re-reading of the
circumstances and policies which gave rise to NATO's appearance.
(NATO itself has in recent years, shown a greater willingness to
coincided with the move away from the historical debate, conducted
throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, about who 'caused' the cold
war. Participants in that debate depicted the United States as either
the defender of the free world or meddling interloper. According to
the former view the Soviet Union was 'responsible' for the postwar
tension in East-West relations; the latter view concedes that the
Soviet Union broke promises and proved difficult on many issues but
argues that these actions were direct and legitimate responses to
American interference in the Russianown sphere of influence.
Strictly speaking, the debate between the holders of both opinions is
unhistorical: historians should leave to politicians, political
scientists, international jurists and journalists the business of
allocating 'blame'. Nevertheless, participation in the argument has
been a spur to historical endeavour and has produced some fine studies,
even if some of the participants have shown at times a preference for
foster discussion about New research has
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denigrating their academic opponents rather than re-examining the
13
record. The debate has bean sustained by the continuing tension
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between East and West, which had a mesmerising effect on historians.
The point is confirmed by the historiographical effect of reductions
in tension: academic dispute in the subject waned from the mid-1970s,
due to the subsidence of the feelings released in the United States
by the war in Vietnam, the decline of the New Left, and the contin¬
uation - at least for a while - of detente between the two superpowers.
Curiously, the immediate causes of NATO's creation are not subjects
for disagreement in that debate. Be they 'traditionalist', 'realist',
'revisionist' or 'post-revisionist', most agree that European fears
played a major part in the American decision to sign the North Atlantic
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Treaty. Escott Reid, himself a participant in the negotiations,
argues that the last thing NATO represents is the West Europeans
being persuaded by the United States to support its cold war policies.
Joyce and Gabriel Kolko suggest that the United States was subjected
by the Europeans to 'a polite degree of blackmail by exploiting its
fear of losing allies'. Daniel Yergin makes the same point: U.S.
policy-makers regarded the Atlantic Pact as 'the best way to demonstrate
U.S. determination' in the face of European doubts. The most complete
expression of this view is seen in the work of the Scandinavian historian,
Geir Lunderstad. He contends: 'The United States did not force itself
upon Western Europe. Nbre often than not, the Western Europeans wanted Washingtcn
to increase its interests in their affairs'. Adding a point which touches
the edges of the interpretation given in this study, he suggests that the
Truman Administration 'even felt that the Europeans were not doing
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enough on their own and were relying too much on the Americans'.
*3
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That strand in Lundestad's reading is elevated here to the point where
the desire to enable the West Europeans to be self-sufficient in every
way is seen as pivotal in the making of U.S. foreign policy between
1947 and early-1949.
The point that the United States saw substantial strategic benefits
from the formation of a West European union is largely absent from
the historiographical coverage of NATO's formative years. American
scholars have tended to be fixated on U.S. - Soviet relations to
notice much else. One of the few exceptions is Henry Steele Commager
who in 1957 echoed the popular sentiments of the late-1940s by arguing
that a 'United States of Europe' was more than a possibility. It had
existed, he says, since 1776 in North America, where European
immigrants and their decendents have proved the virtues of federalism.
This only needed to be recreated in Western Europe for both halves of
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the Atlantic community to benefit. European scholars, for obvious
reasons, have shown more interest but even then those concerned with
European integration have concentrated on that theme and not the
security element which included the United States. Symbolising this
approach is that of Margaret Ball. In her book NATO and the European
Union Movement, the evolution of NATO and West European institutions
are treated in separate chapters. Only when her analysis reaches the
late-1950s is the question raised of whether the European and Atlantic
19
'communities' can coexist. It is clear from documents now available
that this issue influenced the deliberations of U.S. policy-makers ten
years before.
One reason why U.S. students of the cold war have given little attention
to these matters is that the autobiographies and biographical studies of
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years before.
One reason why U.S. students of the cold war have given little attention
to these matters is that the autobiographies and biographical studies of
15
key individuals connected with the Truman Administration show an
apparent lack of interest. Truman himself mentions the issue in his
memoirs but in connection with Eisenhower's brief as NATO's supreme
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commander in 1951-1952. Dean Acheson is even less forthcoming,
despite the fact that as one of the architects of the Marshall Plan
he emerged as one of the foremost advocates of European union in the
State Department (as Secretary of State he maintained that interest
but, according to a colleague, felt little need to make statements
about it because progress toward European integration seemed well
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underway in 1949). The edited and published diaries of James V.
Forrestal are similarly blank. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the
Department of State at the time, is reticent in his autobiography,
describing NATO as 'simply a necessity', without elaborating on his
opposition to the idea in the late-1940s. Only George F. Kennan,
Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the intellectual father of
'containment', gives the kind of weight to the European unity issue in
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his memoirs comparable with that revealed in the contemporary record.
Four reasons for this comparative neglect stand out. The first is
that all of these memoirs were written after the Korean War and
therefore under the influence of most intense period of the cold
war. In the case of Forrestal's diaries, the editor, Walter Millis,
seems to have selected entries in part to establish the author's anti-
communist bona fides, and in part to reconstruct Forrestal!s personal
reputation after the former Defense Secretary committed suicide following
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Truman's decision to dismiss him. Both Truman and Acheson had been hurt
by the accusations of Senator Eugene Joseph McCarthy and had particular
reason to defend their respective records, the consequence being that
16
any consideration falling outside the Soviet-American relationship
was lightly treated. The second reason is that the written recollections
of other individuals have not, or will not, appear in the literature.
John Foster Dulles, Robert A. Lovett, Clark Clifford, and above all,
George C. Marshall left no memoirs; Dean Rusk, Paul H. Nitze and
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John D. Hickerson have yet to do so. Had these been available a
different image of American preoccupations in the late 1940s might
have emerged.
The other reasons are more speculative. With the exception of Nitze,
all those mentioned above expressed themselves during the late 1940s
as being in favour of the creation of a united Western Europe. With
the collapse of the EDC, the non-inclusion of Britain in the original
European Common Market, and the post-Korea emphasis on Atlantic
military build-up rather than European economic rehabilitation and
integration, such ideas looked over-optimistic. It is thus likely
that ambitious U.S. officials and politicians did not wish to identify
themselves even retrospectively with what, after a passage of time,
seemed more and more obviously to have been a political non-starter,
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if not an outright failure. Finally, nearly all U.S. personnel
who contributed to the creation of NATO continued to serve in the
American foreign service, or remained in contact with it through
participation in such bodies as the Atlantic Council of the United
States, and the Council on Foreign Relations. This gave them a
positive incentive not to discuss the European unity issue as a crucial
factor in the making of the Alliance, from an American point of view,
because to do so would reveal the extent to which the United States
and its Allies differed over NATO's raison d'etre from the beginning.
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Given the uncertain State of transatlantic relations since the early-
1950s, it would have appeared politically prudent to many to leave
such things unsaid. In that setting, the future of the Atlantic
Alliance must have seemed more important than its past.
European writing has gone some way towards filling the gaps. Margaret
Ball, whose work has been mentioned already, noted the coincidental
development of Atlantic and European institutions. It was not part
of her purpose to enquire whether American officials saw a causal
connection between the temporary need for Atlantic arrangements and
the permanent establishment of what George Kennan called 'some real
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federal authority1 in Western Europe. The former Dutch foreign
office official, Ernst H. van der Beugel, traced European integration
as a concern of U.S. foreign policy from 1947 to 1965. He concludes
that the idea of European union, for purposes of defence, was replaced
by that of a North Atlantic community; but he does so without having
had access to documents of American diplomacy which indicate the extent
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to which this was not the outcome intended in Washington. Max Beloff,
the British historian, published his The United States and the Unity of
Europe in 1962. In it he argues that 'from about 1950 it was the
State Department itself that became the principal exponent of support¬
ing the movement toward West European unity as conducive to the
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objectives of American foreign policy itself'. On the basis of what
is known now it is clear that this is a conservative estimate. From 1947
on the Truman Administration as a whole took the view expressed by
President Kennedy 15 years later: 'we believe that a united Europe
29
will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defence...'.
With more confidence than Kennedy's, however, Truman's Administration
18
felt it could develop the corollary that a United Western Europe would
correspondingly reduce the level of American involvement in Europe.
Recent publications by British scholars, concentrating on the trans¬
atlantic role of the United Kingdom in the late-1940s, have not yet
addressed this strand in U.S. diplomacy. In her book The British
Between the Superpowers, 1945-50, Elizabeth Barker notes that reasons
of time and space made it impossible for her to conduct a detailed
30
study of American primary sources. Consequently, British and
American objectives - and the means to realise them - in Western
Europe are presented as near-identical (though Barker does show that
less harmony existed over issues in the extra-European world).
Allan Bullock's biography of Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary, based
in part on U.S. sources, reveals a greater muscularity in the Anglo-
American relationship; Bullock never assumes that shared perceptions
governed policy-making in London and Washington. He argues that Bevin
sought 'the association of the United States with Europe's security,
not in the form of a guarantee which would fail to carry conviction
but in a joint enterprise, the embryonic North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.' He gives much of the credit for that outcome to Bevin
but makes the point that the Atlantic Pact 'could never have come
into existence if it had not been for American strength and the willing¬
ness of the Truman Administration to assume unprecedented obligations
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in time of peace'. The argument of this thesis is in substantial
agreement but suggests that the United States envisaged something
much closer to a unilateral guarantee pact, backed by a military
assistance programme of limited duration, than a permanent multi¬
national military organisation. For the United States, the obligations
9
19
undertaken in the North Atlantic Treaty were 'unprecedented, but they
were neither onerous nor intended as permanent.
Only one student of NATO's origins to have published work on the
subject has concluded that the United States' long-term aim was a
reduced American commitment to West European security. Timothy P.
Ireland's Creating the Entangling Alliance, published in 1981, argues
that the Atlantic Alliance was designed by the Americans to accomplish
two goals. The short-term objective was to counter Soviet-sponsored
subversion in Western Europe; over the longer run the aim was to
recreate a balance of power in Europe as a whole. Once the latter
had been achieved the United States could progressively diminish its
security activities in one area of the non-communist world. Dr. Ireland
uses the German question as the focus for his analysis:
The impact of an American policy directed at
re-creating a European balance against the
Soviet Union was this: in order to restore
western Europe as a balancing factor against
the Soviet Union, the United States had to
press for the inclusion of western Germany in
programs for European recovery and defence
and, at the same time, provide France and
other countries of western Europe security
against a possible renewal of German
aggression. However, the only way the
United States could provide adequate safe¬
guards against the fear of Germany
revanchism was progressively to involve
itself in European affairs.^
In contrast to many American historians, Ireland's work shows a welcome
recognition that traditional intra-European politics played a major
part in shaping the U.S. commitment embodied in the North Atlantic
Treaty and, later, in the bureaucratic arrangements within the
(partially) integrated military structure of NATO.
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Ireland's book is a major contribution to the literature, and is
particularly important in that it concentrates attention on the way
in which the North Atlantic Treaty was meant as a solution to the
German question, specifically to French fears about a revivified
Germany. However, the cost is a focus which is too narrow. U.S.
policy-makers were worried by all aspects of the European problem,
which included Germany's future but also much besides (such as the
Soviet Union's intentions, West European economic recovery and the
future role of the United Kingdom). Just as the U.S. 'solution' was
to help create a federation out of the Lande (or provinces) which made
up the western zones of occupation in Germany, so the U.S. 'solution'
for Western Europe was intended to follow the same pattern. To the
German and West European problems a single device could be applied:
a West European-wide supranational system. This would provide a
structure able to prevent German revanchism, create conditions for
economic growth and prosperity, eliminate the sources of internal
subversion, persuade the British that their future depended primarily
upon the European (rather than the Empire and Commonwealth) connection,
and offer a credible deterrent when backed by the U.S. atomic arsenal
to the standing challenge represented by the Red Army. In American
minds, the main difficulty lay in deciding upon the appropriate method
of bringing this desirable state of affairs into being.
To notice Dr. Timothy Ireland's relatively narrow field of concern
is less to criticise than to acknowledge the amount of work which
remains to be done on U.S. foreign policy in the late 1940s. It also
helps account for the fact that NATO's origins are still not an issue
of major historical dispute. Rather than engage in debate, scholars
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have been of late more interested in following their individual areas
of interest. Lawrence S. Kaplan relied on personal experience in the
Department of Defense (which he left in 1954) and full access to
records in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to trace the con¬
nections between the North Atlantic Treaty and the subsequent Military
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Assistance Program. Escott Reid, a retired Canadian civil servant
with long service with his country's Department of External Affairs,
published his Time of Fear and Hope in 1977, which was based on
official Canadian sources; it provides a 'functional' analysis of the
making of the Atlantic Alliance - concepts, negotiations, treaty terms,
geographical scope are each dealt with in detail - and the Canadian
34
contribution to the eventual outcome. Sir Nicholas Henderson,
the veteran British diplomat, published unaltered in 1982 a memoir of
'the birth of NATO' which he wrote during two weeks following the
treaty signing in the Spring of 1949; based on primary sources, it
provides a vivid picture from the perspective of a European official
35
based in Washington at the time. A Scandinavian view is offered
in Geir Lundestad's study of Northern Europe as a region of U.S.
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concern during the cold war. Two Dutch scholars, Cees Wiebes and
Bert Zeeman, have pursued their interest in the mechanics of diplomatic
exchange by concentrating on the rhythms of the negotiations which
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formed part of the process which led to the North Atlantic Treaty.
If there is an issue in the historiography of NATO's origins which
has given rise to disagreement - or at least to differences of
emphasis - it has been identified by the Danish scholar, Nikolaj
Petersen. In the context of Anglo-American relations and the making
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of the Atlantic Alliance, he has asked: 'Who pulled whom and how much?'
22
His conclusion is that the North Atlantic Treaty should be seen as
'the result of converging and finally coalescing European and North
39
American national security interests.' He thus challenges the view
which sometimes appears in the work of British scholars, namely that
the role of the United Kingdom (and of Ernest Bevin in particular)
40
was of pivotal importance. The argument of this thesis is similar
to that of Petersen's, in that both agree that 'American policy
towards the North Atlantic Pact was mainly generated within the
domestic policy set-up and as a result of internal struggles for
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influence'. Where this thesis diverges from Petersen's findings
is that it goes out and beyond the issue of whether North American
and West European (including British) security interests were the
same, to address the more divisive question of how those interests
were to be safeguarded in the medium and long term. As Bevin himself
came to recognise by August 1949, it was 'not so much a question of
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America defending us, as of our helping to defend America'. This
was not the outcome the British had looked for when they first
broached the subject of an Atlantic Pact in December 1947. But it
was certainly the outcome the Truman Administration had sought.
Despite the recent release of documents covering the period which
produced the postwar Atlantic Alliance, much material remains closed
to scholars. The most complete documentary record is available in
the United States, but even there significant gaps exist, notably in
the areas of military planning and intelligence gathering. The
British, Canadian and some Scandinavian archives are now open to a
greater or lesser extent. The French have yet to follow suit. But
the greatest gap is, of course, on the Soviet dimension. Unless and
until the Russians allow scholars access to their records, historians -
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on both sides of the political divide in Europe - will be unable to
answer the most intriguing of all the questions which NATO's formation
gives rise to: was it all necessary?
This thesis concerns American perceptions of West European political,
economic and security matters in the late-1940s. Because similar
perceptions exist today in the United States, it is necessary to
eliminate as far as possible the danger of allowing 'presentism'
to control the historical interpretation. To that end, a particular
method has been adopted throughout.
With the exception of the first chapter, each chapter deals with a
relatively short space of time within the period from the beginning
of 1948 to mid-1949. This organisational device has been used for
three reasons. First, the period in question falls naturally into a
number of sections; the thesis structure reflects this. Secondly,
the discipline imposed by these sections helps ensure that component
parts of the main argument can emerge from the analytical narrative,
thus minimising distortion. Finally, the method is well suited to
an enquiry into the evolution of official American attitudes over a
short period crowded with incident; it enables each stage to be
assessed separately and thereby reduces the chances that preconceived
ideas about the North Atlantic Treaty will intrude as anachronisms.
The interpretation is supported by American diplomatic and military
records in the custody of the United States General Services Agency
(at the National Archives, Washington D.C., and the Truman library,
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Independence, Missouri). A number of interviews were conducted.
Other sources, such as British records held at the Public Record
Office, Kew, are used where they give insight into U.S. policy-making
and policy-makers not apparent from American sources.
In historiographical terms the outcome is not an interpretation which
is at odds with other recent studies but one which is complementary to
them. It does not contradict the prevailing view that NATO's formation
was the Western response to the fact that World War II made Russia
the dominant European power and America the predominant world power.
However, it bears out the truth of a sentiment expressed by Charles
E. Bohlen after his retirement from the U.S. diplomatic service:
1947 and 1948 were, in my opinion, the years
of decision as far as American foreign policy
is concerned. They were the years in which
we were forced to do things we had never
intended to do, and had no thought of doing,
and certainly really did not want to do from
the point of view of the strict material
interest of the United States of America.
The challenge to scholarship is to determine the causes of this
unwillingness, to identify what was preferred, and to explain how
reluctance was overcome in the belief that the preferred solution
would be achieved as a result. This thesis is offered as one way
to meet that challenge.
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CHAPTER 1
WEST EUROPEAN UNITY, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE
POSTURE DURING 1947
NATO was the consequence of the perceived causes of one war and fear
of another. Its formation in 1949 embodied the main lessons learned
over the preceding decade: the folly of appeasement and isolationism,
the need to control Germany, the importance of collective security,
and the dependence on extra-European powers to preserve the peace of
Europe (and therefore, many believed, of the world). More immediately,
the founding members of the postwar Atlantic Alliance looked with
varying degrees of apprehension at the apparently burgeoning challenge
of the Soviet Union; all were agreed on the need to contain its
expansionist tendencies in Europe. To that extent, NATO was originally
conceived as the application of hindsight to the future security
arrangements of the Atlantic community of nations.
However, since the cessation of hostilities in 1945, both the inter¬
pretation of recent events and its application differed markedly on
either side of the Atlantic. On the one hand, the United States was
primarily interested in helping to establish a new kind of West
European state system which would ensure that Americans were not
drawn into yet another costly - and, in their eyes, avoidable -
conflict. On the other hand, the states of Western Europe were
mainly concerned to safeguard their national sovereignty in the face
of the threat posed by the Soviet armies of occupation in Eastern
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Europe. This difference of emphasis - a new Europe or the preservation
of as much of the old one as possible - suggests the real nature of
the transatlantic bargain. The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4
April 1949, was a compromise between Western Europe's minimum demands
and the maximum commitment that North America felt it necessary to make.
Compromise is obviously the essence of any voluntary international
agreement but what is striking about the Atlantic Pact is the extent
to which the United States showed itself ready to make some con¬
cessions in the short-term in the expectation of achieving its
objectives in Western Europe over the longer run. In agreeing to
sign the Treaty - the principal American concession - the Truman
Administration anticipated further moves in the direction of West
European political, economic and military integration and therefore
a gradual and general U.S. disentanglement from Europe. That these
expectations proved mistaken is obvious in retrospect; that they
were unreasonable is less so. But the perceived failure of the
Europeans to fulfill their half of the 'bargain' underlay a steady
American disenchantment with NATO during the 1950s and thereafter.
This sense of disappointment had its origins in the way transatlantic
relations developed during 1947. It is thus appropriate to begin a
study of NATO's American beginnings with an appreciation of events
of that year.
The Tgument of this chapter has three objectives: to demonstrate the
growing recognition in Washington of the gap between U.S. economic
resources and military commitments; to establish the strength and
consistency of U.S. policy-makers' ideas about West European unity
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as part of America's security; and to show that the actual implementation
of policy was done with less confidence than might be expected in this
year of 'containment'.
During 1947 Americans began to articulate their hopes and fears for
the future of Western Europe. The ground rules for discussion were
laid down by John Foster Dulles on 17 January 1947, during a widely
reported speech to the National Publishers' Association meeting in
New York. Looking forward to the forthcoming meeting of the Council
of Foreign Ministers (CFM), to be held in Moscow on the subject of
Germany's future, he put the problem into a global context. 'Whoever
deals with Germany deals with the central problem of Europe', he said.
'Whoever deals with Europe deals with the world's worst fire hazard'.
Statesmanship had to do better than rebuild the European structure
substantially as before. That, he reminded his audience, is what had
been done after every other 'conflagration', with disastrous con¬
sequences. On that reasoning Dulles insisted that the British Prime
Minister, Clement Attlee, was only declaring the obvious when he had
remarked that 'Europe must federate or perish'. The United States
had more experience than any other nation 'in using the federal
formula and in developing its manifold possibilities'. He concluded
that Americans had no option but to offer inspiration, leadership and
guidance to the Europeans in this matter."'"
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Dulles was by no means the first American to expound such views.
George Washington himself, writing to the Marquis de Laffayette,
declared: 'We have sowed seeds of liberty and union that will spring
up everywhere on earth, and one day, taking its pattern from the
United States, there will be founded a United States of Europe'.
Clarence Streit had gained a certain reputation, from the mid-1930s
2
on, with a variant of this: an Atlantic federal union. But it was
Dulles who put the issue of European union on the American political
agenda. He was then in legal practice, specialising in international
law. He was also the Republican Party's leading spokesman on foreign
affairs; he acted as a personal adviser to the Secretary of State,
George C. Marshall, and was an official delegate to the United
Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 1949. Dulles epitomised the
bipartisan consensus which was such a feature of American foreign
policy from VE Day to the 'loss' of China to the communists. His
public pronouncements were therefore more than personal preferences
with a semi-official veneer. According to one scholar, the
Republican Secretary of State-in-the-wings was in closer accord
3
with the Truman Administration on foreign policy than many Democrats.
From the flood of press articles on the same subject, which appeared
in the next several months, it is clear that Dulles had tapped a rich
theme, close to the sentiments of many Americans. Some journalists
4
and commentators were more lyrically enthusiastic than others. But
all agreed that, while the future establishment of a federal Germany
would not of itself bring about the federation of Europe, the
solution to the specific German problem and the wider European one
was the same: economic unification leading to political unity.
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It all seemed so obvious. As Dulles put it, the nations of Europe
had to federate in their own interests, just as the American states
had formed a federal union in 1787. If the Soviet Union would not
support continental unity 'then a worthwhile start could be made in
5
Western Europe'. Congress took up these ideas on 21 March 1947.
A concurrent resolution was submitted in both chambers: 'Resolved
by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) that the
Congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe within the
0
framework of the United Nations'. As with most resolutions this
was referred to committee where, in attenuated form, it became part
of the Marshall Plan legislation. However, the fact that it was
submitted at all, and widely reported, confirmed European integration
as a major element in the postwar American Weltanschauung.
There were two main reasons why the idea was to command persistant
attention from 1947 onwards. The first was that words and phrases
applied to Europe's future - integration, unification, federation,
mutual cooperation and customs union - were quickly rinsed of
meaning by constant repetition and a lack of definition. This
enabled the notion of European unity to change, depending upon
the point being made. Resisting Soviet expansionism, creating a
large, tariff-free market, preventing future internecine European
wars, allowing the United States to return to its own hemispherical
concerns, establishing the framework within which to enable Germany,
or part of it, to rejoin the European family - all these benefits
were identified with the cause of European federalism. In an
American context this meant the idea was virtually impervious to
challenge. The second reason for its continuing popularity was the
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support it evidently had in Europe itself. For so long as sub¬
stantial figures, the most important being Winston S. Churchill,
appeared to promote the prospect of realising this European idea,
few in the United States were predisposed to examine the notion
afresh. This reinforced what the historian Ernst van der Beugel
called the 'deep missionary belief' in the efficacy of applying
American federal solutions to Europe's political, economic and
security problems.^
That this popular conception of a new Europe showed a remarkable
resilience is less important to the argument of this chapter than
the fact that, beginning in 1947, the Truman Administration did
nothing to puncture the prevailing enthusiasm. This is not to say
that President Truman and the State Department felt it necessary
to follow the lead of public opinion on this matter. For all of
the late-1940's the level of interest in foreign affairs, as against
other issues in American politics, was very low. 1947 was no
exception. A number of studies show that about 30 per cent of the
electorate had no interest in international developments; some 45
per cent knew about significant events but not enough to discuss
them in any depth. Only 25 per cent had anything like detailed
knowledge of foreign affairs. But the overwhelming majority, some
80-85 per cent, consistently placed the state of the economy -
particularly inflation - a long way ahead of foreign policy as a
g
source of concern. Provided that the notion of European unity
was seen as part of the anti-communist drive, the Truman Administration
was relatively free to follow its own instincts on this issue.
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While there were few domestic inhibitions, foreign constraints did
create problems. The position of George C. Marshall is instructive.
Sworn in as Secretary of State on 21 January 1947, he was told by
Truman that the wartime Atlantic Charter could serve as the guide¬
lines of policy. From that day to his resignation 24 months later.
Marshall acted as though the Charter had included a clause about
West European unity. But he did so always with the understanding
that Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, could not be
bullied just because Americans were worried about that part of the
world being a 'fire hazard'.
His first major task after taking office was to prepare for the
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting to be held in Moscow during
March and April 1947. The question under discussion was the future
of Germany but that was obviously inseparable from a wider European
settlement. This had been the central thrust of Dulles' speech four
days prior to Marshall's arrival at the State Department. From
evidence in John Foster Dulles' own papers, and in those of the
Department, it is clear that Marshall generally agreed with the
Republican foreign affairs spokesman's views on solving the Euro¬
pean and German problems by guiding the disparate democracies of
Western Europe along the road to federation. In fact, this broad
agreement appears to have played a large part in changing the
Secretary of States' mind about Republican participation in the
team to visit Moscow.
Originally, Marshall intended to restrict membership of his advisory
party to appropriate personnel from his new Department. This caused
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some consternation in those Republican quarters concerned to maintain
the habit of bipartisanship on foreign affairs inaugurated by the
bombing of Pearl Harbor and consolidated during the war, especially
over the formation of the United Nations. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg,
the mainstay of Republican support for bipartisanship by virtue of
his position as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
was particularly annoyed and suggested to Marshall on 4 February
9
that at least one senior Republican should be included. This was
a powerful appeal, but seems not to have been decisive. Benjamin V.
Cohen, Counselor at State, told Dulles on 24 February that the ideas
contained in the 17 January speech had struck a responsive chord in
the Department. According to Dulles he was told: 'At the highest
level there is no basic objection to your views'. Such differences
as did exist were dismissed as matters of 'emphasis and wording'.
Cohen then informally on Marshall's behalf, invited Dulles to be
part of the Moscow-bound "team; the offer was gladly accepted.
Later that day, Dulles saw Marshall himself and was told that his
policy prescriptions on Germany and Western Europe 'had much merit'
and would not create any dissension among Marshall's advisors.
It was this, Dulles believed, which had made the invitation possible.
There were no illusions in the Republican Party about what all of
this might signify. As Vandenberg pointed out, the inclusion of
Dulles meant that the Party with a majority of seats in the Senate
would no longer 'be free to criticize what would probably be a failure'^
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to discount the similarities between
the views of Marshall and Dulles. They "were to become more evident
later in the year. But from the very beginning of George Marshall's
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two highly eventful years as Secretary of State, it is apparent that
he regarded some form of European unity to be the goal towards which
the United States must work. Certainly nothing was to be done to
discourage the process.
In effect, Marshall showed himself sympathetic to the four points
Dulles had made on the 17 January. First, the federal formula
was appropriate to Europe. It would flow from rebuilding the old
structure of 'independent, unconnected sovereignties' and from the
fusion of 'small economic compartments' into a larger, self-sufficient •
economic group. Secondly, a united Europe (Dulles did not specify
its geographical scope) would be in a better position to withstand
the twin Soviet challenge of external aggression and internal sub¬
version. Thirdly, by giving a large measure of autonomy to the
individual German states - and including them in the proposed
European federal structure as independent entities - there would be
less chance that 'vengeful and ambitious' leaders would again rise
in Germany to dominate by economic pressures where military conquest
had failed. Finally, a federated Europe would create conditions
which, in sharp contrast to those following the Treaties of Versailles,
13
would be both 'durable' and 'self-enforcing'.
This last point was of particular importance to the Secretary of State.
It dovetailed with his interest in European self-sufficiency through
some form of unity. Having held high responsibility during World War I
and been made the Army's Chief of Staff on 1 September 1939, he had
unrivalled experience of the costs and consequences involved in
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mounting and coordinating United States' military efforts to prevent
Europe dying of what Americans pardonably regarded as self-inflicted
wounds. He did not want the same thing to happen a third time in one
century. He had attended all the major wartime military diplomatic
conferences and been Truman's special envoy on a doomed mission to
unite Chinese nationalists and communists in common cause. It has
been rightly said that he 'could pass easily from the role of soldier
14
to that of diplomat' As subsequent events were to demonstrate,
he certainly appreciated the fact that American commitments abroad
had become divorced from the economic and military resources which
could be allocated to them at home.
Marshall evidently saw in the prospect of some form of united Europe
one method - though not the only one - of bridging the gap between
resources and commitments. That gap had been apparent to his
predecessor, James F. Byrnes, whose faflure to find solutions to
the United States' foreign policy problems had underminded Truman's
confidence in him. He had been an able Secretary of State but had
been forced to deal with problems on an ad hoc basis. Neither he,
his President nor the United States as a whole had adjusted to the
role which Americans were required to play in the world. There was,
as a consequence, no unifying set of goals and objectives in the first
18 months following the cessation of hostilities in Europe. It was
those which Marshall was largely to supply.
The similarity between both Byrnes' and Marshall's perception of the
problem is striking. The United States had demobilized and disarmed
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so quickly after VJ Day that Byrnes had little military muscle with
which to back up his diplomatic efforts. He could not order a reversal
of that process. This put him in a difficult position,as he wrote in
1947:
Some of the people who yelled the loudest for me
to adopt a firm attitude toward Russia, yelled
even louder for the rapid demobilization of the
Army. Theodore Roosevelt once wisely said,
'Uncle Sam should speak softly and carry a big
stick'. My critics wanted me to speak loudly
and carry a twig.15
Marshall was also caught by the same contradictory pressures. He
recalled that after the Moscow CFM he was constantly urged to 'give
the Russians hell'. He replied that as a soldier he knew a thing or
two about 'giving hell' but that all he had at his disposal then
was less than two operational divisions across the whole United
States. In contrast, he complained,the Soviet Union mustered some
16
260 armoured and infantry divisions.
In the Department of Defense there was also an awareness that
foreign policy and military capabilities had got out of joint. As
Truman's first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, wrote to a
friend on 24 February 1947, 'General Marshall probably has the
17
hardest job of all'. Forrestal was especially conscious of the
difficulties because from late 1946 he had been fighting with both
the White House and the Bureau of the Budget for the kind of financial
appropriations for fiscal year 1947-48 which were commensurate with
America's existing international obligations and responsibilities.
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The problem was that to give the Navy, Army and Army Air Force what
they were asking for risked 'the destruction of everything the
18
military establishment existed to defend'. Truman was adamant:
the armed forces could have no more than $11.5 billions and that,
according to Forrestal, meant further military reductions, thus
19
weakening Marshall's hand still further.
The reason for President Truman's inflexible adherence to budgetary
ceilings for the National Military Establishment was that domestic
political and economic considerations allowed him to do no other.
He did not intend to undermine America's negotiating strength in
international affairs. But, following what had been disastrous mid¬
term elections in 1946 for the Democratic Party, he had to be keenly
aware of the electorate's primary interests if he was to have any
chance to be elected President in his own right in 1948. The United
States' relations with allies and potential adversaries did not
figure prominently in opinion polls; bipartisanship ensured the
minimum of debate in the Republican-dominated Congress. From
Truman's political perspective, foreign policy was thereby relegated
well below the need to arrest the spiral of inflation, balance the
budget, manage the reconversion from wartime to peacetime production
and put labour relations on a better footing. On these issues he
20
was politically vulnerable. There is no evidence that Truman's
attempts to control government spending really did weaken the hand
of the United States in its dealings with foreign powers. But from
the point of view of officials in the Departments of State and
Defense the budgetary bind exacerbated the existing problem of the
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United States being unable to fulfill its commitments adequately.
And it is the perception of these officials which is important. It
was their anxieties which Marshall was to encapsulate in a much-
quoted phrase. He told the National Security Council: 'We are
21
playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out'.
The problem, latent since the war, became more pressing when the
United States acknowledged its wider responsibilities as the world's
most powerful nation. This occurred with the promulgation of the
Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947. The President stated his view
clearly: 'I believe it must be the policy of the United States to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
22
minorities or by outside pressures'. However, general though this
formulation was, it was promulgated with specific references to aid
for Greece and Turkey and to the particular circumstances of the time.
What sounded like a universalist declaration of intent amounted, in
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practice, to short-term assistance to two countries. More generally,
from an American standpoint, this new responsibility had to be under¬
taken only because Western Europe as a whole had been temporarily
weakened by war and could no longer be expected to undertake far
flung defence responsibilities. By agreeing to take on some of
Europe's 'imperial' burdens, the United States made it plain that
Western Europe must concentrate attention on its own security. Put
bluntly, the message seemed to be: the United States is able and
willing to use its power, wealth and influence to help contain Soviet
expansionism on a global scale, but Western Europe would have to be
responsible for its own backyard.
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To put it another way, the Truman Doctrine was redolent of isolationist
sentiment. It was a unilateral promise which, like all other Presi¬
dential doctrines, could be fulfilled or witheld according to circum¬
stances. It did not imply abrogation of the Jeffersonian formula:
'peace, commerce and honest friendship with all; entangling alliances
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with none'. Looked at from Washington, there simply was no need
for a thorough-going and open-ended commitment. With its great
resources, Western Europe ought to be economically and militarily
self-sufficient and would enjoy American aid only so far as such
assistance could contribute to long-term rehabilitation. Furthermore,
Europe would have to demonstrate what it was capable of doing for
itself before the United States considered giving additional help.
As with Greece and Turkey, the American aim was to establish economic
stability and so make future subsidies unnecessary. If made prosperous
once more, Western Europe could afford to defend itself.
In short, the United States was searching for security on the cheap.
This was the motivation behind every agreement with, or offer to,
Western Europe from 1947 and throughout the formation of NATO. The
view was developed and refined in that period; it found numerous
forms of expression on various issues, ranging from economic
reconstruction to the specific issue of Germany's future. But
fundamental to all was the policy-makers' perception of American
military weakness, coupled with Truman's refusal to purchase
security by borrowing money. Although this clearly caused problems
for the Defense Department, James Forrestal was generous. He wrote
to a friend in December 1948 in the following terms:
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I have the greatest sympathy with Truman because
he is determined not to spend more than we take in
taxes. He is a hard-money man if ever I saw one,
and believing as I do that we can't afford to wreck
our economy in the process of trying to fight the
'cold war', there is much to be said for his thesis
of holding down spending to the absolute minimum
of necessity.^5
Marshall's own views on this are not known, but having a 'hard-money
man' as President did put a high premium on diplomatic skills,
especially where Europe was concerned.
It was Western Europe's economic problems which most exercised the
new Secretary of State after the failure of the Moscow CFM to reconcile
the position of the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Within
days of his President's announcing the new foreign policy doctrine,
he gave, in a radio address on 28 April 1947, his interpretation
of Europe's malaise. His reading of the situation did not differ
radically from that of his President - both recognised the primacy
of economic recovery - but his grasp of the complex character of the
problems was in marked contrast to Truman's simpler analysis.
Instead of assuming that the dollar in combination with an ideological
•*>
crusade would solve most difficulties, he echoed American disappoint¬
ment that the process of European recovery had been much slower than
had been anticipated, partly because of what he called 'disintegrating
forces' which were then well established. In a vivid phrase, he
observed of Europe: 'The patient is sinking while the doctors
20
deliberate'.- What was needed, he suggested a few weeks later,
27
was a 'cure rather than a mere palliative'.
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It took some time for the Truman Administration to decide on the
medicine's precise ingredients. There was no argument about the fact
that considerable sums of money would be involved. The problem was
to know how best to prepare 'the patient' for treatment. For American
policy-makers that meant creating the conditions in Western Europe
which would ensure a progressive diminution in the level of financial
assistance to their friends across the Atlantic. The eventual out¬
come was the Marshall Plan, the subject of long (and often heated)
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historical controversy.
However, nowhere in the historiography of the cold war is it sufficiently
stressed that the Marshall Plan - more properly, the European Recovery
Programme - was intended to last only four years. By 1952, Western
Europe was expected to have become self-supporting. This time limit
was imposed quite deliberately to induce the Europeans to act decisively
in what the United States felt to be their own interests. The suppo¬
sition was that if they thought that American aid was always going to
be available as a crutch, the Europeans would defer the hard domestic
decisions which had to be made. Half way through the Marshall aid
programme, its American administrator, Paul Hoffman, told a Senate
committee that 'what we are supposed to accomplish by June 1952 is
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to get Europe on her feet and off our backs'.
That had always been the aim. That was also the American intention
throughout the events which led up to the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty. The Marshall Plan established ground rules for
both the United States and those countries whose relative poverty
left them with no option but to seek help from the United States,
»
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which had emerged from the recent conflict richer than ever . It
defined what was expected of all parties. It set a precedent, the
direct effect of which - for Americans - was as unlooked for as it
was unexpected: a military alliance to which Americans were committed
for a minimum of 20 years. The Atlantic Pact was intended by the
Truman Administration to be the continuation of the Marshall Plan
by other means.
Amid the welter of scholarly debate about the Marshall Plan, there
is an element that stands out clearly from the historical record.
The State Department was convinced that any recovery programme would
founder unless the Europeans committed themselves to self-help. On
that condition all else depended, just as it was fundamental to the
North Atlantic Treaty two years later. At no stage during the period
of the Marshall Plan, nor during NATO's early years, were the Americans
persuaded that Western Europe really understood the importance with
which they invested in this consideration. As on many occasions
previously, U.S. foreign policy comprised a mixture of ideals (or
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ideology) and clear-eyed self-interest. The problem for the
Secretary of State was to fashion this into a diplomatic instrument
but without damaging the national sensitivities of the West Europeans.
The answer, for him, seemed to lie in relinquishing the initiative in
transatlantic relations to the countries of Western Europe.
Whether this was Marshall's own idea may never oe finally determined.
What is evident is the extent to which his senior officials discussed
the idea before Marshall made his speech at Harvard. His newly-
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created Policy Planning Staff (PPS) argued the case strongly in its
first analysis of long-range policy options. On 23 May 1947, it
suggested that the United States
...must insist, for the sake of clarity, for the
sake of soundness of concept, and the sake of the
self-respect of the European peoples, that the
initiative be taken in Europe and that the main
burden be borne by the governments of that area.
With the best will in the world, the American
people cannot really help those who are not willing
to help themselves.32
Exactly the same sentiments were to be expressed by American officials
throughout the formation of NATO. It was because the Marshall plan -
contrary to expectations - had not elicited a satisfactory response by
the Europeans that this economic programme was supplemented by the
political commitments embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty.
Borrowing ideas and phrases from the PPS report, Marshall outlined
his tentative thoughts about economic assistance at Harvard University's
Commencement ceremony on 5 June 1947. He said
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for
this Government to draw up unilaterally, a program
designed to place Europe on its feet economically.
This is the business of the Europeans. The
initiative, I think, must come from Europe.33
The American role was to be restricted to 'friendly aid' in the
drafting process and 'of later support of such a program so far as
it may be practical for us to do so'.^4 This important qualification
- 'so far as it may be practical for us to do so' - reflected two
things. First, U.S. officials had made a clear distinction between
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'a program for the economic revitalisation of Europe on the one hand,
and a program of American support for such revitalisation on the
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other'. In short, the extent of the United States' involvement
was not automatic. Secondly, the qualification reflected the fact
that no 'plan' existed at the time Marshall made his historic Harvard
commencement address. Even by the end of July 1947, George Kennan
36
complained to the Secretary of State: 'We have no plan'. Another
senior official commented - almost two months after the speech - that
the so-called 'Marshall Plan' was rather like a flying s^cer: nobody
knew what it looked like, how big it was, in what direction it was
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moving, or whether it really existed at all.
In terms of NATO's origins, this hesitancy following the publicity
which greeted Marshall's proposals is extremely important. For it
shows that the United States was satisfied that it could only react
to steps taken by the Europeans themselves. However, a few voices
protested against this line of reasoning within the State Department.
For example, William L. Clayton, Under-Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, stressed that because Europe was 'steadily deteriorating',
and because this threatened 'the glorious heritage of a free America',
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the United States 'must run this show'. Other officials took a
somewhat less apocalyptic view but reached the same conclusion. T hey
argued that experience demonstrated the European nations' lack of
ability to agree among themselves on economic matters and that this
meant that the U.S. Government should take the initiative and full
responsibility for the way American money was to be spent. However,
there is no evidence to suggest that these views were accepted by
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either Marshall himself or his Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.
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To have taken them on board would have risked the Marshall Plan being
characterised as an American diktat. As was made clear to Congress
subsequently, this was to be avoided at all costs.
These disagreements within the State Department were less important
than the emerging consensus. On two issues there was widespread
agreement. The first was that the United States could not define
the area - the number of European countries - that would receive
American aid. lb do this would, again, have the appearance of the
United States imposing its will on others and meddling in the internal
affairs of Europe. For this reason, no attempt was made to exclude
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the Soviet bloc countries on ideological or other grounds. The
second was what Dean Acheson later called the 'ancient dream' of
the United States: the establishment of a politically united and
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economically integrated Europe. By 1947 this was believed, by all
influential opinion in the State Department, to be the vital pre¬
requisite to getting Europe off America's back; united, Western Europe
could be left to stand on its own feet. The idea was later incorporated
in American thinking about the Atlantic Pact. But it was the experience
of formulating the Marshall Plan which established the notion, or goal,
of a federal Western Europe in the actual planning - not just thinking -
of the Truman Administration and its successors.
Historians have rightly demonstrated that the Administrations preferred
approach to European unity differed substantially from that of Congress.
The ultimate objective was not in question; the issue was how to arrange
American foreign policy so as to enable that objective to be achieved in
the shortest space of time. The legislative branch was very much
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inclined to put as much pressure as feasible on the Europeans. That
had been the point behind the concurrent resolution of March 1947
calling for the formation of a 'United States of Europe'. The young
Senator from Arkansas, J. William Fulbright was one of the sponsors
of the resolution. He was to remain a key advocate on Capitol Hill
of strong Congressional measures to help bring about European uni¬
fication. (He was to try and maintain pressure on the Allies well
into the 1950's). He told the Senate on 13 June 1947, that the
approach of the State Department to transatlantic relations was
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'unduly timid and cautious'.
Answering a point made by Marshall two weeks earlier at the Harvard
Commencement, Senator Fulbright said:
I do not argue that we should as a matter of policy
always leave the initiative to other nations.
Furthermore, in requesting assistance from us, as
virtually every country in Western Europe has done,
I think they have taken the initiative. Accordingly
it does not seem to me that we shall be dictating to
those countries... in any offensive sense if we
suggest that under their present chaotic political
and economic order they are not good risks either to ^
repay loans or even to survive as democratic states.
He went on to explain that he could not understand the suggestion
that American management for some kind of political and economic
unity in Europe represented 'dictation or undue influence'. On the
contrary, he thought steps such as these were Europe's part of the
bargain. To Fulbright and many others this seemed a small and
44
reasonable price to pay for life-giving aid and succour.
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Marshall in all probability agreed whole-heartedly but was nervous
of exacting such a heavy price. He preferred a down payment in the
form of a firm, political commitment from the Europeans now and the
establishment of supranational institutions to follow in due course
as moves towards unity progressed. The Secretary of State wanted to
use Marshall aid as an incentive to federation; Congress wanted to
use it as a reward to Western Europe for having subsumed nationalism
beneath the workings of a new federal union. It was this difference
which underlay Marshall's anxiety about the resolution. On 4 June 1947 -
the day before he was due to speak at Harvard — he wrote a letter to
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg which suggests the general trend of State
Department thinking on the issue. He began: 11 assume that the
resolution has been deliberately phrased in general terms for the
purpose of endorsing a principle without raising numerous important
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questions of detail1. This was distinctly flattering to the
drafters of the resolution. They seem to have been mainly interested
in a short, punchy sentence which would sum up their views; they
had not really thought carefully beyond that. Marshall was mindful
not to be critical: 'Of course the United States wants a Europe which
is better than [the one] it replaces'. Americans, he implied, could
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do that by inspiring by example rather than trying to force the pace.
Nevertheless there was also a definite toughness in Marshall's letter.
He was keen to blunt the thrust of the resolution.
I am deeply sympathetic toward the general objective
of the resolution which is, as I understand it, to
encourage the peoples of Europe to cooperate together
47
more closely for their common good and, in particular,
to encourage them to cooperate together to promote
the economic recovery of Europe as a whole.
This was a clear attempt to water down the ambitions of Congress.
His characterisation of the purpose of the resolution was altogether
too mild to have been accidental. In particular the House of
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Representatives wanted something much more robust. For that reason
Marshall felt it necessary to make the point he would repeat at Harvard:
'The future organization of Europe must be determined by the peoples
of Europe1. He therefore asked for a preamble to the resolution
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embodying these ideas. (It was refused for the reasons given by
Senator Fulbright.)
Marshall's speech at Harvard, in consequence, referred only obliquely
to the unity of Europe. However, on 14 July, he had another
opportunity to* air some thoughts on the subject. In a speech, drafted
by George F. Kennan, he reminded his audience of the doubts and
difficulties which preceded the final union of the original thirteen
colonies. He also spoke of the extent to which the various states
had nonetheless succeeded in preserving their individual personalities
and institutions. This last point was obviously directed at any
European government anxious to safeguard its sovereign powers at all
costs. No American, he added, 'can help but feel a keen sympathy
for the efforts now being made in Europe to overcome national
• ' . 50barriers'.
Some months later, on 18 November, Marshall returned to this theme.
In a widely reported speech made on the eve of his departure for
48
Europe he said: 'The logic of history would appear to dictate the
necessity of this European community drawing closer together, not
only for its own survival, but for the stability, prosperity and peace
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of the entire world'. That was as far as he was prepared to go in
public. Even so, in retrospect and from a European perspective, ideas
such as these seem to have, at best, lacked specificity or, at worst,
been wretchedly naive. But the fact that a Secretary of State took
them seriously - at the very moment when the United States was coming
to terms with power politics - is the strongest of reasons for not
dismissing these statements as casual remarks. Certainly the Europeans
took them seriously enough. The British Ambassador in Washington,
Lord Inverchapel, reported to the Foreign Office in London that the
Marshall Plan had given considerable impetus to the notion of European
unity and had 'fostered too facile a hope that the Western countries
are at last advancing towards the early realisation of a United States
of Europe'. Inverchapel also noted that 'under the careful prompting
of officials and responsible commentators', the Marshall Plan had
become 'the catalyst for welding the various European problems into
a single issue and throwing it... into perspective as part of a global
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conflict between Soviet and Western democratic values'.
Inverchapel also mentioned that 'the United States public, Congress
and some officials' entertained over-high expectations about the
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rapid rate of progress towards unity which could be achieved. Of
this there is no doubt. In 1947 Harry Truman was reported to have
endorsed the concept of European integration; he, like everyone else,
omitted to explain how a European union could be created or, indeed,
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of what it would consist. Neither the President nor anyone else
49
mentioned that the American experience of federalism included a civil
war. An opinion poll in late 1947 suggested that Truman's uncritical
enthusiasm was widely shared: of those questioned, three quarters were
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in favour of the creation of a United States of Europe. However,
it was apparent to members of the British Embassy staff in Washington,
that there was a harder edge to this vague idealism. Just as the issue
of European unity had been fused with the Marshall Plan - in popular
and official sentiment alike - so the question of large-scale economic
aid to Europeans became inseparable from the general matter of American
security. Inverchapel wrote:
As the American people have willed the end at which
they are aiming without being wholly ready to accept
the means by which it must be achieved, it has been
necessary to enlist their support by relying on a
greater extent than might have been the case on the
Soviet bogey. In consequence, the self-interest of
the United States in connexion with E.R.P. is nearly
always counted in military terms.
As an assessment of the methods used to 'sell' both the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Plan to the American public this supports a number
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of subsequent historical interpretations. However, the corollary
has not been sufficiently noted. As Inverchapel pointed out: 'Much
use is now being made of the argument that, for every dollar denied
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to European rehabilitation, two will have to be spent for defence'.
There was more to this argument than a ploy by Administration officials
to persuade a cost-conscious Congress to pass the ERP bill. Almost
certainly it was an exaggeration. But the important point is that a
primarily economic measure for Europe's rehabilitation was seen to
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have direct and beneficial consequences in terms of the military
budget. Thus, from a purely parochial view - shared by both Congress
and the Bureau of the Budget - the rhetoric of anti-communism which
attended the public campaign for Marshall aid had a very down-to-earth
function: the saving of American tax payers' money. With a Presidential
election to be held in 1948, during which time Republicans would con¬
trol both the Senate and the House of Representatives, this was a
crucial consideration for Truman's team. But it was also the same
calculation which was to play an important part, after the election
had been won, in framing the American decision to sign the North
Atlantic Treaty. As Secretary of State, Marshall was the man charged
with the responsibility of reconciling the conflicting pressures
and steering the course of foreign policy through the minefield of
alternatives. From the moment he took charge at the State Department,
Marshall seems to have sensed that much would depend upon American
reticence, and upon the readiness of the U.S. Government to resist
the temptation to hector the West Europeans into a particular course
of action. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
We must not move in such a way as to awaken
hostilities because of national pride, or that
we do not offer something in a measure suitable
for propaganda distortion by those who are ^
trying to sabotage the European Recovery Program.
Clearly, Marshall's worries were as much about a resurgence of
destructive European nationalism as about communist expansionism.
Either could involve the United States in renewed conflict; both had
to be avoided. It was therefore inappropriate - counterproductive
even - to rely on the stiffening of national sinews in Western Europe
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as the sine qua non for halting the spread of communism. Inflamed
nationalism, the consequences of which still seered the collective
memory, could not be allowed another recrudescence.
It was this perception - more than any other - which led the United
States a little over a year later to adhere to a multinational
security pact of the North Atlantic area. The precise moment when
this perception began to dictate the day-to-day relations with the
Europeans is unclear. (Much still awaits the release of Marshall's
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own papers.) Yet it is evident from a variety of sources that by
the end of 1947 Marshall had become convinced that the approach most
likely to succeed was one which was both undemonstrative and cautious.
It scarcely .needs saying that neither Marshall nor any other senior
American politician or official was aware that the adoption of this
approach would lead directly to the formation of NATO or anything
resembling it.
A small but illustrative example of Marshall's chosen path was his
response to a journalist's proposal put to him in November 1947.
Dorothy Thompson, a columnist with The Washington Star, had decided
to finance and edit a magazine, to be sold in Western Europe under
the title The Idea of Europe. The plan was to combat communist
propaganda by offering the vision of European unity aS a potent and
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exciting alternative. Dorothy Thompson naturally wanted the
support of the State Department for her project. Marshall sent the
proposal to senior officials in order to get their advice. Their
reports were for the most part sympathetic, except in one detail.
All expressed doubts about the wisdom of a publication written and
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produced in America for sale in Europe. The fear was that the
arrival of the magazine on the newstands would evoke a strong reaction
from nationalists and socialists and might even prove to be embarrassing
for some governments. Marshall's reply to Thompson was therefore
simple: he had no objection to the periodical provided it was only
sold in the United States. As this would do little or nothing to
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foster European unity, the magazine was never published.
In sum, Marshall's approaches towards Europe were to be oblique.
Perhaps he thought this the only way to navigate between the Scylla
of European nationalism and the Charybdis of Soviet-inspired communism.
Certainly by December Marshall had sailed uncomfortably close to both.
In that month, Congress debated the Interim Aid Programme, itself a
stop-gap measure, before the European Recovery Programme was finalised
and put into effect. But, also in that month, France - a major
recipient of U.S. dollar aid - was severely disrupted by what an*
unnamed high French official told the American Ambassador, Jefferson
Caffery, were communist-led strikes inspired by and led from Moscow.
According to the French, part of the motivation for this disruption
was some o¥ the political and economic strings which Congress was
insisting be attached to aid for the French.®^ These conditions
did not, in themselves, amount to a great deal but they did symbolise
an American desire to interfere in French affairs. John Foster Dulles,
who was in France at the time, was greeted as the embodiment of United
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States imperialism. On Marshall's arrival, a cable was sent back
to the State Department, with instructions to pass the message to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to get the offending conditions
removed from the appropriations bill then being discussed. In
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deference to French sensitivities Marshall sought to ensure that he
gave no credence to 'the Soviet thesis' that the United States was
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'attempting to reduce France to the status of an American colony.'
In his efforts to avoid giving offence Marshall was well served by
American foreign service missions. They provided a steady stream of
reports to Washington throughout 1947 on the burgeoning European unity
00
movement. Although it is unclear the extent to which Marshall
himself read incoming cables, the volume of 'traffic' on this subject
was substantial. Moreover, American legations in Western Europe
evidently shared the goals of the movement. For example, Dwight P.
Griswold, Chief of the American Mission on Aid to Greece and Admin¬
istrator of the financial assistance granted under the terms of the
Truman Doctrine, was especially interested and sympathetic. He urged
Marshall that the United States could
...with propriety encourage the union of the free
states of Europe as the most effective means of
strengthening... economic and political liberties,
and of diminishing the traditional dangers in ^
economic and national rivalries on the continent.
He gave details, too, of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa
group and the meetings of the European Parliamentary Congress in
Switzerland. The legation in Berne gave further information, together
with analyses of Winston Churchill's United Europe organisation, Paul




The major embassies were also active. From London, Marshall was sent
personal copies of 'Design for Europe', a substantial pamphlet issued
jointly by Liberal and Conservative members of parliament. From Paris
came details of General Charles de Gaulle's proposed 'Constitution of
a Federation of Western Europe' issued in September 1947 to boost his
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popularity whilst still languishing out of power. In a covering
comment the U.S. Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, noted that de Gaulle's
purpose was twofold. First, the plan for federation was designed so
that coal from the Ruhr would be sent to the iron and steel mills of
Lorraine, thus overcoming a problem which had dogged French industry
for decades. Secondly, the plan was intended to convince the U.S.
Government that, once Marshall Aid had ceased, a 'Western Federation'
would 'ensure that the sacrifices you are asking of the American
taxpayers for Germany will not continue for ever'. Caffery was
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sceptical but not dismissive of either idea.
During 1947 one development within the European unity movement did
cause alarm in the Department of State. On 4 December 1947, a cable
arrived in Washington from Robert D.lvtirphy Political Advisor to General
Lucius D. Clay in the office of Military Government for Germany.
Intelligence reports about German groups advocating European union
suggested that many were infiltrated by communists. Furthermore, of
those which were definitely free of communist 'contamination', some
were arguing that only in a united Europe could the new Germany regain
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its national pride and 'again work on equal terms with the world'.
This was worrying because it might mean that European unity would
become the slogan of German nationalism or the flag of international
socialism. These fears proved to be unfounded. Nevertheless, Murphy's
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cable was taken by some as indicating that there was a gap between
American aspirations and European political realities, and that the
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gap had to be closed. This recognition led to a reappraisal of
an idea first broached in the Department of State in 1946. According
to one senior official, Walt W. Rostow, then head of the Division of
German and Austrian Affairs, suggested that 'the unity of Europe could
best be approached crabwise through technical cooperation in economic
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matters rather than bluntly in diplomatic negotiations'. In other
words, the United States hoped that institutional arrangements arising
from joint economic cooperation would create the conditions in which
European unity could flourish.
This idea was embodied in the mechanics of the European Recovery
Programme as it developed. In June 1947, the Department's Committee
on Foreign Aid completed an analysis of the problem. The memorandum
set out the course to be followed.
To avoid injuring sensitive feelings of nationalism,
our appeal should be couched in terms of a European
recovery plan which stresses the raising of European
production and consumption through the economic and
'functional' unification of Europe. In our propaganda
and our diplomacy it will be necessary to stress (even
exaggerate) the immediate economic benefits which will
flow from the joint making of national economic
policies and decisions.^4
This summarised the views expressed during the course of a 'Heads
of Offices' meeting two weeks previously. One of the participants,
Charles E. Bohlen, the new Counselor, noted that the only way of
balancing the dangers of appearing to force 'the American way' on
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the Europeans and the dangers of failure if the major responsibility-
were left to them, was to formalise economic cooperation leading
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perhaps to an 'economic federation' in three or four years.
To advocate 'technical' or 'functional' cooperation as the basis for
European unity had a number of benefits. First, the idea was already
being discussed in continental Europe; it was at the heart of the
Monnet Plan. It therefore could not be represented as forcing 'the
American way' on Europe. Secondly, it appeared a useful formula for
the initiative which George Marshall wanted to be taken by the
Europeans. They would have to get together and decide how much aid
was needed and how it was to be apportioned among them. Thirdly,
institutional arrangements drawn up to administer the economic,
assistance had the potential to become a genuine supranational
authority with powers wider than its original remit. All three were
adapted later in the process leading to the North Atlantic Treaty,
when it became clear that the Marshall Plan was not having the
desired effect on Europe's national structures. There were dis¬
advantages as well however. It was one thing to require, as part
of the European initiative, the establishment of international
economic machinery. It was something else to hope that the momentum
generated by the new machinery would be either at the right speed or
in the desired direction. If coercion was removed - for whatever
reason - the chances were that developments would be other than intended.
As Murphy remarked of American plans for Germany in 1948: 'The trouble
with our good blueprints often seems to be that they get bloody noses
7S
bumping into Russians, French, and at times, British stone walls'.
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Significantly, it was the Soviet Union which first sensed what
Marshall could not admit in public. His 'plan' envisaged the
Europeans - including the countries of Eastern Europe - collectively
conducting thorough studies of their overall requirements. They were
to determine what each could contribute and only then approach the
United States to make up the difference between demand and supply.
The large Russian delegation at the three nations' conference,
gathered in Paris during June to consider the appropriate European
response to the United States' offer of economic assistance, did not
examine the issue for very long. The Soviet Foreign Minister,
Vyacheslav N. Molotov, reported to the conference his government's
conclusions: that an enquiry into the collective resources of the
European nations would violate the sovereignty of the individual
countries concerned. Molotov put a counter proposal: that each
national aid request should be submitted to the United States'
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Government separately. When this was refused, he and his team
returned to Moscow. The historian, William C. Cromwell, has shown
that neither France and Britain nor the United States deliberately
excluded the Soviet Union. However, it is clear that the French
and British believed it preferable that the Russians did not "par¬
ticipate and adjusted their diplomatic efforts accordingly. Bevin
in particular welcomed the breakdown of the conference as something
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he had 'anticipated and even wished for'.
Yet Britain, too, had problems with the Americans over the design
of the aid programme. Bevin said in June that if the United States
took the line that 'the UK was the same as any other European country'
then the British Empire would have to sacrifice what 'little bit of
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dignity' it had left. Bevin, quite naturally, wanted special
treatment for Britain. This the Truman Administration was not
prepared to concede. Special assistance for one country would have
violated Marshall's insistence that what he regarded as the unsat¬
isfactory 'piecemeal' approach to aid be abandoned in favour of one
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which treated all recipients on the same basis. Marshall's staff
were worried that singling out, say, the British would have jeopar¬
dised the chances of ERP legislation being passed by Congress without
being seriously mauled. Indeed, the spectre of Congressional dis¬
approval - conjuring up memories of 1919 - came to be regarded as a
most effective sanction by Washington in the attempt to coax the
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Europeans to make a real unified effort. It was one which was
used routinely from 1947 onwards in virtually all subsequent dealings
with the West Europeans. As a tactic it had considerable promise.
But its effectiveness depended upon a certain consistency in the
State Department's own handling of foreign representatives and
governments overseas. This was lacking in the latter half of 1947.
Relations with the British were a prime case. They had been told
that there could be no special assistance for the United Kingdom, the
corollary being that Britain was not treated differently from any
other European power. William L. Clayton, during a visit to London
during July, made it clear that what the Americans had in mind was a
kind of West European-wide customs union (based on the model already
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established by Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg). The British
reacted strongly: even in principle they were unprepared to agree
to the establishment of such a customs union. The reason they gave
was that the proposal would 'involve delay which in present
circumstances would be disastrous'. Moreover, the Americans were
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reminded that Britain was 'not merely a European country but an
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international trader' as well.
Reactions such as this persuaded the State Department to ease the
pressure. Robert A. Lovett, Dean Acheson's replacement as Under-
Secretary of State, cabled Clayton: 'We are all in agreement with
you on the point that a customs union is a desirable long-run
objective but...the attempt to work it out now would bog Europe
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down in details and distract from the main effort'. This did not
mean that the Europeans were to have it all their own way; pressure
was to be applied indirectly. In August, Clayton received further
instructions from Lovett by wired message :
The main emphasis should be laid on unwillingness
of U.S. public and U.S. Congress to aid Europe
as a whole unless European countries take effective
and cooperative steps to help themselves. Most
effective sanction lies, in our judgement, in
likelihood of U.S. refusal to support European
plan unless there is a real unified effort on
their part.°5
This formula allowed.the Truman Administration to avoid studiously
any action that might be interpreted as attempting to influence the
development of the Marshall Plan programme. The United States could
not afford to appear to be dictating terms.
The unexpected result of this change in tactics was that it left
the United States with very little room for manoeuvre. Kennan
remarked in February 1948 that, once the European Recovery Programme
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was passed by Congress, 'the matter will be out of our hands'. In
reality, matters had already begun to slip away from American control
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six months before. If the United States followed a 'hands off'
policy, then progress would be dependent on decisions taken by the
Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), under the chair¬
manship of the British diplomat, Sir Oliver Franks. Whereas the
Americans saw the CEEC as a regulatory body, the organ of eventual
economic integration, the British saw it as a consultative forum
with no supranational trappings. Furthermore, because of the tactics
adopted by Marshall and Lovett, the State Department could not
realistically use the sanction of Congressional refusal. In practice,
this meant that the recipients of aid were not without influence over
the donors.
This became clear during a visit to Washington by a CEEC delegation,
under the leadership of Franks, in October 1947. The Europeans'
case was put to Lovett in writing:
The programme is a recovery programme and not a
programme of temporary relief. It has therefore
to be a large programme and the amounts available
under it have to be sufficient to do the job.
Otherwise it loses its character, becomes a
further instalment of relief, and at its end the
people of Western Europe will be on your doorstep
again. By then, however, both they and you will
be further disillusioned and, more importantly,
Europe may have gone so far down the hill that
full recovery may have become impossible and the
social and political fabric of Western Europe
so altered and strained as to force other
solutions than those for which we are both
07
working and hoping.
In effect, Franks was saying that if the United States were to retain
Western Europe as a region of allies, the Americans would have to pay
handsomely. This was more than a diplomatically-worded statement
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about European political realities; it also spoke directly to America's
self-image as a global power. Without an economically viable Western
European state system, the United States* status in the world would
be much reduced. Not for the last time in the development of the
Atlantic community since 1945, the Europeans were suggesting that it
was in the interests of the United States to look after the interests
of the West Europeans. On that basis the recipients of aid could
bargain with the providers on virtually equal terms. The problem
for the Americans - not yet appreciated by the Truman Administration -
was that this arrangement militated against their long-term hopes for
a 'new' Europe to emerge from the ashes of World War II.
* * *
The search for NATO's American roots begins in 1947. During that
year the three main factors which were to govern United States'
attitudes towards an Atlantic security arrangement became evident.
These were, first, the fear of Soviet expansionist tendencies
worldwide, especially in Europe; secondly, the desire for a gradual
disengagement from Europe; and thirdly, the policy of holding down
U.S. military spending in the interests of the domestic economy.
Linking all three was the American notion of West European unity.
It would be unwise to attempt co weigh the relative importance of
these. In 1947 each headed the list at one time or another. It was
rather the interaction between them which was to be significant in
the months ahead. For example, concern over Soviet military strength
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caused worries about the wisdom of postwar demobilisaticn and the
descending level of American military expenditure. These in turn
suggested that the Europeans should be primarily responsible for
their own security once Marshall aid had put them on their feet
again, thereby facilitating an eventual American withdrawal. And
that would free Washington's hand to deal with the Soviet challenge
outside Europe, where the decolonisation process might offer Moscow
some considerable temptations.
The State Department, in sum, was not single-mindedly preoccupied
with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower rival. The
instincts and perception of the policy-makers in 1947 did not conform
to Alexis de Tocqueville's famous observation about America and
Russia: that 'each of them seems to be marked out by the will of
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Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe'. The nature of
the Soviet 'threat' was the subject of debate, and U.S. policy
towards Western Europe was based on the proposition that unity and
strength - and therefore the ability to compete with the United
States - were preferrable to continued division and weakness.
Nevertheless, in terms of NATO's origins it is significant that
during 1947 there was no departmental unanimity of opinion about the
American relationship with Western Europe. There were two distinct
sets of views; one was radical, the other more moderate. The
radicals - led by William Clayton with support in Congress and
from John Foster Dulles - advocated exerting maximum pressure oi. the
European democracies to unite. The moderates - led by Dean Acheson
and, later, Robert A. Lovett - argued that this approach was bound
to be counterproductive because it would drive the Europeans even
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deeper into national parochialism. Acheson and Lovett 'won' the
argument because their views were closest to those of Marshall.
These divisions of opinion were not only crucial in the subsequent
formulation of American security policy towards the Atlantic community.
They were also symptomatic of a deeper problem underlying all others.
This was the painful adjustment to the realisation of world leader¬
ship and the extent to which American policy-makers lacked the con¬
fidence to wield the power bequeathed to them by World War II. British
Embassy staff in Washington watched that process of adjustment with
understanding and an awareness of what was at stake. Lord Inverchapel
reported to London:
Whilst an attitude of complacent superiority
towards the outside world is still much in
evidence, it is now widely appreciated amongst
those elements of the community which mould
public opinion that it behoves America to
assume the responsibilities attendant on her
position as the leading world power.®®
In London, a British official added the comment that the new-found
sense of power was very much to the American taste. He thought the
90
United States had learnt a lesson about survival 'beyond forgetting'.
This should not be taken to mean that the United States now perceived
that its interests were identical to those of Western Europe. As
events in 1948 were to demonstrate, Americans were not ready to
inspire and lead the movement towards a formal consolidation of the
de facto transatlantic alliance which had existed since 1945. Until
the middle of 1948, few in Washington thought that the acceptance of
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global responsibilities was synonymous with American membership of
a treaty-based Atlantic alliance.
What helped to change minds in the Truman Administration stemmed in
large part from American thinking which developed in 1947 about the
Marshall Plan. Fundamental to the European Recovery Programme was
the assumption that economic prosperity translated automatically
into political stability. For Americans, political stability in
the Old World meant a measure of real integration and unity. Policy¬
makers, acting on this presumption, believed implicitly that the
requirements for West European union were ultimately the same as
for economic recovery. During early-1948, it became clear that the
connection was neither automatic nor self-evident, as a result of
the Europeans' agitation about the Soviet military threat. This led
Marshall and Lovett,in effect, to transfer from economic considerations
to security matters the same process of reasoning they had used about
economic recovery. If the West Europeans could be made to feel 'safe',
economic prosperity, followed by political stability and eventual
unity, would be assured. Then it would be only a matter of time
before the United States could reduce its commitments: by then the
West Europeans would be able to stand on their oWn. Without that
optimistic perception it is doubtful whether the United States would
have signed the North Atlantic Treaty at all.
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CHAPTER 2
AN ASYMMETRY OF FEAR : WEST EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
JANUARY - MARCH 1948
With the formulation of the Marshall Plan, the initiative in trans¬
atlantic relations passed temporarily from Washington to the capitals
of Western Europe. The most immediate and tangible result of this
was the establishment of the postwar Atlantic Alliance and, subsequently,
the formation of NATO. Marshall's generalisations on 5 June 1947 were
transformed by the British and French into a definite programme for
American loans, grants and other economic assistance abroad. The
radical U.S. journalist I.F. Stone commented at the time: 'A quick¬
witted girl moved with alacrity to say "pes" when all the young man
did was to express some general views on marriage'."'" An American
suggestion had been converted into a morally binding promise to
Western Europe by the West Europeans themselves.
The process which produced the North Atlantic Treaty was different
in two important respects. First, the original suggestion was of
West European origin. Secondly, the Americans played a much more
active role in determining the final shape of the treaty than they
had over the Marshall Plan. At the beginning the U.S. Government's
contribution to the emergence of a formally constituted Atlantic
community was a relatively passive one; later it was to become much
more directly interventionist. The principal reasons for the earlier
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reluctance to get involved in a multilateral security arrangement are
clear from the previous chapter: the mismatch between U.S. foreign
policy and available military power, the fear of turning Soviet
rhetoric about American imperialism into self-fulfilling prophesy
by putting too much strain on West European nations' sovereignty,
domestic budgetary constraints, and a pervasive sense of uncertainty -
in official circles - about the future role of the United States in
world affairs. But there was a further reason which became increas¬
ingly important from the end of 1947. This was the conflict within
the State Department between a number of Marshall's main advisers on
the European question. The effect of this difference of view was to
make American diplomacy less assertive than it might have been.
It was also this division of opinion that provided the West Europeans
with some opportunity to influence the direction of American foreign
policy. This was not to become clear until the formal treaty negotiations
began in mid-1948. But because it is an aspect of American diplomacy
which has gone largely unremarked in the otherwise voluminous writings
on the cold war, it is necessary to consider the appearance of these
internal arguments about policy with some care. They appeared immed¬
iately the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, proposed the
'consolidation of Western Europe' in what was to become the Western
Union (composed of Britain and France plus Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands).
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Bevin's proposal was first broached to the Americans on 15 December
1947. During a private dinner between the British Foreign Secretary
and his American counterpart at the former's London flat, Bevin
reportedly said:
The survival of the West will depend upon the
establishment of some form of union, formal
or informal in character, in Western Europe,
backed by the United States and the Dominions -
such a mobilisation of moral and material
force as will inspire confidence and energy
O
within and respect elsewhere.
On the 17th or 18th December 1947, Bevin came to the conclusion that
what he had in prospect was 'a sort of spiritual federation of the
west'. He acknowledged the American and French preference for formal
constitutions but advocated 'the British conception of unwritten and
3
informal understandings'. At the meeting of the Council for
European Economic Cooperation in Paris during June 1947, Bevin and
Georges Bidault, the French foreign minister, had discussed the
notion of a West European military alliance which included some
American participation. Bevin's proposal of 15 December 1947 seems
the first time the matter was put before the Truman Administration
in any form.^
Marshall's initial reaction was symptomatic of the United States'
diplomacy throughout the next two years. It had four elements. First,
tl ere was the recognition that future cooperation with the Soviet
Union on the postwar shape of Europe was going to be very difficult,
if not impossible. Significantly, Bevin's proposal coincided with
the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meeting in
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London. It was Marshall who moved that the CFM be adjourned
5
indefinitely. Secondly, there was anxiety that no commitments were
seen to be - or actually - entered into. The U.S. Secretary of State
personally asked that the British government be reminded that during
the conversations with Bevin, Marshall 'was not definitely approving
0
at that time any particular course of action'. Thirdly, there was
an inclination to take the British into Washington's confidence more
than the French: Bidault, was given only an expurgated record of the
7
talks. This was partly because of the Anglo-American supposition
that the French government was vulnerable to Soviet spying activities;
it was also partly the result of that habit of cooperation, coordination
and information exchange embodied in the phrase 'the special relation-
Q
ship'. Finally, there was a recognition of the potential worth of
Bevin's proposals but this was coupled with doubts about the real
objectives being sought by the Europeans. Marshall believed that what
Q
was needed was a clearer understanding all round.
Marshall's own uncertainties were revealed in his actions. On the
one hand, he appeared to endorse the whole idea; he even authorised
the American military delegate at the United Nations, Matthew B.
Ridgway, to explore the practical implications with the British and
French delegations.On the other hand, he was unwilling to go
beyond generalisations about support for the effort to alleviate the
sufferings and hardships of the Europeans. In an obvious effort to
force a more positive assurance of U.S. backing than Marshall seemed
personally able to give, Ernest Bevin sent a cable to Washington on
13 January 1948 in which he laid out his idea formally. The House
of Commons was due to debate foreign affairs the following week and
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the British foreign secretary was anxious to be able to assure his
cabinet colleagues that his proposal for a West European 'union' had
the fullest American approval
However, from a Washington perspective, Bevin's Memorandum was full
of ambiguities. Nor did the accompanying note -to George C. Marshall
from the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, do anything to clarify
matters. The title of the Memorandum referred to 'Mr. Bevin's views on
the formation of a Western Union'. It was not clear whether the
British Government was thinking about Western Europe or about 'the
West' as a whole. Bevin wrote:
I believe... that we should seek to form with the
backing of the Americans and the Dominions a
Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia,
the Low Countries, France, Italy, Greece and
possibly Portugal.
This was necessary, he suggested, because it would otherwise be hard
to stem what he called 'the further encroachment of the Soviet tide'.
'Essential though it is, progress in the economic field will not in
itself suffice to call a halt to the Russian threat'. But Inverchapel
supplemented this with the idea that Bevin's 'system' was actually a
way to link Western Europe with the Middle East and, through Anglo-
French cooperation, provide the basis for'the development of Africa'.
Moreover, while the British appeared to have warmed to the notion of
European integration, Bevin suggested that close consultation, rather
than a formal alliance, would bring this about. But Inverchapel
mentioned that Bevin was considering the Treaty of Dunkirk between
France and the United Kingdom as the model upon which to formalise
12
the West European system.
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Despite this lack of clarity the Memorandum did elicit from Marshall
a more definite response than had been given in December to Bevin's
verbal proposal. Marshall called for policy papers to be prepared
promptly in order that his reply could be sent without delay. The
redoubtable George F. Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff,
noted the ambiguities: 'the combination of Bevin's memorandum and
Inverchapel's letter leaves some doubt as to what the British really
13
have in mind'. Nevertheless, Kennan was in no doubt about the
American response. He advised Marshall:
The project of a union among the western European
nations under combined French-British auspices,
is one which we should welcome just as warmly
as Mr. Bevin welcomed your Harvard speech. Only
such a union holds out any hope of restoring the
balance of power in Europe without permitting
Germany to become again the dominant power.14
The Director of the Office of European Affairs, John Hickerson, called
15
Bevin's objective 'magnificent'. Thus fortified, Marshall sent a
message to Lord Inverchapel that 'Mr. Bevin may be assured of our
1 0
wholehearted sympathy in this undertaking'. On 22 January 1948,
the British foreign secretary made a "major Parliamentary speech in
which was announced moves he had initiated to secure a Five-Power
agreement - Britain, France and the Benelux countries - to form the
17
'nucleus' of postwar Western Europe. The result was the Treaty
of Brussels, signed on 17 March 1948.
What Marshall did not communicate to the British Government was any
indication of the role which the United States envisaged for itself
in the new arrangement. This was more than diplomatic caution. The
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policy papers by Kennan and Hickerson contained conflicting advice
on this. There was a departmental consensus that Bevin's proposal
deserved the warmest welcome and merited the closest consideration.
There was also agreement that the notion of using the Dunkirk Treaty
as the basis of the new design for Western Europe was inadequate.
That treaty was a bilateral mutual assistance pact against the
possible resurgence of German military power. There was no mention
in the text of the possibility that the real threat lay further to
the east. (This had been specifically and personally excluded by
Bevin because of the hostility which it was likely to evoke in Moscow
18
and elsewhere in the communist fraternity.) But this modest level
of agreement could not bridge the wide divergence of views on other
aspects of Bevin's ideas.
Two key issues in particular dominated the departmental debate. They
were precisely the ones which were to colour the formulation of the
American position during the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty.
The first concerned the military emphasis in Bevin's proposal. George
F. Kennan deplored this. 'Military union should not be the starting
point', he wrote. 'It should flow from the political, economic and
spiritual union - not vice versa'. Looking some way ahead, he argued
that the German role in a future European union would, eventually,
be crucial. A mutual assistance pact exclusively based on defence
against German aggression had thus little to recommend it. 'If there
is to be "union", it must have some reality in economic and technical
and administrative arrangements; and there must be some real federal
authority'. He was not unmindful of the military requirement however.
Kennan said that if the Europeans developed Bevin's concept, 'there
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will be no real question as to our long-term relationship to it,
19
even with respect to the military guarantee 1.
But John Hickerson had few such reservations. He saw little need
to de-emphasise the military element. He told Marshall that he
shared the views of the Belgian Prime Minister, Henri Spaak, who had
just been advised of what Bevin was thinking. Hickerson clearly felt
that it was necessary to contemplate building sound defences 'against
Russia'. Furthermore, he noted that 'any defence arrangements which
did not include the United States was without practical value'. The
answer, he thought, was a European defence pact. He noted that for
such a pact to be really effective, the United States would have no
choice but to adhere. 'I believe that this country could and should
adhere to such a treaty if it were clearly linked up with the UN'.
In opposition to Kennan, therefore, Hickerson advocated American
participation in a reciprocal defence arrangement with some or all
20
states in Western Europe.
The other key issue in dispute arose from the military question:
the extent to which the United States should participate directly.
Kennan was in no doubt about this. He told Marshall that 'as in
the case of the recovery program, the initiative must come from
Europe, and the project must be worked out over there'. Nowhere
did he suggest the desirability of a formal linkage between American
security matters and those of Western Europe. He crit-jised what he
regarded as the tendency in London to see the whole plan as 'just
another "framework" of military alliances', this time encompassing
the United States. But while Kennan stressed the regional focus of
Bevin 's ideas, Hickerson took a more global view. To him, there
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seemed little choice but to use the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro as the
basis of Bevin's plan for a 'Western Union'. That meant a multi¬
lateral arrangement, rather than a series of bilateral ones, and
American involvement as primus inter pares. By definition this
meant that Hickerson pressed Marshall to take the lead, or at the very
least not lag too far behind the British. Kennan had no objection to
the Rio Treaty being recreated in Western Europe: he simply did not
21
think the United States should be a signatory.
It would be misleading to suggest that a quarrel broke out as a
sudden response to Bevin's request for American backing for what
became known as the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO). It
had been brewing for some time, centering on the question of European
integration and the American role therein. One of Hickerson's
assistants,Theodore C. Achilles - then in charge of the West European
desk - later recalled the intellectual background to the disagreement.
22
His recollections are worth quoting at length.
Ever since the end of World War II the State
Department has been divided between those who
felt that the United States should push the
Europeans into unity from the outside and those
who believed that the United States should pull
the Europeans into unity with us....Everyone
was agreed on the importance of tying West
Germany securely into Western Europe. So far
so good but from there on, opinion divided.
The 'Europe first' school felt that all that
was necessary was American encouragement for
European unity and material assistance. Those
of us who favored Atlantic unity felt that much
more was needed, i.e., an increasing measure of
unity involving the United States and Canada
as well as the nations of Western Europe. We
maintained that the other school was short¬
sighted because, although we fully agreed with
their arguments as to the importance of European
economic unity including Germany, we felt that
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the 'Europe first' school had another unspoken
and less credible motive, namely, that to urge
greater unity in Europe enabled any American
official or Member of Congress to sound
progressive and alive to the needs of an
increasingly independent world but without
intimating willingness to assume any U.S.
commitments other than material aid.
Given that Achilles was a participant in the argument, his views must
be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, there is no doubting
the gulf between the two sides, nor the whiff of acrimony which
characterised the exchanges.
Achilles' push/pull analysis looks somewhat oversimple when compared
to the documentary record. In particular, even during the period
1947-1949 ^n either side there was nothing like the consistency
of view which he suggests. Moreover, although he and his colleagues
could claim to have prevailed in the end - a multilateral treaty
involving the United States was signed - the case which 'won' lacked
the intellectual coherence of Kennan's arguments. Kennan was saying
in effect that once a real West European union had been achieved -
with 'some real federal authority' - the conditions would have been
created in which an explicit American commitment was less necessary,
not more so. Hickerson was also in favour of fostering European
unity but it was never clear the extent to which that development
was to be a precursor to some form of 'Atlantic' union (possibly
following the ideas of Clarence Streit, a writer and journalist whose
23
views on this were well-publicised). One thing was clear however,
For Hickerson, American involvement was the price the United States
would have to pay in order to see moves towards European unity succeed.
75
He thus thought in terms of a multilateral treaty. For Kennan,
American involvement - such as he envisaged any at all - would be
Europe's reward for having created a federal European union with the
provision for the future membership of Germany. He therefore thought
in terms of unilateral gestures of support, following the lines of
the Truman Doctrine which he had helped inspire.
George C. Marshall and his Under-Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett,
never succeeded in resolving this conflict. The shifts in the
direction of American foreign policy throughout the period which
covered the gestation of the Atlantic Alliance are largely due to
that. First one view of the United States' national interest appeared
to be uppermost, then the other. As the negotiations which led to the
formation of NATO were to show, the West Europeans recognised this
and put in considerable efforts to support Hickerson's case against
Kennan's. For the moment, however, Marshall responded formally to
Bevin's ideas by being non-committal. He promised that the United
States would 'do all it properly can in assisting the European nations
in bringing a project along this line to fruition'. Although he
described it as of 'fundamental importance to the future of western
civilisation' he left open all of the questions about American political
24
and military policy which the Europeans were seeking to clarify.
A major reason why the United States seemed to lack a sense of direction
on this matter was that Marshall was sti1! not sure how to proceed.
This became clear three days after he had received Bevin's request
for a formal response. During the course of hearings on the European
Recovery Programme, the Secretary of State agreed with Senator Henry
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Cabot Lodge, Jr., a strong supporter of the 'United States of Europe'
concept, that Americans had to use their 'good offices' to promote
the integration of Europe. But he alluded to personal doubts about
the best way to ensure that the momentum towards unity could be
maintained when the Europeans were 'more or less on their feet'.
On ERP , he said:
The critical time will come [when] the program
is not complete but the "heat" is off....Just
how we keep the process going towards
further cooperation, towards a further consol¬
idation of European states and a general
integration, mutual integration in relation
to the economic work, is a matter of very
great importance.
He likened the problem with that currently exercising his colleagues
in the Department of Defense: the unification of high command. All
Services concur in the principle, he said, 'but they won't agree
with you when you get down to business, unless it is their man that
is to command '. ^
In an effort to clarify Marshall's response to Bevin, Lord Inverchapel
called on Hickerson at the State Department on 21 January 1948. His
stated purpose was 'to obtain some working level views in the
Department' on the proposals looking to the formation of a union of
the free countries of Western Europe. His unstated aim emerged
during discussions: to discover the role the Americans were considering
26
for themselves. Ironically, just as Inverchapel's covering note
to his Secretary of State's original memorandum of 13 January 1948,
had confused the State Department somewhat, the British Ambassador
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was in his turn treated to two sets of views. In so far as Inverchapel
wanted 'working level views' he got both. What this did not enable
him to do was satisfy London about the possibility of an American
commitment to Western Europe, if any.
The 'Memorandum of Conversation' which chronicled the meeting between
Inverchapel and Hickerson encapsulates the problem faced by West
European governments. Hickerson opened the meeting by reading out
an aide-memoire written by George F. Kennan. Its contents were
therefore long on sympathy and encouragement but short on positive
proposals. The military aspects were down-played;" the positive
virtues of the 'political, economic and spiritual union' were stressed
approvingly. But then Hickerson went on to make some comments of his
own. Picking up a reference in the aide-memoire about the Rio Treaty,
he pointed out why it was preferable to the Dunkirk Treaty: it provided
'automatic action against aggression whether from within or without'.
This would make the proposed European defence system more attractive
to other West European states who were hoped to join later. Moreover,
this would not be considered provocative by the Soviet Union.
(Hickerson even suggested - no doubt with tongue in cheek - that on
this basis, the Soviet Union could itself join without detracting
27
from the protection afforded by the treaty.)
In effect, Hickerson verbally over-rode Kennan's cautionary written
remarks about military alliances by stressing ways of maximising the
effectiveness of one based in Western Europe. Inverchapel's response
is apparently not preserved in the records of the British Foreign
28
Office but he could legitimately claim to some confusion. ■ And
this could only have been multiplied as Hickerson continued to air
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his views. Inverchapel was told that 'there were arguments on both
sides with respect to direct participation by the United States 1.
Putting his own ideas forward, Hickerson explained that he envisaged
...the creation of a third force which was not
merely the extension of US influence but a real
European organization strong enough to say "no"
both to the Soviet Union and to the United
States.
Apparently unaware of the implied contradiction, he went on to say
that, if the Europeans decided that no regional defence organisation
could be completed without the United States, Washington would be
'sympathetically disposed and would at least give it very careful
consideration'. Inverchapel evidently seized on this point and
reminded Hickerson that Marshall himself 'did not preclude direct
participation' by the Americans; the Secretary of State had given
the impression tljyat the only thing in doubt was the question of
29
timing. Again, there seems to be no record of Inverchapel's
reaction. Whether he noticed that a European 'third force' and the
possibility of United States' involvement were potentially and probably
mutually exclusive must be a matter of speculation.
The significance of these ambiguities and differing points of view
is considerable. They show that, contrary to the impression generated
by numerous historians, the transition from the Marshall Plan as the
focus of policy makers' attention to an explicit or implicit security
commitment to Western Europe was far from easy. In terms of the
American origins of NATO this is of the greatest importance. The
speed with which the United States could be persuaded to adjust its
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various views to a new set of pressures would be crucial.
From the beginning of 1948, the pace of progress towards an Atlantic
Pact was largely determined by that process of adjustment. This
would have come as some surprise to a number of contemporary observers.
One of them, Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent of the New
York Times, wrote in December 1947 of what he regarded as the militar¬
isation of American foreign policy. He pointed to a number of
indications: the continuing presence of American troops abroad: the
composition of the newly-created Joint Chiefs of Staff, the members
of which all had achieved high service rank during the war; the
enthusiasm for universal military training by civilians, in and out
of Congress; the fact that the National Security Council was made up
of Department of Defense staff on secondment; and the appointment of
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the first military man as Secretary of State. Had these factors
actually meant that American foreign policy was becoming militarised,
then it would be reasonable to expect rather less drawn, out agonising
about the commitment to Western Europe than in fact took place.
What lay at the heart of the American uncertainty and hesitation in
the opening months of 1948 was agreement about the ends sought but
not about the means to achieve them. No-one in the White House or
the Departments of State and Defense seriously questioned the received
wisdom that it was vital to American national interests - diplomatic,
strategic and economic - to ensure the continued freedom of Western
Europe. But there was no consensus about the policy application of
that objective. This need not have mattered had foreign policy been
under firm control. However, this it was not. From the moment the
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London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers broke up with no
agreement on the future of Germany, American relations with Europe
tended to drift. When Dean Acheson was appointed Marshall's successor
a year later, he was able to instil a sense of purpose once again.
But by then the United States was already committed to the territorial
defence of Western Europe.
In the meantime, Marshall and his deputy Lovett retreated into those
objectives and concerns which had dominated their long term thinking
in 1947: the unification of Western Europe. That this had become
their principal preoccupation is revealed in a series of conversation
and letters between Lovett and Inverchapel between 27 January and
7 February 1948. These exchanges began with the British Ambassador
calling once again on the State Department. It is clear from Lovett's
memorandum of the conversation that the British visitor had two aims:
first, to determine whether the Americans had developed their thinking
about Bevin's proposals beyond the schizoid position demonstrated by
Hickerson; and, secondly, to convey to the State Department an
important new initiative from London. The response he received
marked the beginning of what was to be the United States' attitude
and policy preference throughout the negotiations leading to the
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty one year later.
The initial meeting was followed by Inverchapel putting his points
in writing. Lovett responded by sending the British Ambassador the
reflections of George C. Marshall on the new British position. To
avoid repetition, the three documents covering these exchanges can
be considered together.
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Inverchapel told Robert A. Lovett that the extent of the American
support for the political and defence organisation of Western Europe
was crucial. In order to facilitate the maximum possible, the British
now suggested that the United States and Britain, urgently and
secretly ,
...consider the possibilities of concluding some
defence agreement between them to provide against
aggression which could reinforce the defence
project Mr. Bevin had proposed for Western
Europe.
The British Ambassador elaborated in writing on this important
suggestion. He advised Lovett that without the assurance of American
support the bilateral treaties being discussed could not be fully
effective or relied upon in a crisis: 'The plain truth is that
Western Europe cannot yet stand on its own feet'. Britain could
do only so much on its own. Inverchapel noted that the British
government was 'not yet in a position to give firm assurances as
to the role Britain intends to play in operations on the continent
of Europe'. He therefore asked, on Bevin's instructions, that the
United States be ready to 'enter with Great Britain into a general
commitment to go to war with an aggressor'. Lest there be any
misunderstanding, Inverchapel pressed the point by conjuring painful
memories of the recent past. Only with such a development, he wrote,
was it probable 'that the potential victims might feel sufficiently
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reassured to refuse to embark on a fatal policy of appeasement'.
It was a powerful appeal, skilfully made. Lovett immediately
observed 'that this proposal raised questions of the highest importance'.
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An Anglo-American military alliance in peacetime would require detailed
attention by Marshall, the National Security Council and the President;
consultation would also have to be opened with Congressional leaders.
Those constitutional and political requirements disposed of the
British hope for urgency and secrecy and allowed Lovett to concentrate
on the issue of European unity. He told the British representative
that the extent of American participation would be largely determined
by tangible evidence of further progress towards European union. He
went further by pointing out that congressional consideration of the
ERP - 'intended to bring about economic improvement and thereby
lessen dangers and possibilities of war' - might be affected adversely
if attention now switched 'toward military arrangements intended for
the same purpose'. Inverchapel was advised:
Moreover, the Secretary of State feels that European
initiative is of first importance. Therefore, the
injection of the United States into the matter,
before agreement under the proposal of Mr. Bevin
has been developed abroad, would be unwise and
would certainly be subjected to serious challenge
here as premature on our part.
Marshall wanted to see 'a firm determination to effect an arrangement
under which the various European countries are prepared to act in
concert to defend themselves'. Only then would the United States
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consider what support it would offer 'a Western European Union'.
In this connection, it is notable that the Am*- ,'icans virtually ignored
an important part of the British submission. Inverchapel had initially
told Lovett, and subsequently followed it up in writing, that London
envisaged an Anglo-American military understanding about Western
Europe which could be achieved in a similar fashion to one reached
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between the two countries over the Middle East in 1947. The formula
was simple. 'Secret, frank and informal discussions' between rep¬
resentatives of the Foreign Office and State Department, together
with representatives of both the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
hammered out an agreement in Washington. The outcome was particularly
satisfactory to the British Government. It confirmed that despite
the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine the United States regarded
Britain as an equal in that part of the world. The Prime Minister,
Clement R. Attlee, had informed his Commonwealth counterparts that
the Americans were to help build British strength in the region so
that base facilities in Egypt, Iraq and Cyrenaica could be kept open.
The United States also showed enthusiasm that Britain retain its
strategically important footholds in Gibralta, Cyprus, Aden and the
Sudan. In December 1947, Attlee summed up the agreements: the Americans
and British both recognised that one could not implement its own
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policies without the assistance of the other.
None of this was mentioned or referred to by Lovett in his written
reply to Inverchapel. And this despite the emphasis placed upon it
by the Britis_h. Inverchapel reminded Lovett that the Middle East
talks had included the suggestion that there might be cooperation
on 'other segments of what we then described as the crescent of
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middle lands encircling the Soviet Union'. By avoiding the issue
the Americans made their position plain. Containment of what was
perceived as Soviet expansionist tendencies had the highest priority
in a global setting but when it came to Europe, that 'segment of
middle lands' encircling Russia would have to provide for its own
salvation and with the minimum of American military assistance. As
subsequent events were to demonstrate, the problem with this position
84
was deciding in what role the United Kingdom should be cast. When
Marshall and the State Department thought in a European context
Britain was to be part of an integrated West European unit. But
when attention focused on a wider geographical area, the Americans
were anxious to have the help of the British in regions where the
United States had comparatively little experiences and no military
bases or intelligence-gathering infrastructure. For the American
policy planners the problem was made worse by the fact that the
United Kingdom could not discharge both roles. That had been the
lesson of Britain's self-enforced withdrawal from Greece and Turkey
in 1947. Some compromise would have to be reached. From both a
British and American point of view that compromise was embodied in
the North Atlantic Treaty.
However, in the early part of 1948, London and Washington were at
cross purposes. Bevin argued on 6 February that 'a vicious circle'
was developing. Inverchapel wrote to Lovett:
Without assurance of security, which can only be
given with some degree of American participation,
the British Government are unlikely to be successful
in making the Western Union a going concern. But
it appears from your letter that, until this is done,
the United States Government for their part, does
not feel able to discuss participation.
Bevin suggested that his proposals had not enjoyed the same measure
of American support which he had expected in view of his personal
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championing of the Marshall Plan. Lovett's response was firm and
immediate. He replied that the United States had no clear idea of
exactly what Bevin's Western Union proposal amounted to. All that
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Washington knew were broad ideas, sketched by Bevin in the most general
terms. The Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in London, Waldemar
J. Gallman, had already cabled Washington saying that 'at the
technical level' the Foreign Office was stressing the vagueness of
current plans. He added that he could discern no change in British
thinking or policy as a result of Bevin's House of Commons speech
of 22 January 1948. Lovett summed up the attitude of himself and
Marshall when he personally told Inverchapel: 'You are in effect
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asking us to pour concrete before we see the blueprints'.
Bevin could no longer complain, as he had done on 6 February 1948,
that he did not know 'how the mind of the United States Government'
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was moving. He now knew that his general wish for American par¬
ticipation in Western Europe's defence, and his particular desire
to reach an Anglo-American military pact, stood no chance of being
realised unless and until the Western Union idea was seen to blossom.
He knew also that Marshall and Lovett were thinking of the Western
Union as 'a Union of the Free States of Western Europe' and not just
of a joint military arrangement. That the British had got the message
is clear from Lord Gladwyn's memoirs. Gladwyn Jebb (as he then was)
had travelled to Washington early in February to sound out how far
the Americans would support a European defence pact. He recalled
that he was ordered to return to London without speaking with State
Department personnel. As he put it carefully, 'the moment was
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deemed unpropitious ' .
The State Department did not leave matters there. Although divided
on the issue of American participation, it was united in the conviction
that influence had to be used to ensure that the Western Union
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corresponded more closely to 'a Union of the Free States of Western
Europe' than to what Kennan had dismissed earlier as 'just another
"framework" of military alliances'. To that end it made certain
that Belgium, at the very least, would reject the Dunkirk Treaty
formula, and possibly the Netherlands as well, in favour of what
it regarded as a better one.
On 10 January 1948, Marshall sent a copy of the Inter-American Treaty
of reciprocal resistance (the Rio Treaty) to Henri Spaak the Belgian
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Prime Minister. No suggestion was made - or implied - that the
United States Government meant to sign a similar treaty with Western
Europe. In answer to the Belgian's request for some reassurance
concerning American help with the military security of Western Europe,
Marshall replied: 'Constitutional, traditional and material factors
make reassurance on security difficult'. Alan G. Kirk, the U.S.
Ambassador at Brussels, reported that Spaak was studying the Rio
Treaty closely, especially the casus foederis contained in Article III.
By 3 February Ambassador Kirk could report that the Department's
suggestion 'seems to have borne fruit': Spaak had drawn up a draft
treaty for discussion with his Benelux colleagues together with the
British and French based largely on the Rio formula of multilateral
. . 40
reciprocity.
Not surprisingly, Bevin complained to the United States Government
through Inverchapel that he now faced the rejection by Belgium (c.id
the Netherlands) of the Dunkirk model, coupled with the suggestion
that a wider regional instrument should be drawn up. This develop¬
ment was exactly in line with State Department thinking. Article 51
of the U.N. Charter referred to 'individual or collective self-defence'
87
but Article 52 concerned 'regional arrangements'. Spaak also stressed
that for 'defence in depth' U.S. support was necessary but did not
allow that to interfere with the European defence pact idea. It was
this ordering of priorities which recommended Spaak to the Americans.
It was he who had been instrumental in creating the Benelux Union,
Western Europe's first multinational grouping. Theodore Achilles
suggested to Marshall and Lovett on 20 January that the Benelux
represented not only an inspiration to the European unity movements
but also 'an example of day-to-day political cooperation more effective
than anything achieved between Britain and the United States in
wartime'
Achilles' superiors may have doubted the validity of that hyperbole
but they were strongly predisposed to favour Spaak's suggestions
rather than those of Bevin on this issue. For Marshall, this may
have been partly due to his enduring suspicion of the British Foreign
Secretary's personal integrity. This dated from the collapse of the
CFM meeting in London during December 1947. Marshall felt that he
had been deliberately let down when, at that meeting, Bevin failed
to move the adjournment as he had promised to do. (Marshall's successor,
Dean Acheson, developed much better personal relations with Bevin and
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felt that Marshall had rushed to judgement.) However, at most,
this personal feeling was a minor contributory factor in governing
Marshall's preferences. Spaak's ideas appealed because they spoke
directly to American predelictions about a united Western Europe and
did not imply the kind of direct participation by the United States
that all in the State Department - except the Hickerson faction -
instinctively shied away from. British opinions were thus not the
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only ones to count. Bevin was not the only source of West European
pressure for a transatlantic military arrangement of some kind. The
French were if anything, even more interested and never lost the
opportunity of saying rfo. At the end of January 1948, Georges Bidault,
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, made his country's position
very clear to Major General Harold R. Bull, the personal representative
of General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In the report
of the meeting sent to Marshall, Bidault 'expressed the conviction that
American strategic planning should be based on a defence of Western
Europe'. Unless the West Europeans believed that the United States
planned to defend them from the beginning of a conflict, the Americans
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were told, the idea of Western Union would come to nothing.
This was essentially the same message already conveyed by Bevin, but
in the French case Washington was more prepared to listen. Unlike
the United Kingdom, France showed every .sign of falling apart pol¬
itically. Robert Schuman's coalition looked increasingly fragile
after the devaluation of the French franc in January with the
socialists, led by Leon Blum, threatening to bring the government
down. The American Ambassador at Paris, Jefferson Caffery, called
%
on Blum to try to persuade him to behave in what the Americans regarded
as a more responsible way. Marshall personally approved this initia¬
tive, cabling that he was 'increasingly concerned by atmosphere of
crisis prevailing in Paris'. He told Caffery: 'Do not hesitate to
approach Blum again or other leaders whose parties show signs of
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bolting whenever you feel this action would be salutary'. It was
against this political background that the State Department, and
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Marshall in particular, showed sympathy towards those demands which
France made upon the United States.
Unlike Bevin, Bidault did not ask for an under-the-table bilateral
defence pact with the Americans. He consistently spoke of 'the
countries of Western Europe' as an entity in themselves and in which
he clearly included Britain. Where he did argue for special treatment
from the United States was over the question of military equipment.
Marshall was told:
...the French would like to know what we [the
United States ] can do to furnish them with such
heavy equipment on a basis of equipping perhaps
somewhere between twenty and forty divisions.
If we could help, in addition to equipping
themselves they might also eventually be able
to assist other Western European countries.
In terms of the origin of NATO, this request is significant. It
marks the beginning of what was to become the Military Assistance
Programme, without which there might have been no North Atlantic
Treaty. It was some time before the United States responded pos¬
itively but Bidault had succeeded in putting an item on the diplomatic
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agenda which was to grow in importance as 1948 progressed.
Again, unlike Bevin, Bidault had discovered the weakness in Marshall's
diplomatic position. Ever since the Marshall Plan was first promulgated
the Americans had laid great stress on European self-help. It was a
feature both of the Vandenberg Resolution later in 1948 and the North
Atlantic Treaty the following year. As indicated already, the idea
was to ensure that the American commitment - economic or military -
would be a declining one. But Bidault argued that even if the United
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States refused to be associated with the defence of Western Europe,
America's European allies would be incapable of even minimum defence
because of shortages in military hardware which domestic production
could not make up. He did not advocate that the United States supply
everything the French and their continental neighbours needed. Instead
he suggested that a division of labour should be tried: the French
would concentrate on light arms and equipment while the Americans
would specialise in aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. As with
everything else, Marshall acted cautiously; the points were registered,
the Policy Planning Staff was asked to investigate but for the moment
that was all.4®
Later in the year, however, he surprised some of his colleagues,
notably James V. Forrestall, by showing more regard for the prospect
of giving the French the equipment they needed than for the foreign
policy implications of the American forces' reduced capacity - brought
about through Truman's budgetary stringency - to support stated
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objectives. This was not because Marshall was unmindful of the
relationship between political obj'ectives and military means. Nor
was it because he was careless about America's standing in the world.
It was simply the result of gradually becoming attuned to the con¬
tinental European perspective on strategic questions. Bidault pointed
out in March 1948: 'We are sitting here under the guns and your people
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.are on the other side of the ocean'. As a man who had served with
General Pershing in France during World War I and played a key role
in the liberation of Europe during World War II, Marshall would have
understood the strength of French feeling on this. From late January
1948 onwards, and for the rest of his time as Secretary of State, he
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made special efforts to calm France's fears by trying to find spare
materiel for her armed forces. It was an attitude which helped shape
the American negotiating position during the talks on the North
Atlantic Pact later in 1948.
But Marshall did not agree with everything the French put to him.
Two elements in the French analysis of the world situation he could
share only partly. The first was on American military priorities and
the second was on the danger posed by Germany.
On the United States' strategic concept, Bidault was sure he knew
what interests were uppermost in Washington. He told senior American
embassy staff in Paris that:
...in the event of war the United States-military
planners are thinking in terms of three main war
theatres: 1) the Far East; 2) the Middle East
(with its vital oil fields); 3) Western Europe.
He did not doubt that the Americans could defeat the Russians in a
conflict in Europe but 'it would unquestionably be a long, bitter
and hideously costly struggle'. He pointed out that the combined
effects of Soviet occupation and American atomic warfare would leave
Europe 'completely devastated and depopulated'. This would mean, he
added, that there would be no West European civilisation to share
with the United States the task of reconstruction once again. After
its victory, the United States 'would have only Asiatics and African




To officials in the State Department Bidault argued from the wrong
premise but nevertheless touched a sensitive nerve. He was wrong to
suggest that the Far East was seen to be more important to the United
States than Western Europe. Until the 'fall' of China and the Korean
War virtually the only advocates of this position were identified with
the U.S. Navy, often the same people who argued the 'Pacific-first'
case during World War II. However, Bidault was correct in thinking
that the Middle East had a higher military priority than Western
Europe. This was a simple matter of scarce resources but was no less
politically embarrassing for that. As the Congress was told in
January, the European Recovery Programme was designed, in part, to
lessen the burdens on the American defence effort. 'Enlightened
cooperative economic endeavor' in Western Europe would go 'a long
way toward reducing the necessity for a larger national armament in
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the future and probably reducing our present armament levels'.
Aid to Europe was thus to the Truman Administration both a substitute
for increased military expenditures and the reason the Middle East
oil fields could be given a higher military priority than the
politically far more important Western Europe. But that was precisely
the kind of calculation which, if publicly confirmed, would cause
paroxysms among the West Europeans. Consequently, Marshall sent no
word to the Embassy in Paris to disabuse Bidault of these ideas.
The French were similarly just off the mark on Germany. They wanted
from the Americans what Georges Clemenceau had tried to get from
Woodrow Wilson: a territorial guarantee against a possible revival of
German aggression. They were thus always nervous at any move which
might lead to Germany gaining more power than they could live with
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comfortably. On 13 February 1948, the French Government sought
American reassurance by reviving an idea first proposed by Marshall's
predecessor, James F. Byrnes, eighteen months before. Byrnes had
then tabled a Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Dimilitarization
of Germany. It had included provisions prohibiting the reconstitution
of German armed forces, paramilitary groups or a general staff. The
5;
manufacture and importation of arms and munitions were also debarred.
For the French this represented the basis of the American guarantee
they wanted: a political and miltiary replacement for the discredited
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'Morganthau Plan' for the economic pastoralisation of Germany.
On the Draft Treaty, the Minister at the French Embassy in Washington,
Armand Berard, was told bluntly that it was 'a dead duck'. But this
was not because Marshall or his staff had any better ideas. Rather
it reflected the growing inclination in the Department of State to
leave things to the Europeans. The French were advised that 'the
whole question of Western European security should be dealt with
primarily by European 'initiative'. The United States did not intend
to table any 'startling new proposals'. But this could only reinforce
French nervousness about the unreliability of the Americans, thus
ensuring that France would continue to put pressure on the United
States. The French did, however, concede an important point. They
admitted that if Britain could be persuaded to take an active part in
continental security arrangements, then this would go some way towards
substituting for an American commitment. Should a German army ever
be re-established the French reasoned, the combined British, French
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and Benelux forces would match or even outnumber it.
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This reaffirmed the State Department's view that Bevin's Western
Union idea had to be steered in the right direction, with a sig¬
nificant leadership role being played by the British. Unfortunately
for Marshall, the British seemed unwilling to lead. Lovett pointedly
noted to Inverchapel that, as Bevin had admitted, the British were
not yet in a position to give firm assurances about Britain's pol-
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itical and military role in continental Europe. Even if Bevin
accepted some version of the Rio formula for the Western Union, it
did not follow that such assurances would then be forthcoming. Most
importantly, the French had shown that the concept of a United Western
Europe was unworkable without full British participation: the French
would not cooperate because of their fear of Germany and that would
make the prospect of an eventual American withdrawal recede into the
distant future.5^
In sum, the net effect of the British and French approaches to
Washington on primarily military matters was contrary to what either
expected or presumably hoped for. They had consolidated the American
belief that the unity of Western Europe would be of considerable
benefit to the United States in the medium- and long-term. In the
short-term, no senior figure in the State Department disagreed with
George Marshall that American forces on the ground in Germany were
the key not only to European security but to world peace. He expressed
his views to Kennan in a telegram on 25 February 1948:
French are secure against Germany as long as
occupation continues, and as long as European
communism threatens our vital interests and
national security we could ill-afford to abandon
our military position in Germany. Logical
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conclusion is that 3 power occupations may be of
unforseeable and indefinite duration, thus
offering protracted security guarantees. Our
support for West European union is further
response to French security requirements.^
He said he agreed with Kennan that the real significance of the
Marshall Plan and the American sponsorship of West European unity
was that they were ensuring the survival of 'those very concepts of a
58
universal world order' to which Americans were attached.
The importance of Marshall's message is considerable. It marks a
significant moment in the evolution of American transatlantic attitudes.
First, it shows that Marshall had decided to take the line of least
resistance between the Kennan and Hickerson 'camps'. He conceded
to the former the need to get Europe self-sufficient again, and thus
in need of less American help. But he also recognised that the
latter's belief that the long-term security interests of the United
States may dictate a more or less permanent military relationship
with Britain and France in Germany. It was this mixture of 'European'
and 'Atlantic' approaches which was, eventually, to be the essence
of the American negotiating position in the North Atlantic Treaty.
Secondly, that mixture had the potential to cause problems in those
negotiations. If the Europeans wanted a U.S. commitment against
either Russia or Germany or both, the Americans could say that the
presence of the U.S. occupation forces already constituted exactly
that. Any further commitment was therefore unnecessary, especially
as the United States possessed the ultimate retaliatory weapon, the
atomic bomb. On the other hand, if the Europeans succeeded in getting
an added military commitment from the United States, because of their
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apocalyptic fears about the future, then that fact alone would reduce
the chances of the Western Union ever becoming what the American
foreign service and military establishment wanted: the focus of West
European defence efforts.
Marshall's position in late February 1948 was thus a recipe for mis¬
understanding within his own Department and between the two halves
of what was to become the Atlantic Alliance. What it emphatically
did not indicate was a weakening of the State Department's ill-defined
belief in the notion of some sort of European federal system.
Recognition of the need to make some permanent provision for troops
in Europe did not imply a growing awareness of a military threat from
the Soviet Union. Marshall made his views on this plain to the
cabinet. 'The danger of war has been greatly exaggerated'. he said.
'The Soviet Government neither wants nor expects war with us in the
foreseeable future'. Kennan was more direct in an assessment cir-
culated to his senior colleagues on 25 January 1948. 'The Russians
will not allow themselves under any circumstances to become embroiled
in war with us as long as we have the atomic bomb and they do not', he
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wrote. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that the
Russians would not manage to produce an atomic device until 1953 and
would take even longer to develop an appropriate fleet of bombers to
carry them. That the Russians produced their first atomic weapon in
1949 demonstrates how little American intelligence gathering had
managed to penetrate the Soviet scientific establishment This was
why the announcement of a Russian exploratory explosion in September
1949 came as such a shock. But in early 1948 few questioned the
00
estimate of the mid-1950s. The result was that Marshall and his
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Department were complacent about the prospect of war in Europe and
could therefore be more enthusiastic about promoting European unity
than they might otherwise have felt able to be.
Three developments in early 1948 help to define still further the
Truman Administration's overall view of Europe. These were, first,
the visit of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi to Washington; secondly,
the Bulgarian-inspired idea of a Balkan federation; and, thirdly,
the communist coup d'etat in Prague. Although not of equal importance
these episodes help to place American hopes about a united Europe in
a wider strategic context than has been possible hitherto.
Coudenhove-Kalergi arrived in Washington in mid-February 1948. He
was the founder and leader of the Pan-Europa movement based in
Switzerland. His purpose, Marshall was advised by the U.S. legation
in Berae, was to coordinate the Marshall Plan with a recently-
launched 'Parliamentary Initiative for a United States of Europe'.
He had visited the United States on a similar mission during the war
when he tried to persuade Franklin D. Roosevelt to include a united
Europe as an Allied war aim. In this the Count was unsuccessful.
With the rhetoric of European union louder than ever since Winston
Churchill's case for unity, Coudenhove-Kalergi no doubt rated the
chances of success much greater in 1948. His Pan-Europa group was
dedicated to the idea of persuading parliamentary assemblies to agree
to federation and force the decision on the various governments. As
an Austrian aristocrat, he probably had more instinctive sympathy
for the principle of supranational cooperation than most. Marshall
was told by the Berne Legation that as the Count embarked for the
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transatlantic sea voyage he announced dramatically: '1948 is the
01
birth year of the United States of Europe'.
Coudenhove-Kalergi had no official status. He was a self-financed
individual who had espoused the European unity idea since the 1920s.
Nevertheless, his visit was taken sufficiently seriously in Washington
for arrangements to be made for a brief meeting with George Marshall.
As Hickerson advised Charles E. Bohlen, the Counselor at the State
Department, 'If he does not see the Secretary for a few minutes
it might indicate that we have less interest in sponsoring a European
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federation than is the case'. The meeting duly took place and
the Austrian recalled in his memoirs that his 'proposals fell every¬
where on fertile ground'. He reported that Truman and Marshall
personally assured him of their support. He took these assurances
seriously, not considering that perhaps they were merely being
diplomatically polite. As a consequence he placed far more importance
on the meetings than they did. It is evident from the State Department
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records that a number of senior officials were not impressed with him.
The obvious discrepancy between Coudenhove-Kalergi's recollection and
the contemporary records can be overstated, however. It led one
historian, Lawrence S. Kaplan, to suggest that European unity was an
issue which did not animate policy-makers in Washington during this
period. There are four reasons for challenging this interpretation.
First, the flood of incoming work and visiting dignitaries at the Depart¬
ment inevitably meant that an individual with no national accredit¬
ation would only be spared a short time. No particular importance
should be given to that as a result. Secondly, the pressure of events
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made the concept of European unity something of an intellectual
retreat, an objective to be striven for but not at the forefront of
day-to-day discussion with every visitor. Thirdly, Marshall's chosen
diplomatic approach was to avoid giving the impression of America
seeming to meddle in the internal affairs of the West Europeans. As
he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to do otherwise would
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be counterproductive. Finally, Coudenhove-Kalergi represented
parliamentarions, who for the most part were in opposition to the party
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in power, and not governments. Marshall had thus a variety of
reasons for being polite and leaving it at that. Kaplan is certainly
correct to suggest that the Austrian was regarded as something of a
crank. So was Clarence K. Streit, the apostle of Atlantic federalism.
But the ideas of both were no more than extensions of the views of
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Kennan and Hickerson respectively.
Marshall noted that Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas 'have always been in
advance of governmental thinking' and that his efforts had aroused
'considerable interest'. He also noted that Pan-Europa were
'unquestionably furthering in Europe a popular psychology favorable
to such steps as may be practical for the close association of the
free nations of Europe'. Hickerson added that Pan-Europa had gained
a new significance following Bevin's Western Union speech. Bohlen
advised Marshall that by receiving the Count the United States would
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be seen to do more than give lip service to the whole idea'.
Nevertheless, Marshall's self-imposed constraints meant that he
could not go as far as Governor Thomas Dewey did during a Lincoln's
Day Dinner, at which he was joint guest of honour with Coudenhove-
Kalergi. Dewey welcomed the Austrian's 'inspiring message urging
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European unity' and suggested that 'the Marshall Plan should become
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a powerful instrument in the formation of a United States of Europe'.
Dewey, the runaway favourite for the Republican presidential nomination
later in 1948, had the freedom to articulate what the Democrats could
only speak about in private. Moreover, he served notice that in the
coming presidential election the unity of Europe would be one issue -
the only one on foreign affairs - where Republicans felt confident
to attack Truman's record. This was subsequently to cause problems in
the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations.
There was another strand in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's proposals
which were of more than passing interest to some in the State Depart¬
ment. This was the question of Eastern Europe. The essence of his
Pan-Europa movement's argument was that a federal Europe should
stretch from Portugal to Poland. John Hickerson said in March 1948:
'The Unite'd States hopes to see the eventual development of a United
States of Western Europe (possibly later of all Europe) and the
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Brussels Pact offers the hard core for such a development. On
this Hickerson found agreement in George Kennan. Believing that any
West European union should be drawn up so as to allow the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe to join, Kennan argued the case
forcibly. 'Any concept which did not offer a place for Eastern
European states', he wrote, 'meant leaving them...no theoretical
alternative other than a continued association with Russia or some
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highly implausible neutralization and isolation'.
Unlikely though these ideas seem with hindsight, there were activities
in January and February 1948 in the Eastern bloc which gave them a
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certain - if transitory-substance. State Department interest in
these dates from June 1947 when the idea of a Balkan Federation began
to be examined. Kennan advised Lovett then that the establishment of
such a federation would be greatly to America's advantage in that it
would challenge the hegemony of the Soviet Union in that region. He
pointed out that this objective was in keeping with overall objectives:
'The US has consistently believed in the free association of states
for the solution of common problems'. He suggested the Rio Treaty
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and Article 52 of the UN Charter as useful precedents.
Thereafter, the State Department monitored developments closely. On
27 November 1947, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria signed a Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The leaders of both
countries, Marshall Tito and Prime Minister Gheorghi Dimitrov,
indicated that this was the forerunner to a federation. On 17 January
1948, Dimitrov went further by announcing that he envisaged a feder¬
ation encompassing Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. The American ambassador in
Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith, advised Marshall that this was communist
heresy and amounted to direct defiance of the Kremlin. Smith advised
Marshall that he doubted whether Stalin 'would ever trust even the
most subservient henchman to organize a Baltic to Algean Federation'
as proposed by Bulgaria. On 28 January 1948, Pravda issued a strongly-
worded editorial rebuke, and Dimitrov publicly and immediately
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recanted.
In itself the Dimitrov initiative was not important but it did have
the effect of confirming the anti-communist element in the idea of a
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united Western Europe. It therefore encouraged Marshall to accept
the division of Europe as a fact. He told the Cabinet that, for
example, Czechoslovakia had achieved 'the outer appearances of
freedom' and 'developed a political movement proceeding in the
opposite direction to that laid down by Moscow. He was certain that
these semblances of freedom would disappear very quickly. His
Cabinet colleagues were advised that the Kremlin considered Czechos¬
lovakia as the point of entry 'of really democratic forces into
Eastern Europe'. For that reason the Russians would oppose a
federation among their East European satrapies even more energetically
than they had communist involvement in the Marshall Plan. The U.S.
Secretary of State was only weeks early in his prediction but he
made it clear that he regarded any Soviet move against the Czechs
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as 'purely defensive'.
Marshall had, in effect, accepted the argument implicit in Winston
Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri almost exactly
two years before. When Churchill drew a line 'from Stettin on the
Baltic to Trieste pn the Adriatic' he acknowledged that countries
which lay to the east, Czechoslovakia among them, were subject to
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'a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow'.
Marshall acted on the presumption that, as Churchill had argued, the
Soviet Union had legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe,
to tamper with which would be profoundly destabilising. Thus before
the coup d'etat in Prague he had developed a set of altitudes which
would lead him to do nothing about events in Czechoslovakia, other
than to complain loudly. He certainly did not think in terms of
military intervention. Naturally there were those who did but they
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had no influence on the higher management of foreign policy. For
example, David Lilienthal of the Atomic Energy Commission told his
friend Dean Acheson that he thought the fate of Czechoslovakia 'would
be like the sinking of the Maine' in 1898. It would arouse the
country to action, 'particularly since our people thought we had
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enough atomic bombs to win a war very cheaply and quickly'.
That was not the mood of the Truman Administration on the eve of the
coup in Prague. It was more concerned about what might happen in
Eastern Europe if plans went ahead for the consolidation of Western
Europe as a political entity. Marshall asked the Chief of the
Division of Eastern European Affairs, Francis B. Stevens, to assess
the significance of the Dimitrov's proposal and the Pravda rebuke in
the light of the Western Union idea. He was advised:
If decisive steps toward significant integration
in Western Europe are taken, this Government
should be prepared for sudden and perhaps
surprising developments in Eastern Europe...'
It is clear therefore, that the Department not only recognised that
something like the Prague coup was imminent but also understood
that the establishment of a West European union as a potential 'third
force' would hasten such a development. Whether or not the Kremlin
was much exercised by the prospect of union in Western Europe can
only be guessed at. But the fact that the State Department considered
the future in these terms underlines once again the centrality of
West European unity in Departmental deliberations.
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What does not seem to have been realised by those proponents of
eventually extending a West European federation eastwards, was that
their ideas were internally inconsistent. George Kennan pointed to
the problems in his autobiography. For example it was difficult to
see how Hickerson could advise Marshall that a West European federa¬
tion would accentuate the east-west divide, and might even 'speed up
the timetable...for the absorption of the satellites' in Eastern Europe,
while at the same time suggesting that such a federation would one
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day include the Soviet satellites. However, that view was
conditioned by hindsight. At the time, Kennan seized upon the idea
of a Balkan Federation, recanted by Dimitrov but not by Tito, as
the means to promote a communist but anti-Stalin and anti-Russian
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revolt in Eastern Europe.
Kennan summed up the views of one half of the U.S. foreign service
establishment about Europe's future in February 1948. In a major
survey of American foreign policy he wrote:
If there is no real European federation and if
Germany is restored as a strong and independent
country, we must expect another attempt at
German domination. If there is no real European
federation and if Germany is not restored as a
strong and independent country, we invite Russian
domination, for an unorganized Western Europe
cannot indefinitely oppose an organized Eastern
Europe. The only reasonably hopeful possibility
is some form of federation in Western and central
Europe.79
This is probably the purest expression of latent neo-isolationist
attitudes in the State Department at the time. He rejected as of
no further use the 'old fashioned concepts of collective security'
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which arose out of 'multilateral defensive alliances between complete
sovereign nations 1. Because Stalin did not threaten a military take¬
over anywhere in Western Europe, Kennan felt sure that the Soviet
leader was ready to offer a straightforward spheres-of-influence
agreement. When this came, Kennan argued,it would be a great test
of American statesmanship.
In the light of developments leading to the formation of NATO, Kennan's
views are of considerable interest. They mark the distance which some
at least in the State Department had to cover if they were to accept
the notion of a multinational transatlantic collective security
arrangement. Kennan was to be proved wrong about Stalin: the offer
of a spheres-of-influence agreement never came. And, in company with
almost everyone else, he failed to realise that only a divided Germany
held the seeds of lasting stability of a kind acceptable to the two
superpowers. However, while his influence was not in the event to
prove decisive, his voice still carried considerable weight. His
arguments were the ones with which both Hickerson's Division and the
West Europeans seeking a transatlantic pact had to deal in the coming
8'
months. He set the standard against which his opponents were measured.
Writing the day before the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia,
Kennan urged Marshall to refuse a spheres-of-influence arrangement
with the Soviet Union. But, he went on, the United States could
demonstrate to Stalin that two developments were in the Russian
interest. The first was the reduction oi communist pressures in
Europe and the Middle East 'to a point where we can withdraw all our
armed forces from the Continent and the Mediterranean'. The second
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was 'to acquiesce thereafter in a prolonged period of stability'.
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Kennan gave eloquent expression to the instincts of many U.S. foreign
policy makers that the United States should shed responsibilities,
not take on new ones. That had been the substance of Hickerson's
point, too, when he said the United States wished to see the emergence
of a new Europe able to say 'no' to both America and Russia. The
problem with this otherwise intellectually coherent point of view
was that it did not take account of political realities. Throughout
January and February, Britain, France and the Benelux countries had
demonstrated time and again that they did not wish to be in a position
to say 'no' to Washington. They wanted - and actually pursued - a
policy of entangling the United States in their security affairs. As
was to become clear later a major reason for this was the fear that
the arguments of Kennan might become the basis for American foreign
policy. To the Europeans, his ideas were the beginnings of a world
condominium between the Soviet Union and the United States. In such
circumstances the views and interests of the once-great Europeans
would be largely ignored. From a European perspective that fear was
as important as that of Soviet hegemony in creating conditions in
which the Atlantic Pact could be fashioned.
Events in Prague on 25 February 1948 provided the opportunity for
the West Europeans to redouble their efforts. Having accepted that
the Soviets were due to make a move of this sort, the reaction of
Marshall was much more mild than that of his European counterparts.
However, he did issue jointly with Bevin and Bidault a declaration
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condemning 'the establishment of a disguised dictatorship'.
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Bevin was evidently determined that matters should not rest there,
with the United States apparently shrugging its shoulders at the
inevitable. On 26 February 1948 he called the American Ambassador,
Lewis Douglas, to the Foreign office. Bevin suggested - on a
personal basis and without cabinet approval - that
...there should be held, very privately, either
in Washington or at some point in Europe,
conversations between the U.K., France, Italy
and the Benelux countries for the purpose of
exploring what steps all may take collectively,
or in groups, to prevent the extension of the
area of dictatorship.
Bevin said he preferred Washington as the site for the talks. Douglas
commented to Marshall, in a cable recording the substance of the
meeting, that he 'could not determine whether Bevin made this suggestion
as a slanting effort to entangle us at the moment in European quasi-
83
military agreements'. Ironically, Douglas said he doubted that
this was the case when it is evident that this was precisely what
Bevin had in mind. The historian John Baylis has rightly called
into question the notion that Bevin 'charted a deliberate, consistent
and foresighted cause from the end of the war to the signing of the
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North Atlantic Pact'. But from late February 1948 onward Bevin's
t
behaviour, as documented by the State Department, shows just tyhat
kind of consistency. Having been refused an Anglo-American military
alliance, he now changed his approach to one which included Western
Europe as a whole in the hope that this would secure Marshall's
backing where previous initiatives had failed. In addition, he
began much more noticeably to bang the anti-communist drum, thereby
hoping to capitalise on the fears aroused by the Czech crisis in the
United States.
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In the event, Marshall did nothing but revert to his 'wait and see'
policy. On 27 February, he instructed the Embassy in Paris to inform
Bidault: 'We should not be asked to consider associating ourselves
with [the Western Union] until the picture of what Western European
Gvts themselves are going to do about it is much clearer'. He added,
'Recovery and security are obviously related'. These observations
were in answer to remarks made by the French Foreign Minister to
Ambassador Caffery. France was reportedly
...more than willing to sign a secret military
alliance with concrete promises on all sides
for immediate action in any eventuality with
Great Britain and the Benelux countries if
the United States is associated in some form
with them.
What France did not want was a high-rounding treaty 'with nothing
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affective behind it'. On 2 March, when the Czech crisis had
eased somewhat, Bidault followed this up when he told the Americans
that more than anything else, he wanted 'a concrete military alliance
(against Soviet attack) with definite promises to do definite things
under certain circumstances'. Two days later, perhaps sensing that
Marshall would be of little help, he asked that a message be conveyed
to President Truman personally. In it he referred to the beneficial
effects of economic aid from the United States and said that the time
had come 'to apply similar efforts in the political and military
fields as well'. He called for an immediate, top secret meeting of
French, British and American officials to discuss the matter further.^
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Despite these pleas, and those like them from the British, Marshall
remained aloof, refusing to commit the United States to the military
security of Western Europe other than in maintaining occupation forces
in Germany. In the context of NATO's origins he was clearly unsuccess¬
ful . But in the context of American hopes about a united Western
Europe, his policy at least appeared to pay off almost immediately.
By refusing to give any form of American guarantee, Marshall ensured
that the West Europeans would take definite steps to turn Bevin's
Western Union idea into reality. On 29 February, representatives
from the Benelux nations met in Brussels: on 4 March they were joined
by the British and French - after Marshall had formally rejected
Bidault's first request. They discussed a draft treaty, prepared by
Henri Spaak of Belgium. It was based, as Marshall and his Department
had hoped, on Articles 51 and 52 and the Rio Treaty. Spaak thanked
the U.S. Charge d'Affairs in Brussels, Hugh Millard, saying that
American influence had 'done the trick' in persuading the British and
French to abandon the Dunkirk Treaty formula. In response, Millard
told Spaak that the Department was well pleased with the direction
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the talks were taking.
However, there were those in the State Department who knew already
that what was to become the Brussels Treaty would be insufficient.
On 8 March 1947, a week before the treaty was signed and published,
Hickerson advised Marshall: 'A general stiffening of morale in free
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Europe is needed, and it can only come from action by this country'.
Hickerson, as he was to do many times in the coming months, was
faithfully reflecting European anxieties. Reasonably or otherwise
those worries were, at bottom, military ones. The Dutch Ambassador
to Washington, Eelco van Kleffens, made the point for all when he
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said frankly that 'the military features of the draft treaty did not
mean a great deal unless backed, in some form or another, by the
89
United States'. Hickerson argued that the Czechs collapsed easily
because they had no assurance of external support against fifth
columnists or outside forces. The Czech model might be followed in
France or Italy if the United States continued to do nothing. He
recognised that 'the state of United States defences severely limits
our immediate military capabilities' . But he urged Marshall that
at the very least the Americans ought to examine seriously 'the
magnitude and nature of the military commitments this Government is
in a position to assume with respect to Europe'. For Hickerson, this
meant active participation in what he called a 'North Atlantic-
Mediterranean regional defence arrangement based on Articles 51 and 52
90
of the United Nations Charter'.
Significantly,, at the very moment these points were being fed to
Marshall, Kennan was absent from the Department on a special assign-
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ment to Tokyo. Up until then Hickerson's views had always been
balanced by those of the Policy Planning Staff. Marshall had incor¬
porated the views of both as a result. For the next few weeks he
was given an unrelieved diet of advice from the Division of European
Affairs advocating a formal transatlantic partnership. At the same
time the Secretary of State was being informed by the Department's
monitors of public opinion and the press and radio that support was
growing in the United States for a more active and committed foreign
policy. This, Marshall was told, followed directly the recent events
in Czechoslovakia. On 11 March, he advised the Embassy in Rome:
'We believe US public opinion now prepared to support strong measures'
Ill
and even hinted that Western Union would get American backing if the
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results of the Brussels talks were seen to be satisfactory.
It is no exaggeration to say that the combined effect of Kennan's
temporary absence and the movement in American public opinion was the
North Atlantic Treaty. Both developments increased the receptiveness
of the State Department to the West European arguments. These
proliferated in the days after the communist takeover in Prague. On
11 March, Inverchapel handed to Marshall an aide-memoire by Bevin in
which was the news that Norway was about to be approached by the
Soviet Union with a demand to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance.
Bevin wrote strongly of the need to prevent 'the collapse of the
whole Scandinavian system and the chance of calling any halt to the
relentless advances of Russia into Western Europe1. He identified
two serious and imminent threats: first, 'the strategic threat involving
the extension of the Russian influence to the Atlantic'; and, secondly,
'the political threat to destroy all efforts to build up a Western
TT • . 93Union'.
Marshall's response was immediate. He wrote to Inverchapel: 'Please
inform Mr. Bevin that in accordance with your aide-memoire of March 11,
1948, we are prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on
the establishment of an Atlantic security system'. The Defense
Secretary, James Forrestal was advised the same day. President
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Truman personally approved Marshall's reply. It must have seemed
that an Atlantic Pact was just around the corner but, as events
unfolded, almost everyone was to be disappointed in the immediate
outcome.
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The promptness of Marshall's response suggests the conclusions to
be drawn from the events - and the varying official reactions to
them - of January and February 1948. Marshall's reply to Bevin did
not constitute an American commitment to anything other than diplomatic
discussion in secret. But it does mark an important moment in the
evolution of U.S. attitudes toward closer political and military ties
with Western Europe.
The most significant feature of those two months for this inter¬
pretation of NATO's origins is that the American belief in the
efficacy of a united Western Europe, which dated from 1947, was now
fused with the European apprehension about Soviet expansionism,
overt or covert, in Europe. The anti-communist strand in the European
integration idea was always present in American thinking but only as
one among many. Now the tw® factors were given equal weight. Bevin's
success in getting Marshall's agreement in principle to help create
an Atlantic security system stems directly from this. Wittingly or
otherwise, he had managed to balance American hopes and fears perfectly.
This he did by pointing out that the Soviet threat posed a direct
challenge to his Western Union proposal. Given the American hopes
which were invested in that proposal - 'the hard core' of a United
States of Western Europe - it is not surprising that Marshall acted
with alacrity on 11 March whereas for the previous three months he
had done practically nothing in that direction.
This was no knee-jerk reaction to the communist threat. Rather it
was a reluctant agreement to participate in transatlantic discussions
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primarily with a view to calming European fears which Marshall felt
were greatly exaggerated. However, having agreed to talk, the most
basic American instinct was to limit the damage which such discussions
might do to the United States' freedom of manoeuvre and already
overstretched military commitments. In contrast, the West Europeans
wanted to restrict that freedom and to try and get changes in America's
military priorities. Thus as the talks were about to begin, there
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was no 'community of interests', acknowledged and acted upon by all.
It was a curious beginning to an alliance whose most salient
characteristic in retrospect is its longevity.
» * *
The argument of this chapter has three elements. The first is that the
West Europeans collectively had considerable influence on the delibera¬
tions of the State Department, following the collapse of the London CFM
and Bevin's Western Union announcement. This, in conjunction with the
West European response to events in Czechoslovakia, impelled Marshall
to make some gesture indicating the United States' continuing concern
for Western Europe. The gesture he chose was a non-committal agreement
c u.
to disisiss the idea of an 'Atlantic security system'.
The second element is the internal debate within the State Department
about where American interests lay over the long-term. While no senior
official dissented from the need to foster unity in Europe, the issue
in dispute was the method of going about this. Those concerned with
the daily management of relations with the Europeans saw no contradiction
between West European integration, or unity, and the formation of a
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specifically-designed, Atlantic security system. Those charged with
the development of a unified and coherent foreign policy - principally
the Policy Planning Staff - wanted the establishment of a Western
Europe that was economically, politically and militarily self-reliant.
The final element in the chapter is Marshall's diplomatic style. He
had determined - certainly by January 1948 - that any attempt to brow¬
beat the West Europeans would be counterproductive. He settled on a
method of executing policy by what amounted to a system of rewards:
the United States would only help those who helped themselves. He
could have decided to offer inducements or incentives; but such a
policy would, in his phrase, have taken the heat off, thus reducing
the chances of the West Europeans overcoming what Americans regarded
as a myopic dependence on the preservation of sovereignty. In the
case of the Prague coup, he waited for the West European reaction.
When that took the form of the Brussels Treaty, he 'rewarded' them
by agreeing to talk about their security in a wider setting. It was
a diplomatic style which acknowledged that the West Europeans had
influence in Washington, but which nonetheless avoided the pitfalls
of following the prescriptions of either Hickerson or Kennan, both
of which involved the foreclosing of options. It was a policy created
by the need to bring internal American inhibitions into balance with
West European constraints on policy.
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CHAPTER 3
DOMESTIC INHIBITIONS AND WEST EUROPEAN PROBLEMS :
CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY
George C. Marshall's acceptance on 12 March 1948 of the idea of 'an
Atlantic security system' marks an undeniably important moment in the
history of NATO's formation. Without it there could be no formally
constituted Atlantic Alliance of the kind which emerged in the 1950s.
However, the significance of Marshall's acceptance - and all that it
might imply for American foreign policy - should not be overstressed.
No policy decision had been taken other than to concede to the West
Europeans that the United States was prepared to talk about holding
talks. No extra commitments were undertaken. To suggest that
something like the North Atlantic Treaty was just around the corner
would be to disregard the gist of the now-available documentary
evidence. It would also be to fall into the post hoc, ergo propter hoc
trap. The question of 'when' an Atlantic Pact could be created was
not yet on the American diplomatic agenda, and certainly not in
Marshall's eyes. For him it was still a question of 'whether' such
a pact was necessary.
Although Marshall had spent January and February telling West Europeans
generally, and Ernest Bevin in particular, that the United States was
unclear about what was being asked of it, he could not have failed to
grasp the essence of the Europeans' demands. His message of 12 March
1948 implicitly acknowledged their substance. But, even with President
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Truman's limited backing, Marshall knew that his room for man^ouvre
was largely determined by both Congressional opinion and U.S. public
opinion. The Senate debate on the Marshall Plan opened in the first
week of March. Few doubted that the Senators would approve and that
Congressmen would vote the money but there was concern that the
decision should not be seen as a grudging one. Had the votes been
close then the Europeans would not have been given that injection of
confidence that virtually everyone said was necessary. The State
Department had already used the fear of a Congressional rejection of
ERP as a weapon with which to blunt European requests for military
assistance in addition to economic aid. But that same fear was also
a constraint on the makers of U.S. foreign policy: their professional
perceptions of what might be necessary or desirable were not the
sole or decisive determinants of what the United States could or
should do in the international arena.
The aim of this chapter is to add to the points made in the previous one
and so establish the full range of pressures on U.S.foreign policy¬
makers during March and April 1948. As there were both internal
inhibitions and external constraints, the argument has two parts.
The first concerns the domestic setting: trends in public opinion
as monitored by the.State Department and the way in which Congress
impinged on Departmental thinking and vice versa. The second concerns
the way in which developments in France, Britain, Italy and Germany
made it increasingly difficult for Marshall and Lovett to leave
unexamined the policy which they had decided upon during January and
February.
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Marshall had good reason to assert on 11 March 1948 that U.S.public
opinion was prepared 'to support strong measures' vis-a-vis the West
Europeans. On the same day, the Division of Public Studies produced
a review of popular opinion on current European developments. The
author of the report concluded: 'The feeling has grown that US
economic assistance, exemplified in the Marshall Plan, is not enough
to contain expanding Communism and that further political and military
measures are essential'.^"
The report was prepared, like all others which succeeded it until the
mid-1950s, under the supervision of S. Shepard Jones, Director of the
Division of Public Studies within the Office of Public Affairs at the
State Department. It was his responsibility to monitor shifts of
popular attitudes and the essential elements of arguments deployed
for or against a particular policy by newspapermen and radio journal¬
ists. Beginning in March he inaugurated a series of studies of
reaction to events in Western (as well as Eastern) Europe which went
beyond the previous rather rudimentary and less detailed analyses
which had characterised the output of his Division during 1947. The
reviews were circulated widely throughout the State Department. All
%
of them were based on what Jones described as 'a large amount of
articulate discussion including representative and influential news-
2
papers, radio commentators and Congressional spokesmen*. Taken
together they constitute a useful digest of shades of opinion, informed
or otherwise, and therefore help to define the domestic context in
which the policy-makers had to operate. That is the way they will be
used in this thesis: circumstantial evidence apart, their widespread
and regular distribution makes it impossible to say whether, at a
given iroment, a particular report was influential in swinging a policy
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decision one way or another. What they do permit is a convenient guide
to the strength of feeling on those issues which are relevant to the
American contribution to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance.
Jones noted that a series of events had combined in the first two
weeks in March 1948 'to produce significant trends among American
opinion'. These included the coup in Czechoslovakia, the signing
of the Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance treaty, reports of substantial
communist strength in Italy prior to the general election to be held
there in April, and the opening of the Senate debate on the Marshall
Plan. All had served, argued Jones, 'to intensify the conviction
that aggressive communism will expand in Europe unless confronted by
superior force, material and political'. However, he also wrote:
'much of the discussion on the European situation, while somber and
urgent in tone, does not focus sharply on specific policies or
3
measures which might be taken by the United States.' This lack of
specificity may have reflected the Truman Administration's lack of
public leadership on the issue in other than rhetorical terms. But
it was reinforced by the way in which editorial writers, columnists
and Congressmen concentrated on the question of West European unity.
For them it was not the United States which was required to take
remedial action: that was the business of the Europeans.
This was the reason, Jones explained in his analysis, why 'the strongest
note' emerging from the public discussion was that speedy enactment
of ERP was the most valuable step the United States could take to
4
strengthen Western Europe. George F. Kennan's account of the same
two weeks includes references to 'a real war scare' and his accusation
that the Washington community over-reacted 'in the most deplorable way'
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to events in Eastern Europe. This may have been true in certain
military circles but there is little evidence of such behaviour in
the State Department.
The central thrust of Marshall's policy towards Western Europe was
scarcely altered by what had happened in Prague. This is clear from
a telegram sent by Robert A. Lovett to Robert D. Murphy, political
advisor to U.S.Military Governor in Germany. On 6 March Lovett cabled:
Purpose and scope ERP and CEEC are far beyond
trade relationships. Economic cooperation
sought under ERP, and of which CEEC is vehicle,
has as ultimate objective closer integration
of Western Europe. In this way it is a
correlative of and parallel to the political
and security arrangements sought under Bevin's
proposal for Western Union.®
Summarising public discussion on these themes, Jones noticed that in
the press and the Senate there was the same presumption that the Marshall
Plan and the Western Union were designed for similar ends. What he
called 'an impressive array' of newspapers, commentators and Congress¬
men, revealed 'very wide approval of the efforts by the West European
powers to plan greater political and military unity'. Reporting the
Senate debate on the ERP, he observed that 'strong support for
indicating, in some way, U.S. support of European political unity was
evident'.7
On the issue of European integration the Truman Administration was
thus close to popular sentiment. The consensus which had developed
during 1947 continued to hold. Nobody, it seems, questioned whether
a united Western Europe was as self-evidently in America's interest
as generally implied. But on the particular issue of West European
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defence there was less agreement. Jones reviewed the variety of
opinion among press commentators and it is apparent from his summary
0
that there were three distinct positions.
The first was opposed to the idea of any American involvement on a
variety of grounds. The Portland Oregonian encapsulated the views of
this group in an editorial which declared that no West European alliance
could be effective without a guarantee of U.S. support, which it believed
was 'improbable to the point of being fantastic'. Nor was this view
confined to the far north west: it was shared by, for example, the
Pes Moines Register, the Baltimore Sun and the Wall Street Journal.
The Chicago Daily News put a particularly bleak construction on events.
American efforts to stop communism, they warned, were only 'weakening
ourselves'; 'we can't go on for ever pouring billions into a cold war
that is not costing the Soviet Union a kopek'. The second set of views
was rather more optimistic but less precise. Newspapers such as the
Milwaukee Journal and the Toledo Blade declared that only a determined
union of all democratic forces could effectively contain Soviet
expansionism. They therefore left the matter of American participation -
of what kind and to what degree - unexplored. However, of this group
the Charlottesville Observer conceded that if it were known that any
aggression in Europe would encounter direct resistance by the United
States, 'it is very likely that the aggression will never be launched'.
The first and second groups were overshadowed by the third. This
comprised substantial numbers of newspapers and columnists who urged
prompt and vigorous action by the U.S. Government. Furthermore, this
group advocated that an explicitly military commitment be undertaken.
Some urged that the United States make a binding military guarantee to
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a West European union along the lines apparently proposed by Bevin.
Others called for a collective commitment under the Charter of the
United Nations as the only viable and effective way of halting the
'red menace'. And others made less sweeping suggestions: for example,
to make a public declaration, agreed by both Republicans and Democrats,
that the United States will defend France and Italy. All, in short,
agreed that Americans had no choice but to use their political and
military potential to prevent further Soviet encroachments. Those
holding these views represented the majority of American 'quality'
newspapers and journalists: the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Washington Star, the Christian Science Monitor, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, the San Francisco Chronicle, Time, Life, Sumner Welles,
Marquis Childs, James Reston, Elmer Davis, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Hanson
Baldwin, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, to name only the most prominent.
The composition of informed opinion across the United States had three
implications which were not immediately apparent but which, with
hindsight, can be seen to have been an important element in the
development of transatlantic relations during 1948. The first is
that U.S. policy-makers were getting the same message from the most
important segments of American journalism and from West European
Governments. Dissenting views were expressed in the United States
during early March but these did not represent a serious political
or intellectual challenge to the case being put by the majority of
commentators. There was, for example, no public counterpart to the
kinds of view expressed by the Policy Planning Staff within the confines
of State Department counsels. There was thus no serious debate about
the appropriate course to follow. The second implication of the
structure of opinion is that the majority view represented a convenient
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platform on which to build future support for such action as the
Administration might decide to take. Informed opinion - and, by
extension, U.S. public opinion generally - was both a potential
constraint on policy and something which the Hickerson faction could
draw on during the months ahead. That this would be an important
factor was recognised by the British: the Embassy in Washington
reported in April that State and Defense Department personnel thought
that careful leaks of information to the American press were valuable
9
in preparing American public opinion for future developments.
Finally, although the largest body of opinion appeared to endorse
with varying degrees of enthusiasm the idea that the United States
make a clear commitment to the West Europeans' security, that
endorsement depended on the absence of discussion about the precise
kind of commitment. There was therefore, plenty of scope for a
debate to break out in the newspapers of a sort which might be
prejudicial to arrangements made in secret between diplomats and
other national representatives.
This last point was particularly relevant to the matter of European
integration in an Atlantic context. That some form of West European
unity should be the objective of American foreign policy was conceded
by everyone from unreconstructed isolationists to the new inter¬
nationalists. All lamented with Edgar Ansell Mowrer that 'no United
States of Europe was yet in being'.^ Much less clear from the
commentators was how the notion of an Atlantic security system could
be reconciled with that objective. It was not until 1950 that Americans
came to recognise that the formation of an Atlantic arrangement actually
reduced the chances of changing what they regarded as the West Europeans'
intractable desire to preserve an outworn system of sovereign states.
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If West European security required an Atlantic framework then that was
one more reason for the Europeans relegating Western Union in their
priorities. Conversely, should the United States refuse to endorse
an Atlantic system adequately then the Europeans would feel even more
disheartened and thus retreat into parochial, national considerations,
irrespective of what this might mean for their long-term peace and
prosperity. But the United States did not notice this policy trap
until the 1950s.
No such complications entered into the discussion on Capitol Hill
about Western Europe's future economic, political and military
structure. The opening days of the Senate debate on the Marshall
Plan brought forth demands that the recovery programme be supplemented
by political and military action by the United States to further West
European security. In addition, some Senators demonstrated their
determination to link the granting of aid to progress towards West
European unity. Although this was a common feature of public dis¬
cussion, and had already been incorporated into the Republican Party's
political stock-in-trade for the coming Presidential election, this
undermined the essence of Marshall's conception about the way to deal
with the matter. In the event Congressional attempts to make West
European unification an explicit objective of Marshall aid were
defeated. But it needed some effort to do so and the episode served
to remind senior State Department officials that the Congressional
contribution to the formulation and operation of foreign policy could
be either constructive or destructive. What events showed, from
March to the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution, was that the use¬
fulness of the Congress to the State Department was directly proportional
to the extent to which elected representatives were taken into the
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Department's confidence.
On 3 March 1948 Senator William Fulbright addressed his colleagues
on the subject of European unity in precisely those terms which Marshall
had warned against in January. The Secretary of State had told the
Senate Foreign Relation Committee that the United States could not
afford to risk the collapse of the economic aid programme by insisting
that the recipients coalesced into a single unit. This, he suggested,
would awaken hostility because of national pride and thereby jeopardise
the very goal towards which he and his Department were working."'""''
However, Fulbright proposed an amendment to the Foreign Relief
Assistance Act, then being debated in the Senate as the first of
four bills (covering each of the four years from 1948 to 1952) auth¬
orizing the Marshall Plan expenditures. He urged the Senate to write
into the bill an unambiguous statement that the objective was the
political unification of Western Europe. He quoted John Foster Dulles'
testimony before the Committee that Europe must unite herself if she
12
were to thrive and prosper. By doing this Fulbright underscored
the point that there was a bipartisan agreement on foreign policy and
that this extended to the question of West European unity. Despite
this he eventually withdrew his amendment.
The significance of Fulbright's decision against pressing for a vote
on his amendment is that it reveals the way in which Marshall managed
to ensure that nothing in the legislative programme supporting Marshall
aid would damage the operation of policy towards Western Europe, not¬
withstanding strong Congressional enthusiasm for pushing the Europeans
in the direction of federal union.
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Fulbright knew before he stood up to move the amendment that the
State Department had already persuaded most of the Foreign Relations
Committee members that moves of this kind would be counter-productive.
During February, the Committee had wrestled with the problem of how
to compel the West Europeans to honour the promises made in the Paris
Report of 22 September 1947. In that report, European powers recog¬
nised that economic rehabilitation was not enough. As Fulbright said:
It is therefore implicit in the programme that
at its end lies not only economic cooperation
in the form of custums unions and the elim¬
ination of trade and economic barriers...
but also closer political and cultural bonds.
This need has already been stressed by
British, French and other leaders.^
During hearings held in closed session, the Committee's chairman,
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, made his views clear: 'They said they
would try to do something. I don't see why we should not say to
them, "Listen, Bud, this is what you promised to do".' He told the
press afterwards that he 'shared all these hopes for European uni¬
fication. I see little long-range hope except as there can be a
consolidation which is substantially more than economic'. He expressed
a nagging worry of others on the Committee when he observed: 'Suppose
all of this interest in what Bevin calls the Western Union promptly
subsides just as soon as they get their checks. Do we just ignore
14
that?'.
It was sentiments likc this which the State Department wanted to
exclude from ERP legislation. To that end the U.S. Ambassador in London,
Lewis W. Douglas, was brought to Washington as the Department's
principal witness during the executive sessions devoted to drafting
the bill in mid-February. Although Committee members all had a
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preference for what one of them described as giving 'a tremendous
push to the idea of an integrated Europe1, there were clear dif-
15
ferences when it came to deciding upon method. It was these
which Douglas was able to exploit and so limit the language to the
line taken by Marshall and Lovett during January and February.
One side of the argument was put by Vandenberg, the Republican
chairman, supported by two Democrats, Carl H. Hatch and Elbert D.
Thomas. Vandenberg summarised their view:
Marshall said to them [the Europeans], 'You
have to do something for yourselves'. They
said, 'we are willing to try to do the
following things'. Marshall said, 'All right,
then we will help you'. All in the world
we are saying is, 'In response to our invitation
you said you would try to do the following
things. We are just reminding you as a con¬
dition precedent to the first check you get
that you said you would try'.^®
The other side of the argument was put by Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., a
Republican, and Walter F. George, a Democrat. They dismissed the
notion of inserting words to that effect as being two-edged. One
of the points under discussion was the free movement of peoples in
Western Europe should be permitted reflecting the supranational
character of ERP. It was suggested that there was a distinct possib¬
ility that were the United States to insist on this as part of the
evidence for integrationist moves, the Americans would find themselves
vulnerable to European demands for the free movement of peoples across
the Atlantic. Lodge said the United States could not rake the atti¬
tude: 'You are not going to get a dollar until you get a certain amount
of integration'. He also said: 'All we can hope to do...is to make
17
them realize that we hope to God they are going to integrate.'
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This internal disagreement in the Committee meant that Douglas had
the opportunity of appearing to play the honest broker, and then det¬
ermine the final form of words to be used. He succeeded in heading
off Vandenberg's intention to see moves toward unity precede the
granting of aid. At the same time he was able to persuade the others
that this did not mean leaving everything to chance. The trick was
to include both points. The final version of the bill read, in part:
The provision of assistance under this Act
results from the multilateral pledges of the
participating countries to use all their efforts
to accomplish a joint recovery program based
upon self-help and mutual cooperation...and is
contingent upon continuous effort of the par¬
ticipating countries to accomplish a joint
recovery program through multi-lateral under¬
takings and the establishment of a continuing
organization for this purpose.
Put in this way the implicit threat to refuse the next tranche of
aid if progress was not satisfactory became muted. The State
Department accepted that this was the minimum which the Senators
would agree to; and it was sufficient for the members of the
Committee to recommend the legislation to Congress unanimously.
Fulbright's attempt to shape policy was thus not completely doomed
from the start. His amendment called specifically for a statement
to the effect that the United States was interested in not only
sustained economic cooperation among the recipients of aid but also
their 'political unification'. But that was merely to rehearse the
arguments about imposing a 'condition precedent' which had been
settled already in committee. He had no choice but to withdraw
his amendment. Nevertheless, his intervention in the debate was
important because he, like Vandenberg, was close to Congressional
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instincts on this matter. He had followed through on his earlier
co-sponsorship in 1947 of the joint resolution calling for the
creation of a 'United States of Europe', which had been widely
applauded. His arguments in debate were well made and relevant.
He pointed out what the CEEC countries had apparently promised to do
was the least that Americans could reasonably expect. Adding an
historical argument, he reminded his audience that before 1914,
Europe had been prosperous. This had not prevented war then and would
not do so again: 'I do not believe that the relatively small, inde¬
pendent political sovereignties of Europe, as they now exist, can,
under modern political and economic conditions, maintain their
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independence for long.'
From the perspective of the policy managers in the State Department
the outcome was satisfactory. Although Fulbright was not apparently
in collusion with officials, his remarks in the Senate served as a
useful reminder to West European Governments yet did not constitute
direct pressure. And Ambassador Douglas had succeeded in putting
into the language of an American statute the phrase 'self-help and
mutual cooperation'. It was a formula that was subsequently to be
regarded by Washington as the heart of the Vandenberg Resolution
and the North Atlantic Treaty. It represented the standard by which
Americans would judge European contributions to the defence of the
Atlantic area once NATO had taken shape.
The 'self-help and mutual aid' formula had two main virtues for the
executive and legislative branches of the government. The first
was that it neatly expressed that strong current of opinion which
had been running in the country ever since John Foster Dulles made
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his seminal speech on West European unity in January 1943. The free
nations of Europe were not to be allowed to lean on Uncle Sam and the
best way for them to become self-reliant was to persuade them to
cooperate as closely as possible. In the short-term Americans under¬
stood that to mean economic integration: over the longer run it meant
political unity as well. The second advantage was that the phrase
'self-help and mutual aid' did not go beyond the guidelines for
policy towards the Europeans, set by Marshall during February and
March. It did not refer directly to the general U.S. desire to see
unity in Western Europe so as to restrict America's peacetime commit¬
ments to a few years only. But it did imply all of that. Incorporated
into the North Atlantic Treaty it carried the same connotation - for
Americans - but with the admixture of military considerations. As
became apparent later, Marshall and Lovett had no thought of subsuming
the Western Union beneath a larger 'Atlantic security system' when
they agreed to talk about additional U.S. military assistance to
Europe. The Western Union was not to be neglected. Rather, it was
seen as the embodiment of 'self-help and mutual aid': it was to be the
permanent feature, an Atlantic security system a temporary expedient.
However, contributions by Congress to the formation of U.S. policy
position during March regarding Western Europe did not end with the
'self-help' formula. It went some way towards resolving a disagreement
which had broken out within the State Department and which spread to
the Bureau of the Budget and the President's Committee on Foreign Aid.
The row first broke out between Marshall and Lovett on the one hand,
and Hickerson and Kennan on the other. The issue was the role of the
American foreign service. Marshall's 'hands off' policy towards the
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Europeans effectively meant that he intended to de-emphasise the
usual reliance on diplomatic exchange and entrust American interests
to the administrative body to be set up by the CEEC, the Organisation
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Consciously or otherwise,
he had accepted the method of bringing about West European unity
espoused by Jean Monnet, the French civil servant often described
as 'the father of Europe'. (Marshall may in fact have absorbed
Monnet's ideas through John Foster Dulles, who was a long-standing
personal friend of both Marshall and the Frenchman). It was Monnet's
idea that European integration would never come about by appealing
to elected national assemblies. Governments would be persuaded to
move in that direction when it was proved to them that it was in
their interests to do so. That proof, Monnet thought, could only
be provided by the successful operation of supranational administrative
arrangements. This was the essence of the future Schuman Plan, which
Monnet inspired, and the proposal to establish a European Defence
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Community in the early 1950s. Every action which Marshall took in
1948 suggests that he broadly accepted Monnet's methods as the ones
most likely to succeed.
Hickerson and Kennan did not agree with this. In his memoirs, Kennan
made the distinction on which their joint opposition was based. 'It
is axiomatic in the world of diplomacy,' he wrote, 'that methodology
and tactics assume an importance by no means inferior to concept and
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strategy'. All shared the same concept and .strategy: American
security was best served if Europe became self-reliant. The dif¬
ferences arose over method and tactics. Hickerson's Division of
European Affairs made its position clear in January 1948. West
Europeans could be helped in three ways: by attending conferences
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specially arranged for the purpose; by participating in the work of
such bodies as the CEEC; and through the normal diplomatic channels.
Conferences were dismissed as rarely productive, standing bodies as
unpredictable. That left diplomacy as the best chance of encouraging
political cooperation, minimising friction and securing 'a common front
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on a maximum of issues 1.
Kennan took the same line but expressed it differently. He complained
that Marshall's method meant that the recovery programme was being
managed as 'a technical business operation and not as a political
matter'. This would 'reduce drastically' the programme's potential
political effect. He was particularly critical of leaving things to
outside agencies:
Our experience with ad hoc wartime and post-
hostilities agencies operating in the foreign
field has demonstrated that not only are new
agencies of little value in executing policies
which go beyond the vision and educational
horizon of their own personnel, but that they
actually develop a momentum of their own which,
in the final analysis, tends to shape - rather
than serve - the national policy.
He added that once the ERP bill was passed 'the matter will be largely
out of our hands'. The planned operation of the Marshall Plan would
make it difficult for the Department of State to conduct 'any
incisive and vigorous policy with relation to Europe'. This, he
warned, 'thrusts this Department back - with respect to one great
area of the world's surface - into the position it occupied in many
instances during the recent war:- the position of an advisory,
rather than an executive agency.
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As career diplomats, Kennan and Hickerson had a vested interest in
protecting the institution of the foreign service. They therefore
opposed Marshall's proposal to establish a separate agency outside
the Department, headed by an Administrator responsible directly to
the President, to liaise with the OEEC. This could only 'cut deeply
into the operations of the Department of State in European affairs'
and 'reduce the prestige, competence, and the effectiveness of its
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mission in Europe'.
This view was supported by the influential Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, James W. Webb (who on Lovett's retirement was to become
Under-Secretary of State). He believed that no new executive agency
was needed, partly because the requisite machinery already existed,
and partly because the Department was seen to have done a good job
on the Interim Aid Programme and the special assistance to Greece
and Turkey. Because the Secretary of State was responsible for
foreign policy he should have overall charge. Moreover, the cost-
conscious Bureau Director pointed out that a new organisation would
mean establishing staffs which would tend to duplicate the work done
already by sections of the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture
and Commerce. But some wanted to go even further than Marshall, notably
the President's Committee on Foreign Aid, popularly known as the
Harriman Committee after its Chairman Averell Harriman (then Secretary
of Commerce). Whereas Marshall wanted a new agency responsible to the
President direct, he did advocate that it operate in accordance with
policy guidance of the State Department. Harriman's Committee wanted
a Presidential appointee, confirmed by the Senate, whose guidance would
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come from a Board made up of the heads of the Departments involved.
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It was left to the Senate to sort out this array of sectional arguments.
This it did in drafting the final form of the Economic Cooperation Act
of 1948. As had happened over the issue of pushing the West Europeans
towards unity, a compromise was reached, again with the help of
Ambassador Lewis Douglas, by including elements of all sides of the
argument. The finished text stipulated that a separate organisation
be set up with its own Administrator:
1) the Administrator and the Secretary of State
shall keep each other fully and currently informed
on matters, including prospective action, arising
within the scope of their respective duties which
are pertinent to the duties of the other;
2) whenever the Secretary of State believes that any
action, proposed action, or failure to act on the
part of the Administrator is inconsistent with the
foreign policy objectives of the United States, he
shall consult with the Administrator and, if
differences of view are not adjusted by consultation,
the matters shall be referred to the President for
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final decision.
On the issue of a potential conflict of interest between the Secretary
and the Administrator, Vandenberg had the clinching argument. He
pointed out that on atomic energy there was a similar formula for
reconciling the 'violent clash of rival interests' of the civilian
and military authorities. There had been no appeal to the President:
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the 'whole thing has just worked right out in good shape'.
By taking the view that the same formula would work as well for the
administration of ERP, the Senators ensured that Marshall prevailed
over his critics, inside and outside the State Department. There
was a bonus too. The Administrator appointed by Truman was Paul G.
Hoffman who left his job as president of the Studebaker Corporation
specifically for this purpose. On his own admission during the
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Senate confirmation hearings on 7 April 1948, he had 'no knowledge
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of government'. What he did have was experience on the Harriman
Committee where he established himself as a strong supporter of
European integration and political unity. He, like Dulles, knew
Monnet well. He summed up in a sentence Marshall's whole approach
when he told the Foreign Relations Committee later:
Fundamentally what we are supposed to accomplish
by June 1952, is to get Europe on her feet and off
our backs, and one must never forget that, because
we cannot go on indefinitely supporting these
foreign countries....I do not think our economy
can stand that.29
Harriman, who was of the same opinion, left his post as Secretary
of Commerce to become Truman's (and Hoffman's) Special Representative
in Europe. The Marshall Plan legislation which created these new
jobs passed the Senate by a large bipartisan majority (69 to 17) on
13 March 1948. Two days later, the OEEC was formed in Paris; and two
days after that the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collabor¬
ation and Collective Self-Defence - the Brussels Treaty setting up
the Western Union - was signed.
Marshall and Lovett could take considerable satisfaction from all
this activity. Indeed, thereafter Marshall left the day-to-day
running of relations with Western Europe to Lovett, while he became
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closely involved with inter-American affairs. In the immediate
aftermath of the crisis over Czechoslovakia things must have appeared
to be going well. On 15 March, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris,
Jefferson Caffery, was approached by the former Premier, Paul Reynaud,
to offer a view said to be widely held in the French foreign office.
No doubt to the satisfaction of his superiors in Washington f Caffery
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was told: 'No federation can possibly come into being unless a state
can assume the role of "federating state'". Reynaud said that only
the United States would play that part and asked that 'the US shed
its fine seniles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
Europe' and participate actively in the elaboration of the West
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European union. He would have understood Marshall's diplomacy
better had he remembered Talleyrand's observation: 'Non-intervention
is a term of political metaphysics signifying almost the same thing
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as intervention'.
Lovett's first major initiative in transatlantic relations was to
discuss the proposed North American-West European security relationship
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This time the objective
was not to resolve internal arguments within the Truman Administration
on the issue, but to deflect West European pressures for a cast iron
military guarantee against the Soviet Union and (for some) Germany.
The vehicle for doing this was what came to be called the Vandenberg
Resolution, passed in June 1948. In the historiography of the Atlantic
Alliance that resolution is invariably sited as a precursor to the
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North Atlantic Treaty. This interpretation takes a different view
and argues that in mid-1948, the Truman Administration hoped that the
passage of the resolution would reduce European anxieties, thus making
more formal and binding arrangements unnecessary. These anxieties
were especially strong in France, Britain, Italy and Germany. In
answer to these, the Vandenberg Resolution was intended as a substitute,
not a preparation, for an Atlantic Alliance.
Lovett was impelled to take this step largely because the West European
interpretation of recent events was more alarmist than that of Marshall
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and himself. Cabinet had been told in November to expect trouble in
Prague; when this occurred there was outrage but not surprise.
Marshall's reaction went no further than to lodge a diplomatic
protest. When Jan Masaryk, the Czech Foreign Minister, fell to
his death on 10 March - in circumstances regarded by many in the
West as suspicious and symptomatic of Russian ruthlessness - Marshall
was informed by the U.S. Embassy in Prague that Masaryk had almost
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certainly committed suicide. Regretfully though he may have
done so, Marshall simply accepted that, since Czechoslovakia had been
prevented from participating in ERP, Soviet influence predominated
in that part of Europe. Western Europe wanted greater reassurance
than attitudes of this sort could generate. The fact that such
reassurance might not be forthcoming was an added anxiety to half
a continent already overburdened with worries.
The French were the most nervous and vociferous. On 4 March 1948,
Bidault had a long meeting with Caffery in Paris and demonstrated
the profound effect which the coup in Prague had on French thinking.
Caffery was told that the French Government was ready to shoot if
necessary to avoid a similar coup in Paris. Moreover, Washington was
informed, there was now a real danger of a direct Soviet attack, which
would be enhanced further if the Italian communists won power in April.
Bidault's views on this were characterised by Caffery as follows:
From everything we have been able to find
out, Russian thinking is about like this:
"If we do not take over Western Europe in
the relatively near future, the Americans
may wake up and then we shall be up against
it. Of course there is a little risk that
the Americans will wake up sooner than we
think and knock us out with some of their
famous atomic bombs. However, we believe
that the Americans are still des naifs and
will wait too long". ,
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Bidault was reported as having concluded: 'I know that this may-
sound extravagant, but we are sitting here under the guns and your
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people are on the other side of the ocean'.
In effect, Bidault was asking for a more specific version of the
assurances that had been given to Greece and Turkey under the Truman
Doctrine one year earlier: that it should be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities and by outside pressures. Here was clear con¬
firmation that the West Europeans recognised the difference between
Truman's declaratory policy and the policy actually pursued. As
suggested in Chapter 1, the President may have combined the struggle
between right and left in Greece with the Russian ambitions in the
Dardenelles - both impulses dating from the early 19th century at
the earliest - and made them appear a universalistic conflict
between democracy and totalitarianism. But in practice the pledge
to Greece and Turkey was non-transferable. Events in Prague,
together with those in Paris during December 1947, made the French
extra sensitive to this.
American diplomats were aware of the French domestic ramifications.
The Schuman government rested on a shifting and uncertain parliamentary
coalition. Washington tended to the view that Schuman and his foreign
minister Bidault were politically reliable, if only because they
were - from an American viewpoint - more acceptable than the two
alternatives. General Charles de Gaulle the wartime leader, was
making a strong bid for a return to power. Caffery noted that de Gaulle
had said, and done, nothing to assist when Schuman had been under
siege in November and December by the communist trade unions. This
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inaction did not endear him to the State Department and his strident
nationalism sounded uncomfortable echoes of Nazi Germany in the 1930s.
The other alternative was the communists. They were reported as
jubilant at the prospect of a de Gaulle victory: they thought this
would bring the 'class war', and thus their ultimate triumph, that
36
much closer. Given the choice between a continuation of Schuman's
government on the one hand and the possibility of either a Gaullist
or Communist victory on the other t the State Department naturally
opted for the former.
By taking this view, the United States could not deny to Schuman
and Bidault any reasonable request for additional assistance. This
became especially apparent during the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations.
Nevertheless, the Americans were far from sure of which horse to back.
Tentative soundings were made with de Gaulle: if he were to come to
power it made no sense for contact with him being limited to a short,
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secret meeting with John Foster Dulles in December 1947. At the
same time, the Truman Administration apparently sactioned the American
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organisations to
assist in the attempt to bolster the non-communist left as the best
means of combating Soviet influence. In the case of France, this
meant channelling funds - promised by the Treasurer of the American
Federation of Labor, David Dubinsky, on a visit to Paris - to the
socialists who had so irritated the State Department in February by
weakening the Schuman government by refusing to support the devolution
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of the franc. American diplomats resolved the inherent inconsis¬
tency here by taking the view that any government in Paris, the
communists excepted, would be forced by geostrategic realities to
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look to the United States for assistance.
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The State Department was also ambiguous about the United Kingdom,
although in different ways and for different reasons. On a personal
level, Marshall's mixed impressions of Bevin were confirmed in March.
Following the Prague coup, the British Foreign Secretary told Henri
Spaak - who then told the American Ambassador in Brussels - that he
thought the Soviet Union was neither ready nor willing to launch an
attack on Western Europe. Moreover, he gave it as his opinion that
the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, was 'a strong stabilising influence
against war'. Shortly afterwards,however, Bevin suggested that,
unless the Marshall Plan was backed up by a Western military pact,
this might provoke an armed attack. He wrote:
[I ]f we proceed with half measures which are
purely economic and financial and do not carry
them to their logical conclusion, the Soviet
Government might think that that is all we
are likely to do. This would consequently
weaken our position and so might precipitate
the conflict which we desire to avoid.
This could only be interpreted in Washington that Bevin said one
thing to his European colleagues and something else to the Americans.
Suspicions in the State Department were raised even further when it
was learned that at least part of the British Foreign Office wanted
American support for the Western Union because this would 'eliminate
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the necessity of Britain's military guarantee to Europe'. This
was in obvious contrast to what the State Department had supposed
lay behind the Western Union proposal.
But the State Department's uncertainty over Britain went much further
and deeper than noticing such apparent inconsistencies. The basic
problem was how the United States should comport itself towards the
United Kingdom. George F. Kennan described this dilemma in a Policy
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Planning Staff memorandum (PPS/23), submitted to Marshall and Lovett
in late-February. If the Americans took the British into the U.S.¬
Canadian orbit, Kennan wrote, this would solve Britain's long term
economic problem but at the cost of casting off Britain 'from the
close political association she is seeking with continental powers'
and therefore make those countries more vulnerable to Soviet pressure.
On the other hand, if the United States urged the British 'to seek
salvation' in closer association with her continental neighbours,
this would ensure that the economic problems of both Britain and
Germany would remain unsolved in 1952, when Marshall aid ended, and
thus invite 'another crises of demand' on the United States for still
further amounts of economic assistance. "The scope of this problem'.
Kennan suggested, 'is so immense and its complexities so numerous
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that there can be no simple and easy answer'.
Kennan saw only two ways to find a real cure for Western Europe's
'abnormal dependence' on U.S. governmental aid. The first was to
create a close economic association between North America and the
Western Union, including Britain. Perhaps because this proposal
was similar to the 'Atlanticist' line propounded by John Hickerson,
he was careful to point out that for this to work properly there
would need to be a substantial degree of currency and customs union,
plus relative freedom of migration between Europe and America. The
second cure was a recommendation that Britain, France and the Benelux
countries take full advantage of the twin facts that Africa was
comparatively free from communist subversion or influence and that
it was no longer an area of great power rivalries. This meant that
Western Europe 's flagging economic fortunes could be revived by the
economic and commercial exploitation of the African continent. It
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would, said Kennan, absorb large numbers of people, including Europe's
'surplus technical and administrative energy'. It would also 'lend
to the idea of Western European union that tangible objective for
which everyone has been rather unsuccessfully groping in recent
months'.^
Although the Policy Planning Staff paper contained the idea that
these two solutions were not mutually exclusive and might complement
each other, there is no doubt that Kennan himself favoured the African
option. Ironically, his ideas on this were shared by Ernest Bevin,
whose 'Atlanticist' preferences Kennan strenuously argued against.
The British Foreign Secretary was reported as having said later in
1948: 'If only we had pushed on and developed Africa, we could have
had the U.S. dependent on us and eating out of our hands in four
or five years'. Similarly, Gladwyn Jebb, a rising star in the Foreign
Office, confided in his diary during January 1948 that he hoped it
was possible to construct a 'Middle Power', consisting of Western
Europe and the bulk of Africa, which would be friendly to the United
States but not dependent on her, thus being able to pursue independent
foreign policies where necessary. In the light of this congruence of
view between Kennan and some sections of the British foreign service,
it is not surprising that similar ideas were developed about France.
Commenting on the French plan to incorporate French North Africa
into metropolitan France, the Policy Planning Staff advised Marshall
to accept French imperial policies in that region, despite the fact
that those reflected the French refusal to consider independence for
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subject peoples there 'even as a distant goal'.
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While France and Britain continued to exercise U.S. policy-makers
in their deliberations, the most pressing problems in early March
were associated with the defeated Axis powers, Italy and Germany.
On 11 March the Division of Public Studies in the State Department
identified Italy as the subject of special concern to the American
public. The press regarded it 'as the most crucial point in the
present Western European situation'. A survey of press opinion
suggested that many observers regarded it as 'the place to draw the
line'. Particularly prominent, according to Departmental analysts,
were the opinions of those advocating a United States commitment of
some sort. Most were agreed that prompt action prior to the election
due on 18 April was essential. A radio journalist made a common point:
communist efforts in Italy (and France) would be successful 'in
inverse ratio to the assurance of aid from the U.S.'. Very few took
a different line; among these were the Rochester Times-Union which
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denounced as immoral any 'attempt to bribe the Italian electorate.
Tens of thousands of Italian-Americans did not agree. An unprecedented
letter-writing campaign - supplemented by propaganda broadcasts by
U.S. citizens with Italian connections, such as the popular singer
Frank Sinatra - urged friends and relatives in Italy to vote for the
parties most likely to cooperate with the United States. Behind all
this lay the implicit threat that if the communists won power Italy
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would receive no Marshall aid.
President Truman took a personal interest. His advisor, Clark Clifford,
recalled that the President had been 'very practical and approved [the]
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use of every means to influence the election'. For domestic political
reasons he had little choice. The large Italian-American vote could
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not be risked by the prospect of a 'loss* of Italy to the communists,
especially in a year when Truman had to face the American electorate
in a contest almost everyone thought would be won by the Republican,
Thomas Dewey. But Truman also recognised that the crisis in Czecho¬
slovakia necessitated U.S. action regardless of American political
considerations. On 10 March he told the Secretary of Defense, James
V. Forrestal, that circumstances in Italy constituted 'a real menace
to our troops and a threat to the primary security interests of the
United States'. Forrestal was instructed to send the Italians a
variety of munitions and materie1, the purpose of which was
...to increase in so far as practicable the
potential ability of Italian security forces
to maintain the internal security of Italy
and so suppress anticipated attempts by ^
subversive elements to seize power by force.
Even here Truman kept one eye on his own electorate. In order to
ensure he was not accused of allowing the U.S. military establishment
to profit from Italy's misfortunes, he ordered that any reimbursements
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paid by the Rome government be lodged with the U.S. Treasury.
Background papers on special military aid to Italy had been circulating
within the executive branch for some weeks prior to Truman's author¬
isation on 10 March. They reveal the different ways in which the
diplomats and the military men regarded the problem, at a moment just
before the United States began to talk to the Canadians and British
about an Atlantic Pact. The two approaches were symptomatic of much
discussion within the Truman Administration in the months ahead.
Interestingly, both were predicated on the fear of a communist take¬
over, despite the fact that the Director of the Central Intelligence
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Agency felt confident that Italy would not succumb.
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It is indicative of the salience of the Italian issue that the National
Security Council (NSC), formally constituted in September 1947, should
chose Italy as its first subject for study. It recommended that the
United States should make full use of its political, economic and
military power in order to prevent an invasion of Italy from Yugoslavia
or a communist coup in Rome or elsewhere on the Italian mainland. The
joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were quick to respond. Admiral William D.
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
and Truman's main military advisor, put the JCS position to Forrestal.
It had three parts. First, all of the equipment approved by Truman
could not be in Italian hands by the date of the election on 18 April.
Moreover, even such supplies as would arrive on time could only retard
the military aid programmes to Greece and Turkey. The JCS wanted
Truman to decide which was to have priority: resources were scarce.
Secondly, if the U.S. strengthened its ground, naval and air forces
in the Mediterranean area as a signal of American intent, this could
only bite deeply into available reserves. This, as Leahy explained,
was the result of the 'extended military position' of the United
States: new commitments could not be undertaken without something
having to give elsewhere. Finally, the NSC had suggested that, at
the request of the 'legal Italian government', the Americans and
British might deploy forces in Italy. The JCS judged this to be
militarily unsound because it 'would entail serious risks of global
warfare' and could only be contemplated after full mobilisation had
taken place.^
The JCS concluded that the only way to avoid these difficulties was
to enhance the overall strength of the United States armed forces.
In other words, the Pentagon seized on the Italian situation as an
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illustration of its claim that Truman's budgetary stringency was
seriously damaging the American position in the world. Admiral Leahy
wrote:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the
over-all world situation, of which Italy is
only a part, dictates the necessity for
strengthening immediately the potential of
our National Military Establishment. Some
form of compulsory military service is
essential if timely and effective strength¬
ening of our potential is to be achieved,
since this is the only method short of
mobilization which can produce desired results
CO
without delay.
The point was driven home by the observation that neither limited
nor general mobilisation would result in 'appreciable augmentation of
our combat strength' for at least one year after the order to mobilise
had been given. The kind of objective being cited by the NSC in Italy
was identical to that pursued elsewhere in the Mediterranean, the
Middle East and further afield. The United States' limited forces
could not carry out all the obligations given them by their civilian
masters, the JCS argued.5^
Truman was sceptical of such claims: he approved the NSC working
paper without accommodating the views of the JCS, except to specify
that any additional deployments of force to the Mediterranean would
require partial mobilisation. Thus on the specific issue of Italy
the Pentagon had very little impact on policy.(However, selective
service was reinstated on 24 June 1948, as a way of overcoming the
Services' chronic manpower shortages but not in such a way as to
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breach their budgetary limits). A 'secondary priority' for Italy
was decided upon by the Department of State, but this did not affect
the programme of aid: Hickerson suggested that the Pentagon's estimates
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of what was possible usually 'proved overly pessimistic'. And so it
turned out. On 8 March 1948, it was established for Marshall that
'substantial deliveries' could be made to Italy in time to be effective
in connection with the 'control of disturbances anticipated during and
immediately after the election'. On that basis, Truman instructed
Forrestal to press ahead, regardless of the complaints put forward
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by the armed forces.
By taking that decision the President seemingly settled the policy
of the United States towards Italy. Military aid would be sent,
partly to strengthen the Italian armed forces but mainly as clear
evidence of the American desire to help. This would be augmented by
a range of measures, from the encouragement of the letter-writing
campaign to the relaxation of unduly onerous terms in the Italian Peace
Treaty, and from the hastening of economic aid to putting pressure
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on Britain and France to admit Italy to the Western Union. But
%
almost immediately the Rome Government complicated matters consider¬
ably. The Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, told the American
Ambassador that, although grateful for the offer of equipment, he
did not want it shipped until later. In his judgement the arrival
of such a shipment would have an adverse effect on his electoral
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campaign. It was a timely reminder that Marshall's fears about
inflaming national sentiments by Americans acting too vigorously
were entirely justified. It was comparatively easy to offer economic
aid, support Italian membership of tve United Nations, send aircraft
carriers and station them below the horizon, and use American
celebrities and politicians with Italian connections to broadcast
Western propaganda. But it was much more dangerous to appear to
keep de Gasperi in power by providing him with American arms with
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which to turn on the Italian population, should the election result
go the 'wrong' way. The U.S. Ambassador in Rome, James Clement Dunn,
advised Marshall that reports from Washington in the Italian press
about the shipment of arms had caused de Gasperi to go on to the
defensive against tiie political attacks of the communists. He there¬
fore asked that every precaution will be taken to keep the matter
completely secret. On the understanding that supplies arrived after
the election, de Gasperi agreed to a formula whereby shipments did
not come direct to Italian ports but were off-loaded at Bremenhaven
in Germany and then transhipped by rail through Europe, entering Italy
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in comparative safety from observation.
The election result came as a great relief to Washington (although,
presumably, not as a surprise to the CIA): de Gasperi won convincingly.
No-one could be sure whether the extraordinary effort put in by the
Americans helped the parties dedicated to parliamentary government to
victory. The irony was that, although the result meant to Washington
that Italy was no longer of critical concern, the Italian government
almost immediately joined the queue composed of the other West
Europeans demanding a security guarantee from the United States.
Americans may have helped defeat the communists but that only increased
the Italian appetite for further assistance. It was not to be reduced
until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the passage of
the Military Assistance Programme in the following year, the measures
which also did much to satisfy France and the United Kingdom.
No such easy remedies were at hand for the largest problem faced by
the United States in Western Europe, namely Germany. Although it had
been accepted by the United States that the industrial resources of
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Western Germany could and should be used to encourage and sustain the
economic recovery of Western Europe, the similar calculation was not
made on military matters until 1949. Politically, the re-armament of
Germany was as yet utterly unacceptable to the West Europeans. It
was also anathema to the Russians. On 6 September 1946, the U.S.
Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, announced in Stuttgart:' [I]t
is the view of the American Government that the German people throughout
Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary
responsibility for the running of their own affairs.' He went on to
indicate the terms under which this might happen. Among them was
the statement that U.S. occupation forces would stay 'for a long
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period'. This was a substantial shift of policy; originally the
occupation was due to end sometime in late 1947 or early 1948. As
the historian John Backer has demonstrated, this change was of great
importance to the whole tenor of East-West relations and to the
United States' relations with its friends in Western Europe. 'The
barrier of the Atlantic...seemed removed', he wrote, 'and the future
60
of the United States effectively tied to that of Western Europe' .
Byrnes was still thinking in terms of a possible re-unification of
Germany. By the time Marshall replaced him at the State Department,
the de facto and temporary partition of Germany had begun to take on
a de jure and permanent character. No-one willed this; it simply
emerged as an arrangement which satisfied the different interests of
the Americans, the Russians and their respective allies.
Unfortunately, in early 1948, the arrangement was not popular with
Germans. It was an issue with which American policy makers were
closely concerned. George Kennan took a special interest, perhaps
because he was a fluent German speaker, had spent some time in Germany
149
as a boy and seen wartime service there as well. Writing in late
February 1948, he produced a striking analysis of the German situation
for Marshall:
In any planning we do for the future of Germany,
we will have to take account of the unpleasant fact
that our occupation up to this time has been un¬
fortunate from the standpoint of the psychology of
the German people. They are emerging from this
phase of the post-hostilities period in a state of
mind which can only be described as sullen, bitter,
unregenerate and pathologically attached to the
old chimera of Germany unity. Our moral and
political influence over them has not made headway
since the surrender. They have been impressed by
neither our precepts nor by our example. They
are not going to look to us for leadership.®^
He added that German political life would polarise around the extreme
right and the revolutionary left, both of which from an American stand¬
point were 'unfriendly, ugly to deal with' and contemptuous of the
things valued by the United States.
Kennan was to be proved wrong by events on all these counts. However,
when he turned to the issue of West European unity, and West Germany's
place in it, he was more correct. Virtually all important personnel
in the State Department assumed that the long-term interests of the
United States and Western Europe were best served by the creation
of a real European federation. Kennan noted that, as yet, the Germans
themselves had been poorly prepared for the idea; this would have to
change. Furthermore, he argued that there were only three possible
outcomes for Western and Central Europe. The first two were,res¬
pectively, Russian domination and German domination. To accept either
would be to throw away the fruits of victory from the last war. This
left the third possibility: 'a federated Europe, into which the parts
of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries
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is sufficient to hold Germany in her place'. Kennan argued that
this was the optimum solution but that it would depend on a more
or less permanently partitioned Germany. A unified Germany within
a West European federation would unbalance the other components.
Therefore to Kennan there was no alternative but to prepare the
Germany population to accept an artificial - but nonetheless real -
S3
division of their country.
In the event, the Germans did accept partition: those in the East had
no choice; those in the West conceded the necessity on the under¬
standing that the Western half of the country receive its full
share of American economic largesse. In early 1948, few if any
foreign service personnel in Washington realised that the transition
would be as comparatively trouble free as it turned out to be. Most
thought that there was no option but to support German unification:
the Germans wanted nothing else and the Russians made promises to
that end. The U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, Robert D. Murphy,
cabled Hickerson from Frankfurt in January:
Our object is to see a unified Germany under a
German government with sufficient powers to
govern. During coming months we will do nothing
to defeat that purpose. It would be wrong to
say that a division of Germany is a fact we must
recognize. Neither we nor the Germans recognize it.
What is significant about Kennan's memorandum to Marshall in late
February is that it represents the first departure from the consensus
view expressed by Murphy.
It is notable that Kennan's rationale for moving towards an acceptance
of partition rested on the objective, shared by Murphy among many
others, of a federated Western Europe. As with the Marshall Plan and
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the U.S. reaction to Bevin's Western Union proposal, the ill-defined
but powerful concept of a united Western Europe was the yardstick
against which all other political and economic goals in Western
Europe were judged. From early on in 1948, and throughout the rest
of that year, there was an increasing propensity among policy-makers
to see a divided Germany less as an unfortunate necessity in the
short-term than as a positive benefit over the longer run. On a
day-to-day basis the Americans had to deal with more mundane matters -
the problem of the Ruhr, the integration of the West German economy
into that of Western Europe as a whole, the impact on the German
population of the de-nazification and re-education programmes and,
above all else, the Nuremberg Trials and relations with the Soviet
Union - but the long-term objective was always in view. In Kennan's
words: 'With these tasks and problems before us it is important that
we should do nothing in this intervening period which would prejudice
our later policies '. ^
What made the application of this policy difficult was that, unlike
the concurrent situation in Japan, the United States did not wield
unquestioned authority in Germany. Americans could not unilaterally
impose their wishes on, or coordinate measures with, the Germans.
Account had also to be taken of Russian actions. Even though the
London CFM had broken up in disarray, leaving any hope of four-power
agreement over Germany in tatters, the fact remained that Soviet
forces controlled a sizeable proportion of German territory and had
full occupational rights in Berlin. Moscow's opinion could thus
not be ignored. Similarly, the British and French had also to be
consulted for the same reasons. There was also the question of the
Benelux countries: no successful ordering of Western Europe could be
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achieved if Germany's northwestern neighbours were not fully committed
to whatever final settlement was to be decided upon. The Policy
Planning Staff's advice was to concede that it was in the United
States' interests to temper policies in order to win support and
minimise opposition from friends in the West and potential adversaries
in the East; this was preferable to acting unilaterally in defiance
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of the feelings and interests of those also directly concerned. It
was the adoption of this attitude, applied to the wider context of
Western Europe, which helps explain why the United States eventually
became a founder member of the Atlantic Alliance.
* * *
The argument of this chapter contains three strands. The first of
these is the growing importance of public opinion in the United States
about what was happening in Europe. From early-1948, additional
efforts were made in the Department of State to monitor views expressed
in newspapers and on the radio networks across the country and to
analyse opinion surveys closely. No serious opposition to the idea
of aiding the West Europeans - in addition to economic assistance -
was apparent. By late March, of those Americans with opinions on
the subject a ratio of 5 to 3 expressed themselves in favour of some
U.S. military help being given to Western Europe should war break out.
(A similar proportion was not opposed to supporting West European
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countries threatened by internal communist activity.) At this point
therefore, it can be seen that public opinion did not inhibit policy
makers from taking decisions to help. Nevertheless, the importance of
popular attitudes had been acknowledged: in an election year, with
the chances seemingly running against Truman, it would loom even larger.
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The chapter's second theme is the role of Congress, especially the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Policy could not be divorced from
the political community: diplomatic objectives could be pursued only
as fast as Congress could be persuaded to go. During March the rela¬
tions between the executive and legislative branches on the issue of
transatlantic diplomacy became a major preoccupation of the State
Department as a whole, and of Marshall and Lovett in particular.
They sought to use the relationship, first, to raise the spectre of
Congressional refusal as a useful lever vis-a-vis the West Europeans;
and secondly, to consolidate their policies against challenges from
within the Department of State or elsewhere in the executive branch.
The final strand of this chapter is a continuation of the consideration
given in Chapter 2 to the impact the West Europeans were having on
policy choices. However, this time the focus is not the pressures on
Washington. Rather it is the recognition that American objectives
were complicated by particular problems associated with individual
countries, notably France, Britain, Italy and Germany. Of these, the
French presented the fewest difficulties: the United States simply had
to decide whether to give them some form of security guarantee against
the Russians and, more importantly, the Germans. The choice was less
straightforward in the case of the British. The Americans found them¬
selves in a dilemma of wanting on the one hand to see the dismantlement
of the British Empire coupled with British membership of a united
Europe; and on the other to preserve Brit-in's global position as an
adjunct to the strategy of containment. Italy proved troublesome
because the prospect of the communists winning powers by legitimate
means was an embarrassing one. Furthermore, the imperatives which
drove Truman to encourage intervention in Italian domestic politics
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ran counter to Marshall's 'hands-off' policy. Finally, the German
problem continued unresolved. Above all the miriad daily details
of occupation duties, two considerations predominated: the need to
incorporate the western half into a European federation, and the
understanding that this would largely depend on the cooperation of
the British and French.
When those three themes are taken together with those developed already
in the previous chapter - West European influence in Washington,
internal debate within the State Department and Marshall's diplomatic
style - one conclusion suggests itself. It is that at the very moment
when Marshall agreed to talk about an Atlantic security system with
his West European counterparts, the State Department was being pushed
and pulled from a variety of directions. The picture which emerges
from the documents is not of a Department single-mindedly concerned
with the ideological, political and military challenge represented
by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Marshall's pointed lack of
action in response to the coup in Czechoslovakia suggests that he wished
to reassure the Russians that the United States had no intention of
disrupting Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. His was not the policy
of 'brinkmanship' and 'rollback' later associated with John Foster
Dulles. Marshall put his faith in politically moderate governments
and opposition parties in Western Europe. Following this lead, the
State Department concentrated on that region where a continuation of
the status quo was unsatisfactory but where, unlike Eastern Europe,
constructive change was possible and capable of being influenced by
the United States. In March 1948, that process of change appeared
to be underway with the signing of the Brussels Treaty.
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CHAPTER 4
TOWARDS THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION : POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
On 17 March 1948, the day the Brussels Treaty was signed, President
Truman made two speeches; one to a joint session of Congress, the
other to an Irish-American jamboree in New York. The speeches marked
the U.S. response to the creation of the five-power Western Union.
The subject of both addresses was the same: what the President termed
the 'communist menace' to the free world, the West European response
to it and the supplementary action to be taken by the United States.^"
As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, while the rhetoric was explicitly
anti-communist the practical application remained unclear. Like George
C. Marshall's Harvard speech, Truman's remarks amounted to a declar¬
ation of intent; they were scrutinized by journalists; Congressmen and
Administration officials for policy implications. This lack of
specificity reflected, first, Marshall's chosen diplomatic method in
transatlantic relations and, secondly, Truman's own reading of the
lessons of Woodrow Wilson's failure in 1920 to mobilise enough
political support at home for his diplomatic objectives. Truman
recalled: 'Our European friends apparently remembered the League of
Nations too; they were most anxious to have not only a presidential
2
declaration but also a congressional expression confirming it.' This
was an apt formulation of the problem faced by the U.S. Administration
over a year before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.
156
Truman's dilemma can be characterised by the question: how could the
things being demanded by the Europeans be made identical to America's
national interest and couched in language which would not be rejected
by either the Congress or the people of the United States? This chapter
contains an interpretative account of the way in which the Truman
Administration began to discover its own answer to that question. The
chapter has four subjects. The first is the speeches themselves and
the U.S. press reaction to them. The second is the array of responses
from within the Administration about ways of filling out the President's
policy framework. The third is the way this internal debate had an
impact on the comparatively low-level discussions on Atlantic security
which opened in March between the Americans, Canadians and British.
The final theme is the Vandenberg Resolution, intended as the 'congress¬
ional expression' confirming the presidential declaration but which
became something rather different. Connecting all four are two parallel
strands - the continuing support for West European unity and a growing
apprehension about the economic and military implications of current
declaratory policy.
* * *
In his speeches on 17 March, Truman expressed grave concern about the
situation in Europe. He referred to the Soviet Union's 'constant abuse
of the veto' in the U.N. and communist action which had 'destroyed the
independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in
Eastern and Central Europe'. This, together with pressure on
Scandinavia, Greece and Italy, had established a pattern which was
unacceptable to the United States. He welcomed the fact that 'this
growing menace' had persuaded the free nations of Europe 'to draw close
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together for their economic well-being and for the common defence of
their liberties'. In this respect his choice of words was indicative
of the trend in U.S. foreign policy deliberations. In welcoming the
Brussels Treaty he stressed that its significance went 'far beyond
the actual terms of the agreement itself'. He said:
It is a notable step in the direction of unity
in Europe for protection and preservation of
its civilization. This development deserves
our full support. I am confident that the
United States will, by appropriate means, extend
to the free nations the support which the sit¬
uation requires.
Echoing the help-for-self-^help formula of the ERP, he added that the
determination of the free countries to protect themselves would be
matched by an equal determination on the part of Americans to help
them do so. A similar analysis was offered in New York later the same
day. The British Ambassador reported to London that Americans
generally regarded Western Union 'as a step towards the ultimate
3
establishment of a fully-fledged United States of Europe'.
Taken together, these two speeches represent Truman's first major
public foray into foreign policy since the promulgation of his
eponymous Doctrine. His remarks had some striking features, the
most obvious being the picture of West European unity as an obstacle
to Moscow's burgeoning ambitions. The point was not laboured; as
Marshall would have wished, European national sensitivities were left
only slightly ruffled. But the link between the policy of c^ itainment
and the American conviction about the efficacy of European union was
manifest. Moreover, Truman offered nothing dramatic, despite the vivid
image of ruthless, expansionary communism which he had conjured up.
When he promised 'full support' this was qualified by two phrases,
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'by appropriate means' and 'the support which the situation requires'.
The implication was clear: it would be for the Americans, not the
beleaguered Europeans to deem what was appropriate or necessary. Like
the Truman Doctrine, these two speeches were long on rhetoric and short
on substance. The President was certainly not offering, as John F.
Kennedy was later to do, 'to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship or support any friend' in order to ensure the survival and
4
success of liberty.
This was neither reluctance nor parsimony. For some time it had been
apparent that there was a danger that, unless the West Europeans made
greater efforts, the burden on the United States might become polit¬
ically and economically untenable. In November 1947, the Policy
Planning Staff in the State Department produced a report, written
by the intellectual godfather of containment, George F. Kennan,
which made the case. Kennan noted that since World War II the United
States had 'borne almost single handed the burden of the international
effort to stop the Kremlin's political advance'. This had stretched
American resources "dangerously far'. He therefore urged:
In these circumstances it is clearly unwise for us
to continue the attempt to carry alone, or largely
single-handed, the opposition to Soviet expansion.
It is urgently necessary for us to restore something
of the balance of power in Europe and Asia by strength¬
ening local forces of independence and by getting them
to assume part of our burden. ^
The historian Timothy P. Ireland rightly links this with the position
of Germany. The presence of American troops there was becoming a dis-
0
incentive for the Europeans to safeguard themselves. But this line
of thinking has a wider significance. In the longer historical
context, Kennan's memorandum may be taken as the first draft of what,
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two decades later, would be called the Nixon Doctrine: the idea that
American (and Western) security was most efficiently safeguarded when
regional powers took on the task of defending their area, the role of
the United States being that of arms supplier, political supporter
and little else. In the immediate context of Truman's 17 March speeches,
Kennan's reasoning provided, from the perspective of United States'
national interests, the strategic rationale for the creation of a West
European union with a military dimension.
That this kind of consideration was fundamental to Truman's own apprec¬
iation of developments can be inferred from his recommendations to
Congress. He did not call for an increase in military appropriations.
Nor did he suggest that all available military aid be sent across the
Atlantic. He showed no inclination to reverse the postwar 'recon¬
version' programme by turning American industry from peacetime to war-
7
time production. What he asked for was much more modest. The first
request was an economic one: the speedy enactment of the Marshall Plan,
currently being debated by both Houses. As virtually everyone agreed
in Washington, the ERP was the single most important measure which
Americans could take to put Europe permanently back on its feet, foster
a spirit of unity and thus reduce the United States' involvement over
time. Using the technique which had worked for the Truman Doctrine,
the President used somewhat extravagent anti-communist language in
order to minimise potential opposition. The second request was a
military one: the reintroduction of selective service and the estab¬
lishment of universal military training (UMT) for all able-bodied
Americans. In the event, selective service was reintroduced (it was
only abandoned in 1972 after the Vietnam War); UMT was rejected.
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Truman regretted the rejection of UMT. He considered the measure of
'paramount importance' to American security, and had been considering
it since 1946, when he established a commission to report on the idea.
The commissioners argued that UMT was necessary because it was the
only method by which military manpower levels could be raised'without
overburdening the country's economy through the maintenance of a huge
Q
standing Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps'. This theme was
taken up by a number of Administration officials. According to
Forrestal, on 30 January 1948, Marshall 'spoke with great vigour as
to the necessity of the U.M.T. Programme'. It would, the Secretary
of State argued, convince the world that the United States was ready
to back up its policies abroad 'and thereby would in the long run
result in the saving of very large sums'. On 12 February, he told
the National Security Council that the United States was 'playing with
fire while having nothing with which to put it out'. The answer was
UMT, he suggested. The retiring Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight
D. Eisenhower told Forrestal, the Defense Secretary, that unless
the Army got more men, Germany and the Far East 'would have to be
abandoned to chaos and Communism'. The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C.
Royal1, told Congress that without UMT and the Marshall Plan 'the Army
9
budget and the Army itself should be increased.
However, Truman did not have wholehearted backing for his UMT proposal,
even from within his Administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were
not opposed but felt that the initiation of such training would take
too long to improve the numbers of men under arms. Their preference
was thus for selective service, the effect of which on combat strength
would be more immediate.^"0 In the Policy Planning Staff there was a
different concern. Marshall was told that his personal advocacy of
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UMT held certain risks:
The best information available to the Policy Planning
Staff is that the prospects are poor for enactment
of the UMT legislation this year, even with the
weight of your prestige behind it. This being the
case, failure to enact the legislation after your
strong testimony in its favour would have a very
bad psychological effect abroad, both in dis¬
couraging our friends and encouraging further
aggressive moves by the USSR."'""'"
On this Hickerson disagreed. He advised Marshall that it was possible
'to crystallize public opinion in support of UMT*. Marshall evidently
believed this too. On 17 March, following Truman's message to Congress,
the Secretary of State told the Armed Services Committee in the Senate
that he saw no possible way financially to maintain a reasonable
military posture except on the basis of universal military training.
'Diplomatic action, without the backing of military strength, in the
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present world', he argued, 'can lead only to appeasement'.
Truman and Marshall over-rode the doubters among their policy advisers.
The State Department's Office of Public Affairs produced a special
quantitative study of the press reactions to Truman's two speeches
including their military content. According to this, some three-
«s>
quarters of the leading newspapers received Truman's message favourably.
Most supported the economic and military elements, special support
being for the immediate enactment of ERP. 'Approximately three out of
five of the papers generally approved enactment of the draft, and over
half were also convinced of the need for UMT'. Editorial support was
particularly strong 'with no measurable geographical differences
13
apparent'. Some front-page headlines on the 18 March give a
flavour of the coverage:
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Truman Asks Draft, Universal Training, West Europe
Signs Military Pact: Quick passage of ERP urged to
stop Reds - the Denver Post;
Draft and Military Training Urged by President
in Anti-Red Message: Soviet obstructionism
and desire to subjugate Europe bluntly assailed -
the Cincinnati Times-Star;
Truman Asks Temporary Draft Immediately and
Universal Training as Price of Peace: Marshall
backs plea, House speeds ERP Bill; Soviets
Denounced - the New York Times.
In nearly three-quarters of the papers reviewed - and in almost all
headlines - selective service received the greatest emphasis. This
was natural: of Truman's proposals, conscription touched the American
citizen most immediately.^
Although Truman could take some comfort from this support he had also
to take account of his critics in the press. Opposition came mainly
from sources which were normally against the policies of Truman's
Administration. There were conservative papers like the Wall Street
Journal and Chicago Tribune, which argued that Truman was being forced
into desperate measures because of what they regarded as his previous
policy of appeasing the Russians. His speeches on 17 March were thus
an opportunity to call for the election of a Republican to replace him.
There was criticism from the left as well, mostly from newspapers like
the New York Sun and the Miami Herald which had identified themselves
as mouthpieces of the Wallace wing of the Democratic Party. They
therefore bombasted Truman's 'war-at-any-price programme'; complained
that no alternative was offered to the 'militarization of America';
and asked for 'better evidence that an atomic war' was the 'only
solution' before they would accept Truman's philosophy. More sober
comments came from the San Francisco Chronicle which called for further
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information and wanted to know 'the dimensions of the crisis'; on the
basis of information about the situation in Europe, the paper asked
15
whether there were sufficient grounds for 'sounding the tocsin'.
These criticisms and doubts were not, however, the real causes of the
Truman Administration's failure to establish universal military-
training. Instant demobilisation after a war is part of the American
ethos, backed by a Constitutional proscription of standing armies.
UMT did not conflict with the constitution but there were worries on
Capitol Hill about the trend towards something which might be a
nascent standing army. Congress was doubtful, therefore, irrespective
of the initially positive response in the U.S. press. There were
more specific objections as well. First, the Senate Armed Services
Committee was nervous about the financial cost of UMT and its 'relation
to other components of the military budget'. The Department of Defense
was never able to allay those fears. Secondly, Congress had become
enthusiastic about the potential of air power allied to the atomic
bomb. Opinion was running in favour of the long-range bomber as a
substitute for unattractive measures for enhancing military strength
like UMT. The newly autonomous U.S. Air Force did everything it could
to encourage this view. Finally, Congress had already passed the bill
designed to unify the armed forces within a single government depart¬
ment. The Senate Armed Services Committee, aware of the problems
which inter-Service rivalry had created for the unification programme,
was not disposed to recommend UMT which was endorsed by the Army but
16
opposed by the Air Force.
The congressional rejection of UMT - correctly anticipated in the State
Department - emphasised again the problem of growing commitments and
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shrinking, or at best stable, military resources. During the weeks
after Truman's speeches on 17 March, much attention was paid to
this problem, as it applied to Western Europe. The focus of delibera¬
tions was the President's declaration to Western Union that the United
States would extend to the free nations 'the support which the situation
requires'. Pressmen evidently thought this constituted a policy, the
details of which had already been worked out. In fact, Truman's remarks
marked merely the beginning of that working-out process.
The Policy Planning Staff, under the temporary directorship of George
H. Butler (due to the absence of George F. Kennan in the Far East), now
grappled with the problem. On 19 March, Butler produced a discussion
paper setting out three alternative ways of giving effect to Truman's
words. Each of these had powerful sponsors within the Administration.
What emerged a year later in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty
contained elements of all three. The first was for a treaty of
reciporocal military assistance, based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
but not restricting membership to a particular geographical region.
The second was for a regional treaty of mutual military assistance
which would be an amalgam of the Rio and Brussels Treaties. Both of
these options involved the United States directly and formally in the
defence arrangements of Western Europe. The third was different.
It was based on the idea of giving a unilateral assurance to the Western
Union that an attack on the Brussels Treaty signatories would be
interpreted as a direct assault on the United States. The objective
behind all three was the same: to deter an aggressor by assuring him
in advance that any aggression would meet the countervailing force
17
of the United States.
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Superficially the proponents of the unilateralist position - led by
George Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor at the State Department -
lost the argument: an 'entangling alliance' was created. However,
their views were powerful influences when the detailed text of the
treaty was drafted months later. It was only when the organisation
spawned by the treaty began to operate in the 1950s that their' views
were rejected as irrelevant. On historical and intellectual grounds
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they certainly cannot be lightly dismissed. They were, after all,
close in spirit to the U.S. diplomatic tradition of avoiding foreign
entanglements. They represented what can be called the postwar version
of isolationism made respectable. Also, the United States had only
ever been 'isolationist' vis-a-vis the Europeans. Given that the
postwar world had thrust greater global responsibilities on the
Americans, there was a strong case for keeping commitments to a mini¬
mum in any one area. This argument appealed to those critical of the
West Europeans. As Kennan wrote:
The suggestion... that an alliance was needed to
assure the participation of the United States in
the cause of Western Europe's defense only filled
me with impatience. What in the world did they
think we had been doing in Europe these last
four or five years?^"®
The essential point here, as Kennan made plain, was not anti-Europeanism
but rather a consciousness that resources were finite and that the
United States was acting already 'as generously and effectively' as
it could to confront the challenges faced by the West Europeans.
On political grounds, however, the unilateralist argument had scant
chance of wide acceptance within the Administration. Kennan and Bohlen
said, in effect, 'We are not as strong as we need to be; therefore we must
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steer clear of any entanglement'. But most of their colleagues did
not agree. They preferred to say, 'We are not as strong as we need
to be; therefore a way must be found to augment our strength by building
up friendly powers to share the job of world policman with us'. More¬
over, the Truman Administration had established a habit of responding
to West European weakness. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan
were the two most conspicuous examples of this. The outright opponents
of Kennan and Bohlen, and those who had different views, were there¬
fore predisposed to listen to the West Europeans. And not a single
government in Western Europe saw the world as a safer place if the
United States did not make a whole-hearted security guarantee to
themselves. The thought uppermost in the minds of Marshall, Lovett,
Butler, Hickerson and Achilles was not, as Kennan alleged, 'the
20
ostentatious stimulation of a military rivalry' between East and West.
Rather it was how to reassure European opinion that the United States
was not going to follow its own example in 1920 and assume the role of
perfidious America.
Those of such opinions had their views reinforced almost daily by the
influx of cabled messages from U.S. missions and embassies in Western
Europe. Expectations had been aroused in Europe by U.S. aid and could
not now be disappointed without serious consequences. What these
consequences might be was dramatically illustrated by a despatch from
Ptt-rfc
the Embassy in London, dated 30 January 1948. The cable read, in fa&t:
It is because British gratitude to US today is
not unlike what it was in the days when lend-
lease bill was being debated in 1940 that Bevin
could take a calculated risk in standing up to
Soviet Union. But it was a risk based on
assumption that US aid would be forthcoming
in acceptable form. If that expectation should
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be disappointed, no one can say what the outcome
will be. So great are the stakes that British
may have no alternative except seek rapprochement
with Soviet giion, no matter what government might
be in power.
For American officials this was geostrategic reality in its starkest
form. It was repeated in one way or another throughout 1948. No
single despatch was as influential as, for example, Kennan's 'Long
Telegram' from Moscow in February 1946, in which he first put the
case for 'containment'. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of a
whole series of messages helped to undermine the unilateralists' case
still further. Put another way, many American representatives in
Europe had, in the diplomatists' parlance, 'gone native*.
A convert to the view that something further had to be done to reassure
the West Europeans was Kennan's deputy, George H. Butler. Perhaps
taking advantage of his superior's absence in Japan, Butler produced
a report which took a different line from Kennan's. It was titled
"The Position of the United States with respect to Western Union and
related problems', known as PPS 27, and circulated on 23 March 1948.
Butler argued that, although the United States had to help 'resist
the aggression of Soviet-directed world Communism', fear of the Soviet
Union did have a constructive side: 'Fear of Soviet-Communist aggres¬
sion is sufficiently strong that many of the free nations of Europe
are willing to cooperate in close association, provided they are
assured of military support by the United States'. That assurance,
Butler thought, 'could be predicated upon resolute action by them
and should take the form of a firm commitment to extend military and
other support'. Here again was the self-help theme: the precise method
giving meaning to the President's 17 March speech to Congress should
'leave maximum freedom of method compatible with effective assurance
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of reciprocal support from them'. Butler envisaged a three-stage process.
First, Western Union should be expanded to include Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and Poland and Portugal. Later, Italy, Eire, Switzerland,
Germany, Spain and Austria would also join. Western Union members
were to be encouraged to deepen their cooperation, in economic and
cultural fields in addition to military ones. Second, the United
States should give an immediate but unilateral assurance that an
attack on any member of Western Union would be regarded as an attack
on the United States. Finally, Butler recommended that the United
22
States conclude a mutual defence agreement with these countries.
Kennan was furious about the content of PPS 27. Some of the recom¬
mendations contained in it were the very ones which he had argued were
not only inappropriate but also unnecessary. Yet because it had been
produced by his departmental section, he felt at least partially bound
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by it, as he admitted. Nevertheless he continued, with his
colleague Charles E. Bohlen, to oppose the very idea of a treaty
on the grounds that it would divert attention from economic matters -
where the United States was strong - to military issues - where the
United States (and the Western world) was weak. He recalled his
attitude at this time vividly in his autobiography.
Time and time again, in the ensuing weeks, I said
to my colleagues: 'All right, the Russians are well
armed and we are poorly armed. So what? We are
like a man who has let himself into a walled garden
and finds himself alone with a dog with very big
teeth. The dog, for the moment, shows no signs of
aggressiveness. The best thing for us to do is
surely to try to establish, as between the two of us,
the assumption that teeth have nothing whatsoever
to do with our mutual relationship....If the dog
shows no disposition to assume that it is otherwise,
why should we raise the subject and invite attention
to the disparity?'^
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Kennan also opposed the treaty idea per se: he had little confidence
in treaties of alliance, perceiving that they could be readily distorted
for ulterior purposes. He did not abandon his efforts against an
Atlantic pact until after the re-election of President Truman later in
the year.
Apart from Kennan's continuing opposition, there are three additional
considerations to be taken into account before assessing the possible
impact of PPS 27 on the formation of policy. First, Marshall himself
never approved the report. He regarded it as having 'the status of
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a working paper', and had 'not taken any position with respect to it'.
The National Security Council received the report in a different form
and produced its own version only after the Vandenberg Resolution had
been passed. By then a number of things had changed. Secondly, Kennan
was in agreement with his staff, and the State Department generally,
on the question about expanding the membership of Western Union, to
include most, if not all, of Western Europe. No senior official in
the Department envisaged a mutual defence pact as in any way as
acceptable replacement for the notion of a truly united Western Europe,
or for the conviction that the West Europeans had to do more to help
themselves militarily. Finally, Butler's memorandum was issued the
day after talks began - in a Pentagon basement amidst great secrecy
between American, British and Canadian representatives - on the subject
of an Atlantic Pact. Thus PPS 27 followed a trend already established
rather than initiating a new departure.
The tripartite discussions on the subject of an Atlantic security
system began in Washington on 22 March 1948. What had prompted the
talks was the Anglo-French request, discussed in Chapter 2, for such
170
exchanges; but only representatives from the United States, Britain
and Canada were present. The ostensible reason for excluding France
was that country's apparent vulnerability to Soviet intelligence
penetration. However.it is reasonable to speculate that, when it
came to talking about transatlantic military matters, the habits of
tripartite wartime cooperation simply took over. The discussions
lasted for a little more than a week. On 1 April, the representatives
produced a report on their deliberations - known as the Pentagon Paper -
which recommended *a course of action adequate to give effect to the
declaration of March 17 by the President of support to the free nations
20
of Europe'. The essence of the Pentagon Paper was described in the
minutes of the final meeting of the representatives.
It was generally agreed that a treaty should be
accomplished and as soon as possible, the optimum
possibility being that it might be accomplished
prior to the end of the current session of Congress.
This would have much greater political affect than
a mere declaration of intent, no matter how strongly
worded for Presidential delivery.^
London and - almost certainly - Moscow were the only European capitals
to which the news of this conclusion was passed. The Foreign Office
knew of the Pentagon Paper because British representatives took part
in the drafting of it. The Kremlin was probably told of its existence
by a member of the British delegation, Donald Maclean, later to be
exposed as a Soviet agent. Again almost certainly, the relief in both
capitals would have been similar. The British could feel that Bevin's
concept of an Atlantic Pact had moved a large step forward. The Russians
could take comfort in the news - if MacLean so reported the proceedings -
that despite events in Czechoslovakia in neither West European nor
American minds was there any intention of embarking on a strategy of
28
destabilisation in Eastern Europe, much less an actual armed attack.
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Both could feel safer.
However, crucial to the understanding of the Pentagon Paper's real
significance is the fact that the document was much more important
to the British than to the Americans. Marshall himself took no part
in the talks other than to approve of their taking place; he left
Washington on 29 March to attend the ninth International Conference
of American States at Bogota', Columbia. Lovett was also otherwise
engaged. There was no representative from Truman's staff present
either. No participant was of higher than ambassador rank. The U.S.
team was led by Lewis W. Douglas, who had already represented Marshall's
views on aspects of transatlantic relations to the Senate Foreign
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Relations Committee. Douglas was supported by Hickerson and Achilles,
whose views on closer Atlantic ties were well known; and by George
Butler, who a British diplomat described as 'representing George Kennan'
30
but who had come to share Hickerson's opinion. Also in the American
team was Major-General Alfred M. Gruenther, representing the U.S.
military establishment. Absent were Charles Bohlen and others in the
Department of State opposed on grounds of principle or practicality
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to an Atlantic Pact.
The U.S. delegation, in sum, was of high calibre but of relatively low
status, and not representative of all shades of opinion in the Admin¬
istration. It is therefore premature to describe the Pentagon talks
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as 'the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty'. Throughout the
negotiations the Americans repeated that no commitments were being
entered into; the results of the talks would not be binding on the
three governments concerned. From the American point of view this
was partly because Congressional support could not be guaranteed,
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and partly because the U.S. representatives were not empowered to
define the position of the Administration. Even Hickerson was being
careful, according to the minutes of the last meeting, to impress the
British with the idea that the Pentagon Paper represented 'only a
concept of what is desired at the working level1 and that British
expectations should be based on nothing more than this. Half way
through the talks, the British Ambassador, Inverchapel, indicated
that Bevin was being kept abreast of developments; Hickerson commented
that the talks were 'too tentative to merit official reaction at
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Mr. Bevin's level'.
In an account of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty written in
the weeks following the signing ceremony on 4 April 1949, J. Nicholas
Henderson, then a Secretary in the British Embassy, noted he had
regarded the progress towards an Atlantic Pact as inevitable, once
the next stage in the negotiations got under way during the summer of
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1948. Three decades later he was more sceptical and referred to other
apparently inevitable international arguments which never came about
because of 'excessive focus on immediate national rather than common
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long term interests' . That same scepticism is appropriate to the
Pentagon negotiations of March 1948 as well. Nothing was decided
upon other than the text of what amounted to an international working
paper and no more. Even the agreement in principle to conclude some
form of arrangement at a later stage meant very little. As Dean Rusk -
then Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs - recalled,
George Marshall during his time as Secretary of State was always
against agreements in principle because such agreements meant nothing
until all of the fine print, qualifications and modifications were
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known. Given the 'excessive focus on immediate national interests'
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in an election year, with what many regarded as an already 'lame duck'
President, the West Europeans were as far from formalising a greater
American commitment to themselves as they ever had been.
The Pentagon talks are important but not for the reason that they
represent the 'launch' of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Pentagon
Paper, and the talks which produced it, are of interest to historians
because of what is revealed in them about the complexity of the
American attitude towards Western Europe. In comparison, the position
of the Canadians and British was straightforward. The Canadians had
been on record for some time as wishing to strengthen the U.N. Charter
by the creation of an Atlantic security arrangement under Article 51.
They would not have opposed a collective pact open to all, including
the Soviet Union. The British position was summarised by Henderson
as 'an attempt to obtain an early American commitment to support the
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Brussels Treaty, and to join an Atlantic Pact'.
Two European scholars, Wiebes and Zeeman, have argued that PPS 27
'laid down future policy' and that the State Department had decided
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upon an Atlanticist policy as early as March 1948. Both contentions
are correct as far as they go. PPS 27, Butler's memorandum of 23 March,
did resemble the Pentagon Paper, white in turn bore a strong similarity
in outline to the North Atlantic Treaty. On the basis of the Pentagon
Paper, it is clear that the Atlanticists - Hickerson, Achilles and
Butler - were beginning to dominate policy formulation regarding Europe
in the State Department. But their 'success' was due, in part, to
the temporary absence of two key 'unilateralists' or 'Europeanists',
Kennan and Bohlen, from the deliberations. Even if that had not been
the case, the steps towards a collective defence pact suggested in
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the Pentagon Paper had still to be approved at the levels which
mattered: by Lovett and Marshall; the NSC, Forrestal and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; and finally by the President and a Republican-dominated
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Congress in an election year. It is therefore not surprising that
Hickerson should have warned the British and Canadian delegations that
they had to realise that 'some Presidential declaration might in
practice be all that the Americans could offer'. Adding that a great
deal would depend on whether there were fresh outbreaks of potentially
hostile Soviet activity, he reportedly said that 'if complete calm
prevailed it would be so much more difficult to sell the idea of a
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pact to the Senatorial leaders'.
The Soviet Union was soon to oblige by beginning the blockade of
Berlin in late June. But in early April the U.S. Government had still
to define its own position with respect to West European demands. Two
issues in particular caused difficulties later for American policy
makers: the question of which regional groupings were appropriate to
what purposes; and the extent to which any Administration could commit
a successor to take military action or qualify the right of Congress,
enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution,to declare war.
On the regional issue the Americans drew a distinction between a
European and an Atlantic group not drawn by the British. Had all three
sets of representatives shared the twin objectives of the British -.U.S.
backing for Western Union, and the creation of an Atlantic Pact - then
this could have been readily achieved by extending the Brussels Treaty
to cover the United States and Canada. The assession clause of that
treaty, Article IX, provided for just such a development. However,
this was specifically ruled out by the Americans, whose position was
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set out in the minutes of the second tripartite meeting on 23 March.
Extension of the Brussels Pact should not involve
adherence by the US (or Canada), in Hickerson's
view, since the US hopes to see the eventual
development of a United States of Western Europe
(possibly later of all Europe) and the Brussels
pact offers the hard core for such a development.
It would lose its utility for this purpose were
the US to join.40
Coming from a convinced Atlanticist like Hickerson, these remarks are
important. They show, first, that despite the international atmos¬
phere surrounding the events in Prague, American enthusiasm for West
European unity was undimmed. Secondly, although the tripartite
talks had been convened, there was no sense in which the U.S. Government
saw an Atlantic arrangement replacing the Brussels Treaty system.
Finally, following the Marshall Plan experience, the Truman Adminis¬
tration was clearly banking on Western Union as a military organisation
with a function similar to that of the O.E.E.C.: an institution the
workings of which would help inculcate the habits of international
cooperation, leading to a degree of supranational authority.
However, there were problems with this design, largely because of the
position of France and the United Kingdom. As Kennan had recognised
in February, there could be no viable European union or federation
41
without the full support of both countries. The French would take
no action unless the British did as well; but if Britain did look
towards Europe it would not solve its long term economic problems
and therefore retard European recovery, rehabilitation and recon¬
struction , the sine qua non of the Marshall Plan. The Americans could
not decide whether an Atlantic security arrangement or a European
political and economic union ought to have over-riding priority.
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This indecisiveness reflected a lack of clarity about where United
States' national interests really lay, an indecisiveness which was
the product of a combination of differences of opinion within the
State Department, Marshall's diplomatic style and doubt about what
Congress would approve. In contrast, the British and Canadians knew
much more precisely what they wanted. It was they who were instru¬
mental in eliminating a world-wide pact under Article 51 or a straight¬
forward Presidential declaration as possible options for the United
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States.
But deciding which nations should join which group, and whether an
Atlantic or a European arrangement ought to be the first order of
business, did not help the United States to solve its other problem:
the exact wording of the casus foederis in the suggested treaty. Even
at this stage defining the circumstances under which the signatories
would go to war was of paramount importance to the Americans. It was
not so significant for the United Kingdom, as was made clear by
Gladwyn Jebb, a member of the British delegation. He told his colleagues
in the Foreign Office that the United States would only agree to a
treaty if the casus foederis was to be determined by the individual
signatory nations themselves, not by some majority or collective
decision. He went on to note:
All this is of course important, but nowhere near
so important as the main question, namely whether after
making their enquiries the United States Administration
feel able to support the idea of a Pact at all.4^
For its part the Truman Administration could not decide whether to
support the idea of a pact until the casus foederis had been agreed.
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Two main options presented themselves, neither of which was satisfactory.
The Rio Treaty of 1947 offered one possibility. The operational clause
to which the United States had agreed as a signatory stipulated that
an attack on one American state would be regarded as an attack against
all and that each of the signatories undertook 'to assist in meeting
the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence' recognised in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Even though from a United States viewpoint the Rio Treaty was backed
by the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine - and many U.S. military inter¬
ventions in Latin America - no mention was made of the use of armed
force. The same formula applied to West Europeans might have been
accepted by the Americans but would not have achieved the main purpose
of restoring confidence in Europe. The West Europeans may well have
accepted in the end, had the United States insisted. But matters never
reached that stage because Washington did not lose sight of the need
to reassure its friends. The other option derived from the Brussels
Treaty itself. Article IV automatically committed the signatories to
military action if the casus foederis occurred. The members of Western
Union agreed to afford the country under attack 'all the military and
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other aid and assistance in their power'. They would have been
wholly content had the Americans been prepared to agree to that 'hair
trigger' clause. In practice, constitutional considerations made this
impossible for Americans. (The Brussels Treaty would have been modified
had the United States sought to become a signatory). Under the U.S.
Constitution, the President and the Executive may negotiate and ratify
treaties but this can only be done 'with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate'. The Senate would not approve any measure which reduced
Congressional influence on foreign policy, especially the right to
45
determine when the United States was at war.
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The difference between tie two options was thus raich more than a technical
distinction. Apart from the political and constitutional considerations,
there was a military dimension to this as well. The availability of
American forces to augment the troops in central Europe was much in
doubt. Shortfalls in manpower levels had persuaded both Truman and
Marshall to support the reintroduction- of selective service and the
inauguration of universal military training. However, there was no
guarantee that these measures would be passed. As Inverchapel noted,
the American public was 'well ahead of Congress' in its willingness to
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accept both. Congressional refusal to deliver more men would be
certain to undermine any feasible, additional commitment to Western
Europe.
Major-General Alfred Gruenther, representing the Department of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon discussions, was under¬
standably cautious in his contributions to the talks. Although James
Forrestal was reported to be the 'foremost advocate' of an Atlantic
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Pact, the JCS were more wary. Inter-Service rivalry and fierce
arguments about roles and missions made it impossible for the JCS
to agree on anything other than the desirability of minimising commit¬
ments. Asked by Ambassador Douglas whether the United States was
biting off more than it could chew if an Atlantic Pact was formed,
Gruenther was non-commital. All he would say was that any undertaking
to go to the aid of another country should not stipulate that such aid
be delivered locally. He argued that the United States should retain
the freedom to carry out action against an aggressor in accordance
48
with existing American strategic concepts. As will become evident
in the next chapter, this could scarcely reassure the West Europeans.
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However, the most striking evidence of the inconclusiveness of the
Pentagon negotiations comes from Bevin's reactions. On 9 April 1948,
the British Foreign Secretary cabled Inverchapel in Washington with a
message for Robert Lovett. From the shortened version handed in at
the State Department it is obvious that Bevin was not working on the
assumption that a treaty was imminent or even a more distant prob¬
ability. The message had three aims. The first was to acquaint the
Americans with the fact that Bevin had cleared the idea of an Atlantic
pact, as discussed in the Pentagon Paper, with the Prime Minister and
Cabinet colleagues. Should the United States invite participation in
a conference to discuss defence arrangements for the North Atlantic
area, then Washington could be assured in advance that the British were
eager to attend. The second objective was to argue the case for a
multilateral, collective security system. If Bevin had confidence
in the Pentagon Paper as embodying American foreign policy, this would
not have been necessary. He argued for going beyond the 'half measure'
of ERP; for creating confidence in Western Europe; and for American
support of Western Union and membership of an Atlantic security system
as ways of solving 'the age-old trouble between Germany and France'.
Bevin's third purpose was to destroy the case for American support
being conveyed in a Presidential declaration. Again, a modicum of
faith in the Pentagon proposals would have rendered this effort un¬
necessary. He concluded: 'To sum up, we' do not believe that there
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is any substitute for a Treaty if something effective is to be done'.
The argument used against a Presidential declaration was well designed
to stimulate the desired response from the Truman Administration.
Bevin wrote:
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Again, any such declaration not having the backing
of the Senate would make people here very doubtful
as to whether they had incurred any reciprocal
obligation. We should certainly be under a moral
obligation not to leave the United States in the
lurch. We should be constantly challenged as to
whether we were in any way bound by a presidential
declaration, and we should have to say that there
was no commitment. That would leave us in a very
unsatisfactory position and might arouse resent¬
ment in America.
This diplomatic understatement was effectively suggestive. Sensitive
nerves were touched with precision: the acknowledgement of the Senate
as a power in international relations; the legally worthless promise
of a European 'moral obligation' to American security; and the implicit
suggestion that resentment^in the United States) of Europe's response
to the President's initiative would redound on Truman's hopes of re¬
election .
Unwittingly, Bevin somewhat spoiled the effect. He expressed the
anxiety that, in an emergency, the British would be left waiting'as
in 1940 in a state of uncertainty'. He went on to suggest, albeit
indirectly, that without a collective security arrangement which
included the United States, Britain would find it difficult to resist
aggression and may have to resort to appeasement policies again. It
was one thing for the U.S. Embassy in London to express almost identical
sentiments, but quite another for Bevin to question the integrity of
the United States in having irresponsibly left the United Kingdom
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standing alone in 1940. The effect was immediate. Lovett cabled
Douglas in London with instructions to tell Bevin that the United
States Government considered, his wording as 'highly unfortunate'.
Bevin's response was to the effect that Britain was relatively much
weaker than in 1940 and so could not hope 'for a successful stand
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against the Soyiet hordes for a protracted period'.
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Bevin's apologetic explanation was accepted but the net effect of
this slight cooling of the temperature in Anglo-American relations
was to confirm U.S. officials in the view that European self-help
was a theme to be stressed again and again. Bevin was told by-
Douglas that the tendency on the part of Western Union members to
hold back from developing their joint venture, pending an American
assurance of prompt military support, represented precisely the
attitude which might deter the United States from making any commit¬
ment. (Bevin blamed the French for dragging their feet; in the months
ahead the same accusation was directed at the British). Douglas,
now back in London after leading the U.S. team in the Pentagon talks,
restated the policy laid down by Marshall and Lovett in January. The
Europeans were to attach considerable importance to the President's
17 March speech in which the United States pledged to keep troops in
Germany until the peace of Europe was secure. Against that background,
if the Brussels Pact members revealed a resolute determination to
integrate and coordinate their defences, the United States would be
prepared to discuss how best to provide support by the coordination of
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the production and supply of military materiel.
Here was clear evidence that the "anti-Treaty Party' - as Henderson
called Kennan, Bohlen and other opponents of the Atlantic Pact -
had begun to reassert itself after having been excluded, deliberately
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or otherwise, from the Pentagon talks. While the British had come
to see the issue in black-and-white terms of a choice between an
Atlantic Pact or chaos, the American officials not in the pro-Treaty
Party saw matters in less simplistic terms. Douglas was saying that
such a choice did not exist; that there were other ways of making
Western Europe secure, which did not necessary require a fully-fledged
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treaty. Western Union was militarily weak but it had the manpower.
The United States could use its productive potential to help provide
European forces with the equipment they needed. By avoiding wasteful
duplication through consultation across the Atlantic, and between the
members of Western Union, strength would be built to the extent that
the Western Europeans could deter an aggressor. This was very much
the line taken by Kennan and Bohlen. They were not gambling with
European security; they simply believed that the presence on the
ground in Germany of American troops was the foundation of peace
in Europe, and that therefore talk about a treaty was largely irrel¬
evant. At most what Western Union needed was to expand its membership
and be supported politically by a unilateralist declaration and mil¬
itarily by a 'military ERP'.
The growing influence of these views became apparent to the British.
The Foreign Office was informed that 'Hickerson had been encountering
resistance to his idea of a Pact' during discussions with State
Department colleagues. Bevin told Attlee at the beginning of April
that he calculated the chances of the U.S. Government agreeing to
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treaty proposals were 'little better than fifty-fifty'. Lovett
was particularly anxious to disabuse the British of the notion that
the outcome was foregone. Henderson recalled a meeting between the
U.S. Under-Secretary of State and Lord Inverchapel, which took place
on 10 April when the British Ambassador told the Americans of Cabinet
approval of the Pentagon Paper.
Alas, Lovett could report no such progress on the
American side. His mood that day was pessimistic,
even for him. More than the usual number of bogies
were besetting him from all sides. There really
were terrible difficulties with Congress, he feared.
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He mentioned potential problems in Congress about the appropriations
vote on ERP and that in an election year some general declaration of
support was all that the President could give. He also pointed out
that, as yet, the United States had not seen any serious efforts at
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military collaboration among Western Union countries.
All of this was in marked contrast to the timetable established in the
final Pentagon meeting. It had been decided then that the need for
quick results over-rode all other considerations. Full scale nego¬
tiations were to begin in May at the latest. So strong was this
conviction that the series of talks was brought to a premature close
in order to make preparations for the substantive talks, despite
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unresolved disagreements on a number of items. In fact the
serious negotiations did not begin until after the Berlin blockade
had begun. It was not until this fresh evidence of apparent Soviet
intransigence that the Americans felt obliged to sit down with their
Canadian and West European colleagues. Even so, negotiations on
Atlantic security lasted from July until the very eve of the North
Atlantic Treaty signing ceremony.
Commenting on the lull between the end of the Pentagon talks and the
opening of proper negotiations, two historians have suggested that the
most important reasons for the delay were 'the internal differences of
opinion within the State Department and the efforts to unite Congress
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behind the pla s'. Measured against much of the historiography of
the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO, this explanation is perceptive.
However, it does proceed from what might be termed the 'Whig inter¬
pretation1 of NATO's origins. The unspoken assumption is that the
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North Atlantic Treaty was somehow inevitable and that NATO was the
natural.beneficial and automatic product. The delay is thus seen as
no more than a break in continuous progress towards those goals. From
the perspective of the State Department in April 1948 matters looked
rather different. There was no certainty that the Hickerson group
would succeed in convincing the higher echelons in the State Department
of the desirability of their proposals. Despite what Lovett told
Inverchapel, relations with Congress were productive because Senator
Vandenberg was not asked to back the 'plan' outlined in the Pentagon
Paper. Above all, there is no room in the interpretation for the
strong possibility that the Americans deliberately exaggerated the
internal difficulties and problems with Congress as a method of forcing
the British - and through them West Europeans as a whole - to do more
for themselves.
This was the strategy that Marshall adopted in the immediate aftermath
of the Czech crisis. It was foreshadowed in the Secretary of State's
remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January. Referring
to the long-term effects of ERP, he said that the problems would
occur when the 'heat' was no longer on the West Europeans to consol¬
idate their joint efforts into collective action. If there was a
single sentence of Bevin's initial written enquiry about U.S. backing
for the proposed Western Union which impressed Washington it was:
'We in Britain can no longer stand outside Europe and insist that our
problems and position are quite separate from those of our European
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neighbours'. It was just that kind of remark which convinced State
Department officials that their Utopian ideas about a 'United States
of Europe' were capable of being brought to fruition, to the benefit of
the United States of America. When Lovett personally learned from the
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Belgian Prime Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, that the British and French
were reluctant to proceed with a tight implementation of the Brussels
Treaty he acted promptly. Cables were sent to the Embassies in London
and Paris to convey the message that the more tightly the Treaty was
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implemented, the better the United States would like it. As with
the Marshall Plan, the key to success in the American scheme was the
emphasis given to the self-help condition: U.S. assistance was to be
an offer only to the extent of providing what the Europeans could not
produce themselves.
Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
entirely agreed with that approach. Because of the central role he
played in gaining wide, tripartisan acceptance of ERP, he was fully
conversant with the assumptions underlying foreign policy. Lovett
showed him the proposals contained in the Pentagon Papers, during
the first in a number of meetings designed to explore the limits of
tolerance of Senators and State Department officials on trans¬
atlantic security policy matters. Vandenberg's initial reaction to
the idea of a pact suggested in the paper was characteristic. Lovett,
reporting their conversation of 11 April, wrote: 'He said that the
Congress was anxious to help but that the proposal here was in the
nature of an unlimited, open-ended offer of aid to anyone who might
reach for it...'. It was the Senator's view that such an offer would
encourage America's friends 'to fold their hands and let Uncle Sam
carry them', or, alternatively, to foster an unwarranted sense of
security which might actually lead to provocative action by the
recipients of aid. He told Lovett that the need for some sort of
assurance of assistance was recognised, but felt that 'its form must
in all events leave the determination to this country' as to the
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circumstances under which the United States extended aid. Vandenberg
was 'cool on the formal guarantee of a pact' but prepared to cooperate
in the search for a short-term procedure to back up the countries of
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Western Europe.
Given the currents of opinion running in the State Department there
was no significant difference between the views of the two men. The
product of their meetings was Senate Resolution 239, known as the
Vandenberg Resolution, passed on a vote of 64 to 6. The two most
important clauses entitled the U.S. Government to pursue:
Progressive development of regional and other
collective arrangements for individual and
collective self-defence in accordance with
the purposes, principles and provisions of
the [U.N.] Charter;
and Association of the United States, by
constitutional process, with such regional
and other collective arrangements as are
based on continuous and effective self-
help and mutual aid, and as affect its
national security.
Dean Acheson, Marshall's successor, later called this resolution 'the
forerunner of NATO'. John Foster Dulles linked it to the Monroe
Doctrine as a landmark in U.S. diplomacy. NATO's first Secretary-
General, Lord Ismay, said it marked a striking evolution in American
foreign and defence policies in peacetime and made possible American
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membership of the Atlantic Alliance.
Historians have tended to confirm those opinions. In its own publications,
NATO describes the resolution as having cleared the constitutional road
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to the North Atlantic Treaty. There is no doubt that some in the
State Department did see in this way, notably the pro-Treaty Party.
But others did not. Certainly no-one at the time thought that the
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resolution would lead to a permanent international bureaucracy such
as NATO became. There is therefore a need to distinguish between
cause and effect. Certainly the effect of the Senate vote was to
make the North Atlantic Treaty a constitutional possibility. However,
that is not an argument supporting the assumption that such was the
intention. This is an equally strong case for saying that the framers
of the resolution thought in terms of precluding the development of
an Atlantic Pact.
The problem faced by Vandenberg and Lovett was to define the extent
to which the United States could go towards membership of a regional
defence arrangement, yet at the same time reserve to the Senate the
final decision about how far the United States would in fact go.
Vandenberg, the former isolationist converted by the attack on Pearl
Harbour, made his own position plain: "The whole purpose is to avoid
any direct alliance, or the whole purpose is to retain complete freedom
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of action on our own part with respect to the evolution of events.'
Lovett made a similar point when explaining the resolution to represent¬
atives of Western Union and Canada. He pointed out that it was an
'extraordinary paper in America history' in that it was a statement
of policy in advance. He stressed that it represented no guarantee
and ought not to be over-emphasised, 'except as representing the
absolute maximum to which the United States might go'. He insisted
that the resolution 'carried no assurance that the U.S. would go that
far'. It was an act of one element of the American government and he
warned that 'the final result might differ markedly from the concept
00
contained in the Vandenberg Resolution'.
188
On that basis, Resolution 239 can be interpreted as a recognition
of what might be necessary or possible, rather than as an expression
of what was desirable or probable. Similarly, the lack of specificity
in the language reflected not only Senatorial caution but the division
within the State Department. The actual wording gave no encouragement
to either the 'Atlanticists' or the 'Europeanists'. Both could
accommodate their policy proposals within it. However, on the Senate
side, there was interest in the relationship between the resolution
and the general inclination towards the idea of European unity. Lovett
was therefore careful to make the connection in his talks with Senators.
He told the Foreign Relations Committee, for example, that passage of
the resolution was necessary before the end of the legislative session.
Prompt action by the Senate would help the nations comprising Western
Union 'to firm up their union and fusion movement in three areas:
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political, economic and military'.
This was more than merely a grace note sounded for the benefit of
Senators whose preferences were well known. Lovett linked the issue
of unity in Western Europe directly with American national security.
The Senators were told:
The military situation is one of particular concern
because the union of Europe, which is one of our
cardinal purposes in connection with the national
security aspect of this country as well as the
hopes of rehabilitation in Europe, depends a great
deal on what the countries involved feel the
attitude of this country is toward such a union.
With West European unity in mind, the resolution was based on the
same principles as Marshall Aid. Any action by the United States
would depend upon the Europeans recognising the 'fundamental necessity'
of helping themselves and helping each other 'long before they come
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to us'. Lovett denied, without qualification, that the United States
would join the Brussels Treaty. The West Europeans, he said, 'must
08
not take the attitude, "I'm tired, Daddy. Carry me" '. Vandenberg
supported this overall approach when speaking for the adoption of the
resolution in the Senate debate. He spoke of a federation of the
European peoples as 'one of the most helpful evolutions that could
be contemplated' . He thought that the emphasis on the development
of regional and collective arrangements 'specifically includes the
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great idea of a United States of Europe'.
Vandenberg's support for European unity of some sort may have been
the vestiges of his earlier isolationism but his obvious enthusiasm
was nourished by his close working relationship with John Foster Dulles.
Vandenberg was the acknowledged Republican spokesman on foreign affairs
in the Senate and he relied on Dulles as his principal adviser.
Dulles in turn was one of Marshall's confidants, and the man recog¬
nised as Marshall's successor at the State Department in the event of
a Republican victory in November. Lovett had given his blessing to
Vandenberg's continuing consultation with Dulles on the issue of the
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resolution. Even before the Vandenberg-Lovett conversation began,
Lovett approached Dulles to get his general views. Both men agreed
on 8 April that political and economic guarantees should be given to
Europeans only on a provisional basis. This would 'give some
protection during the dangerous period of transition from division
to unity'. Dulles added that he felt it would be a 'catastrophe' if
the United States were to guarantee 'the existing status of disunity'
Echoing Marshall's earlier remarks about how to keep the 'heat' on
the Europeans, Dulles wrote to Vandenberg: 'Unity requires hard
political decisions which are only taken under the pressure of necessity,
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and if we take that pressure off, little will happen'. Confirmation
that this attitude was justified came when Dulles met Paul-Henri Spaak,
the Belgian leader currently in Washington. Spaak told Dulles that
he was ready to lead moves towards European unity but was not hopeful
of any major developments unless the United States kept the pressure
on. Two weeks later, Lovett told Dulles that in drafting the
resolution, care would be taken to ensure that the United States was
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not underpinning the status quo in Western Europe.
Dulles himself was confident that his ideas were shared by both Lovett
and Marshall. Their views on European unity were less public than
his but there can be no doubt that Dulles made his own contribution
to the Vandenberg Resolution. An American historian, Daryl J. Hudson,
has suggested that the resolution illustrates the influence of
Vandenberg on foreign policy, rather than evidence of State Department
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dominance, as suggested by Acheson and others. This conclusion
might well be extended to cover Dulles's contribution also. His
intervention ensured that the resolution determined not so much that
the United States was willing to enter a regional defence arrangement
but that it would consider doing so only once the West Europeans
took firm and irrevocable steps to unite. This was a straightforward
application of the principles Marshall had already decided upon. The
implication of the two paragraphs from the resolution,quoted above,
was that Europeans were to create a regional grouping before Americans
would consider any 'association' with it. As Senator Hickenlooper
remarked, the United States had to avoid being trapped into supporting
73
something where 'we give all the quid and there just is not any quo'.
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The four people most closely concerned with the drafting of the res¬
olution - Marshall, Lovett, Vandenberg and Dulles - were meticulous
about the wording. Nuances of meaning were explored in order that
the eventual text went no further than Truman's speech of 17 March.
The clause dealing with the 'association' by the United States with
regional security arrangements was obviously crucial and it went
through a number of textual revisions. Lovett rejected the words
'participation' and 'support' on the grounds that both implied a
degree of commitment greater than was envisaged by the State Depart¬
ment. In all cases, the acid test was U.S. national interests. 'If
a regional group was set up in such a form as to advance the national
security of the United States', Lovett said, 'then U.S. was ready to
consider association with it'. The ranking Democrat on the Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally, asked whether this meant
'membership'. Lovett replied that it did not and defined 'association'
as meaning the opening of military conversations; the exchange of
strategic plans and their harmonisation; and included -the idea of
standardising equipment. (This was the same line as that pushed by
Douglas in his conversation with Bevin in mid-April). Lovett said
that the resolution would have the effect of restricting talks with
Western Union countries to conversations about 'the basic principle
of self-help and mutual aid...in their military activities as well as
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their economic activities'.
In his presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
closed session, Lovett was at pains to convince his audience that
self-interest was the dominant consideration governing the United
States' attitude towards Western Union. He told the Senators that:
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Bevin's suggestion of a Western Union, which
was to deal with political, economic and military
union, arose to a certain extent from the continued
discussions that we had had with them about self-
help and mutual aid.
He emphasised this point, he said, because he believed it to be 'the
common denominator' of all problems besetting the West Europeans.
The resolution was intended by State Department officials 'to keep
those people firm in their desire to pull together and to act as a
unit'. Time was also important: Lovett wanted to take advantage of
the Europeans' apparent present willingness to lower national
prejudices. As Lovett had said, there was to be no possibility of the
West Europeans being allowed to let Uncle Sam carry them. He summed
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up his views in the phrase: 'We are not the guarantors of anything'.
These arguments were not used by the State Department merely to per¬
suade a potentially still-isolationist Congress to accept a new
departure in American foreign policy. They undoubtedly had ^;hat
effect but the same arguments were used by the Department in its
dealings with West European governments as well. During the same
period as appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
executive session, Lovett saw the French Ambassador, Henri Bonnet,
to advise him of the impending resolution. The Frenchman, who was to
become something of a thorn in Lovett's side during the substantive
negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty, asked whether the
measure represented any kind of guarantee. The U.S. Under-Secretary
of State informed him that the United States had 'never considered
any form of guarantee' and was thinking instead of 'practical measures'
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and policy coordination to improve West european security. Earlier
theFrench had been advised that they, like their European colleagues,
ought not to decide to do nothing pending an American decision to
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increase the commitment. Caffery told them in mid-April that it was
only when the Brussels Treaty powers had made progress towards col¬
lective self-defence, mutual aid and coordinated military planning
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that the United States would make its move.
Recognising that this was more than rhetoric, the Brussels Pact
signatories met on 17 April 1948 to decide how best to coordinate
their defence planning without prior American assistance. The
previous day, Douglas had outlined for Bevin the framework of American
policy: U.S. troops to stay in Berlin and to the West of the inner
German border for as long as necessary, coupled with consideration
of further military assistance once the West Europeans had determined
for themselves what was still needed. Douglas made plain his belief
that such measures, together with the American monopoly on atomic
weapons and delivery systems, were all that was necessary for the
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peace of Europe to be sustained. He could have added - but apparently
did not - that this formula was also held by some in Washington to be
sufficient to deter indirect as well as direct aggression. In a
careful analysis of Soviet takeovers in Eastern and Central Europe
since 1940, Hickerson advised Lovett on 12 April that no communist
coups d'etat could or would occur without the physical presence of
Russian soldiers to lend 'prompt and compelling support to the
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pressure tactics of local Communist parties'.
This attitude may have struck the Europeans as myopic complacency.
Certainly they did not share it. This is particularly clear from a
telegram which Douglas sent to Lovett, reporting a conversation with
Winston Churchill, on 17 April. The contrast in views symbolises
transatlantic differences, despite the fact that neither Douglas nor
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Churchill was formally representing the attitudes of their respective
national governments. Churchill's idea was that the Soviet Union
would one day acquire its own atomic capability. When it did so,
war would be inevitable. He therefore suggested that atomic diplomacy,
as it came to be called by historians, be applied: tell the Soviet
leaders to withdraw from Berlin and East Germany to the Polish border
or the West would raze Russian cities. Douglas agreed with Churchill
that the only vocabulary understood by Moscow was that of force. But
he disagreed on every other point. The American thought that with
the formation of Western Union, backed with U.S. materiel constituted
'a demonstration of solidity and irresistible force' to deter the
Soviets from adventurism. Furthermore, he considered that such a
demonstration would deter the Soviets, even though they 'may ultimately
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develop - if they have not already developed - the atomic bomb'.
This then, was the shape of American thinking behind the Vandenberg
Resolution. It would help the re-establishment of Western Europe as
a centre of power but at a minimal cost to the United States. As
Lovett and Marshall told Dulles and Vandenberg, any formal agreement
made 'would be short, possibly as long as five years, with a right to
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withdraw on a year's notice'. It was necessary not because the
United States had fallen victim to 'Pactomania' but because it could
not go on giving what Vandenberg called 'the negative answer' to
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European pleas for assistance and support. Senator Alexander H.
Smith, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, remarked: 'It
seems to me this [resolution] is framed as an answer to the pressure
brought to bear on us by the British-French-Benelux crowd'. His
colleague, Walter F. George, was more prescient: 'We will be far more
bound by this resolution than I fear we are willing to admit at the
195
moment'. Vandenberg's son remarked after his father's death that
'rarely in American history had such a small egg hatched so quickly
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into such a large chicken'.
* * *
Alexis de Tocqueville observed that in America sooner or later every
domestic political question becomes a judicial one. The same change
can be seen taking place in U.S. foreign policy toward Western Europe
in the three-month period covered in this chapter.
The chapter opens with President Truman's vague commitment to West
European security contained in his speech to a special joint session
of Congress on 17 March 1948. It ends with Truman's sentiments being
given congressional confirmation in the carefully considered language
of an insurance policy. The validity of any claims was to be deter¬
mined by the United States in the light of prevailing national interests.
The premiums were to be paid by the Europeans in the form of an
obligation to do more to help themselves militarily through mutual aid.
Ironically, the phrase "self-help and mutual aid' in the Vandenberg
Resolution became the kernel of American commitments undertaken later
in the North Atlantic Treaty. However, between April and June 1948,
this was not the intention of Marshall and Lovett or Vandenberg and
Dulles, who all thought in terms of Western Europe becoming self-
sufficient and thus obviating the need for such a commitment. This
view was reinforced by Paul-Henri Spaak who articulated the ideas
the Americans most wanted to hear: that an Atlantic Treaty was not
necessary and that he was ready to become the first European leader
in a position of power to advocate the cause of West European union
as an active policy.®4
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The inter-relationship between, on the one hand, the general American
desire for long-term disengagement from Western Europe and the European
unity issue, on the other, is central to the understanding of where U.S.
foreign policy stood on the eve of both the Berlin blockade and the
opening of formal negotiations about a treaty. The assumptions which
lay behind the Vandenberg Resolution epitomise the effect of that
inter-relationship in the formulation of policy in 194-8. The resolu¬
tion was an acknowledgement that a treaty might be necessary but not
as a matter of urgency, nor as a commitment which went beyond the
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loose obligation contained in the Rio Treaty. It was to be the
Europeans' task to impress on the United States that this did not
accord with military realities in Europe. For their part, officials
in the State Department had yet to realise that military imperatives
had already pushed the United States well beyond the point where a
treaty could be refused. In sum, Thomas Jefferson's proscription of
'entangling alliances' had been slightly compromised; instead, in
Vandenberg's Resolution, Americans had accepted George Washington's earlier
O
formula of trusting 'to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.
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CHAPTER 5
TOWARDS THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION : MILITARY CALCULATIONS
During the drafting stage of the Vandenberg Resolution, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee asked the State Department for details of
U.S. public opinion on the American military relationship with Western
Europe. This was supplied on 18 May 1948 and took the form of two un¬
published surveys of national opinion, commissioned by the State
Departmnet, one conducted in late March, the other a month later. Taken
together they reveal that - despite Czechoslovakia, Truman's St. Patrick's
Day speeches, and the emergence of the McCarthyite sentiment embodied
in the Federal Employee Loyalty Program - the American public found
certain aspects of anti-communism unpalatable when translated into
actual policies. That feeling undoubtedly pervaded the Vandenberg
Resolution and accounts in large part for its vagueness.
Historians are generally wary of the value to be attached to opinion
polls."'" Politicians and officials tend to be much less critical;
%
their reactions to surveys of opinion can be illuminating. The first
survey, referred to above, contained the question: 'Would you approve
or disapprove of the United States sending military supplies to
countries of Western Europe now, in order to strengthen them against
future attack?' Of those asked, 52 per cent approved, 39 per cent
disapproved and 9 per cent were of no opinion. In the second survey
a different question was posed: 'Do you think we should promise to go
to war on their side if Western European countries are attacked by
some other country?' This time, of those asked, 40 per cent said such
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a promise should be made, but 48 per cent disagreed; 18 per cent
2
were undecided or had no opinion. The difference in the two
questions means that no conclusions about trends can be drawn but
that very difference is notable. When the question included the
phrase 'sending military supplies' a comfortable majority appeared to
approve. However, when the question suggested a possible need to
'go to war' a significant majority were opposed to the idea.
The American public's capacity to make distinctions of this kind in
matters of foreign policy was of obvious importance to the Lovett-
Vandenberg conversations. The Foreign Relations Committee was advised
of the State Department's interpretation:
The disparity in the response to these two questions
suggests that popular attitudes on any proposition
as to the use of U.S. troops to aid other countries
may depend a great deal upon the language in which
it is presented.3
The views concurrently expressed in press and magazine articles
supported that conclusion. There was a perception that the Brussels
Treaty had increased Western Europe's potential to defend itself.
This could be increased still further by the United States authorising
a limited, military version of 'lend-lease'. A typical view was that
of Joseph Alsop who advocated 'a closer, more formal relationship
between this country and the Western European union' but who saw
this not as a 'military alliance'. The front-runner for the Republican
presidential nomination, Governor Thomas E. Dewey was also reported
4
to be against a military alliance.
199
All of this information was passed to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the resulting Vandenberg Resolution was worded, in part, to
accommodate the preferences and antipathies of the American public.
These coincided with the views of Marshall, Lovett and Vandenberg
and go a long way towards explaining why Senate Resolution 239
stopped well short of an unambiguous commitment. But there were
military reasons for this hesitancy too. It is these which are
the subject of this chapter.
* * *
Commenting on the Vandenberg Resolution, the Chairman of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, David E. Lilienthal, remarked that it
5
was 'virtually an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe'.
There is considerable irony in the remark; as the custodian of
America's stockpile of atomic weapons, Lilienthal was in a better
position than most to appreciate it. Like the Monroe Doctrine when
originally promulgated, the resolution was in essence a unilateral
declaration of intent which conveniently ignored the inability of
the United States to support its diplomatic position with armed
force . Both were exercises of political bluff in international
politics. The intention behind both was to prevent potentially
hostile states from taking steps which might lead to conflict with
the United States. Yet at the very moment when deterrence began to
be accepted as the basis of both foreign policy and defence posture,
the military strength (especially ground force capability) necessary
to make deterrence credible was ebbing away. In retrospect it is
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easy to assume that the American monopoly on atomic bombs constituted
a substitute for weakness in what are now termed conventional forces.
That was certainly the view of the fledgling U.S. Air Force (USAF),
which provided the delivery vehicle, but the same confidence was not
apparent elsewhere in the Pentagon. Nor - Winston Churchill apart -
was it very evident in Western Europe. To U.S. policy-makers, the
atomic bomb represented military strength of a kind but not of the
dependable sort upon which to base American and Western security.
In 1948, there was no nuclear bias such as developed under the
Eisenhower Administration during the 1950s.
Given U.S. military weakness - or, more properly, American policy¬
makers 1 belief that the United States was militarily weak - there
could be no fully satisfactory response to the West Europeans'
reiterated demand for a military guarantee. These demands were
based on a twin European assumption that such guarantees could be
given and that they would be respected by putative adversaries.
In mid-1948, senior U.S. officials disagreed with the first assumption
and had not yet begun to consider the second. The Vandenberg
Resolution was, in effect, an attempt to reconcile the views held on
either side of the Atlantic. It did not succeed: the Europeans
pressed for clarification of what was meant and, having discovered
that this was less than satisfactory to themselves, took steps
designed to ensure that when U.S. policy was clarified it would be
along lines closer to their own perspective. (The process by which
this happened is the subject of the next chapter.)
From a European point of view in 1948, the most encouraging aspect
of the Vandenberg Resolution was that a transatlantic treaty had
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not been excluded as a possibility. As shown in the previous chapter,
American policy-makers did not regard this as a concession.
Agreeing to the idea of a treaty, whether directly or indirectly,
meant little to them until the actual terms of the contract were
known. The Europeans saw symbolic, political significance in an
Atlantic treaty, almost irrespective of its content. The Americans
did not share that perception, preferring to interpret a treaty as
an enforceable contractual obligation which could not be undertaken
for any reason other than it being in their national interest to do
so. A treaty could be worded as loosely or tightly as circumstances
demanded. Whereas the foreign policies of the West European powers
towards the United States were reminiscent of gentlemen's agreements,
0
U.S. foreign policy was defined by lawyers. A mixture of realism
and naivety is apparent in the approach of both. An Atlantic treaty
did have symbolic significance but treaties - as Europeans knew
to their cost - were frequently torn up and the territorial guarantees
contained in them disregarded. On the other hand, although a treaty
did commit the signatories, Americans tended to transpose the Anglo-
Saxon concept of individual law into the chaotic field of inter¬
national relations, where a gentleman's agreement might be quite as
good as any other.^
The one thing that the United States felt it could not offer '
militarily in mid-1948 was to supply what Georges Bidault had asked
for on behalf of his French countrymen: 'a concrete military alliance
with definite promises to do definite things under certain circum¬
stances' . Ernest Bevin had tried to achieve much the same when he
proposed an Anglo-American military agreement in February 1948. As
has been demonstrated in previous chapters . George C. Marshall had
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deliberately witheld just such an American military commitment in a
calculated effort to impress upon the West Europeans the need for them
to cooperate amongst themselves - politically and economically as well
0
as militarily. However, the formation of Western Union had done
little or nothing to bring about any real measure of military inte¬
gration or to rebuild Western Europe's confidence and fighting spirit.
For their part, the Europeans were understandably suspicious when they
noticed the gap between the rhetorical flourishes of the President's
speech of 17 March and the evident subsequent aversion to back up the
ringing declarations with armed strength. Contrary to Marshall's hopes,
the witholding of American backing for - or membership of - Western
Union only undermined the potential of the enterprise to succeed
in fostering a spirit of self-reliance. Not for the first or last
time, this apparent obduracy merely made the Europeans question the
reliability of the declaratory policy emanating from Washington.
What the Europeans failed to understand was that Marshall saw no
option but to steer clear of tighter military ties. His decision
reflected more than the general view expressed by John D. Hickerson
that Western Union was regarded as 'the hard core of a future United
States of Western Europe' and which had to be encouraged on that
9
basis. Marshall's outlook was coloured by the problems left by the
rapid demobilisation of American armed forces after V-J Day, 1945,
and by Truman's determination to ensure that defence expenditures did
not take resources away from more deserving (and politically rewarding)
sectors of the economy. One of Marshall's biographers noted that the
Secretary of State was always concerned with the 'necessary connection
between diplomacy and military power'It can be added that Marshall -
and all other senior policy makers in the area of foreign and defence
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policy - had to live downwind of the 1946 mid-term elections which
had brought Republican control of both Houses of Congress, largely
on a ticket of cutting the expenditure of central government, reducing
inflation and lowering personal income tax levelsThis necessarily
weighed more heavily with Truman than the pleas of the West Europeans.
The military and diplomatic corollary was spelt out by Marshall to
the National Security Council in February 1948. In a famous phrase
he said: 'We are playing with fire while we have nothing with which
to put it out'. Much would therefore depend on appearances. Regarding
the possible deployment of troops to Europe, Palestine or any other
potential trouble-spot, Marshall pointed out that no such action would
be possible without at least partial mobilisation. Robust policies
needed financial and manpower resources. Neither was available in
sufficient quantity even though, he argued, it was vital that the
United States- resolve be not perceived abroad as weakening. If that
happened, he suggested, the United States would 'lose the game' and
prejudice its national position, especially since the Marshall Plan
12
had involved the Americans in Europe's future well-being.
%
However, as Marshall knew, there were compensating factors. The
ERP had been initiated as a method of preventing the 'fire' spreading
westwards. In Kennan's phrase, the objective was 'to create strength
in the West rather than destroy strength in Russia'. That idea was
welded Ln the American mind with the notion of West European unity,
political and economic integration, and military self-sufficiency,
all to be achieved in the medium- to long-term. This meant that,
from Washington's point of view, building strength in the West did
not require a large and expensive American force-in-being. A strong
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Western Europe would militate against the need for a powerful standing
force of the sort which offended some of the oldest of American
sensitivities. The Defence Secretary, James V. Forrestal, put the
case in its strategic context to the Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, Chandler Gurney. He wrote in December 1947:
At the present time we are keeping our military
expenditures below the levels which our military
leaders must in good conscience estimate as the
minimum which would in themselves ensure national
security. By doing so we are able to increase
our expenditure to assist in European recovery.
This he argued was a calculated but acceptable risk in order to follow
a course which offered 'a prospect of eventually achieving national
13
security and also long-term world stability'.
That risk was still the linchpin of American 'grand strategy' in
mid-1948. The main problem was that it did not satisfy its principal
beneficiaries, the West Europeans. Living next door to the huge and
battle-hardened forces of the Red Army, they took the view that rather
more was necessary. Truman and Marshall agreed. As indicated in the
previous chapter, their answer was universal military training (UMT)
for all American males for one year between the ages of 18 and 21,
coupled with the reintroduction of selective service. In strategic
terms, the objective was to provide the kind of reserve force, capable
of being swiftly mobilised, which had been so conspicuously lacking
in both 1917 and 1941. In economic terms, UMT was designed as a way
of getting security on the cheap. In transatlantic terms, UMT
represented, in Marshall's opinion, 'the best manifestation to
Europe - both as to the Western friendly countries and the Iron
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Curtain - of the continuity of our policy and our determination to
14
continue our position in European matters'.
Marshall and Truman's concern for Western Europe was undoubted but,
despite their vigorous advocacy, UMT in reality was the U.S. Army's
proposal for the survival of ground forces as a major component in
the American armed forces. The atomic bomb threatened to turn the
Army into a minor service along with the Marine Corps: prestigious,
with a long history but little political muscle on Capitol Hill or
in the counsels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Marshall was naturally
predisposed to identify with the Army's cause - his long and distin¬
guished service in its ranks made his sympathy virtually automatic.
President Truman was similarly inclined, being immensely proud of his
service on European battlefields during World War I. Behind the
arguments of both was the assumption that in a future war, regardless
of whether atomic munitions were used, the final result would be
determined by the success of failure of infantry and mechanised
divisions winning and holding territory. Vast areas would have to
be occupied and that required a mass army based on conscription. The
Army added its own arguments, pointing out that there could be no
guarantee that atomic strikes would be decisive; if they were not,
even greater troop numbers would be necessary to deal with the un¬
constrained Soviet army. Moreover, the United States had neither
aircraft nor missiles of intercontinental range; the Army would thus
be responsible for establishing bases within operational range of
15
available aircraft.
Of the four U.S. armed services, the Army was the most Eurocentric.
As in World War II, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps tended to look
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towards the Pacific, and considered its organic air capability -
embarked on even larger aircraft carriers - as a candidate for
atomic weapons delivery. The U.S. Air Force had few self-doubts
either. In his first annual report, published on 30 June 1948, its
Chief of Staff, General Carl A. Spaatz, argued that 'air power will
inevitably be the primary instrument' through which a decision would
16
be reached in wartime. A combination of the pre-war assumption
that 'the bomber will always get through'; the 'successes' of the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrations of superior air power; the
arrival of new ballistic technology; and the relationship between an
expanding air force on the one hand, and job opportunities and export
sales from airframe manufacture on the other, made the USAF's case
17
appear very strong. Both the Navy and Air Force could envisage
for themselves a major global role whatever may happen on the ground
in Europe. In contrast the Army needed Western Europe to defend if
it was to survive with its roles and missions intact.
However, it was the Army which disposed of the forces most suitable
for what Forrestal called 'various potentially explosive areas over
the world'. A large fleet assembled off Seoul in South Korea, or
Greece and Palestine in the Eastern Mediterranean, could do little
to influence the activities of indigenous nationalists or communists.
A group of B-29 bombers with an atomic weapon carrying capability
could do even less. Such responsibilities fell on the Army which
was already, on its own estimates, badly overstretched in Germany,
Austria, Trieste and Japan. So serious had the situation become
that a formal review was made at a White House briefing on 18 February
1948, attended by the President, the Secretaries of State, Defence
and the Army, together with the four Joint Chiefs of Staff. Judging
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from Forrestal's report, General Alfred Gruenther made the most of
the occasion. Central to his presentation was the disparity between
available strength and present (and potential) commitments. Manpower
levels were presented as representative of the problem.






Army 552 560 669
Navy 476 526 664
Marine Corps 79 87 108
Air Force 346 362 382
TOTALS 1453 1535 1823
• Source: Millis (ed.) The Forrestal Diaries, adapted.
The real point to be taken from these figures was not that overall
U.S. armed forces were 20 per cent under strength, although that gave
the military grounds enough for worry. It was that the ratio between
combat capability and administrative, logistic, planning and other
support functions had become unfavourable. U.S. national security
18
required relatively more 'ceeth' and less 'tail'.
Gruenther concluded that the deployment of anything larger than a
division outside continental United States 'would make partial
19
mobilisation a necessity'. Marshall subsequently showed himself
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specially anxious that alarmist forecasts of that sort should not
be discussed publically because of the potentially adverse affect
on West Europeans. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee that
UMT was the way not only to make substantial cash savings but also
to show the world that 'the United States intends to be strong and
to hold that strength ready to keep the European world both at peace
20
and free'. He therefore did not want 'stark comparisons' made by
Defense Department personnel 'between the forces disposed of by the
Soviet Union and those of the free world'. Forrestal had planned
to make exactly such a comparison in a written and unclassified sub¬
mission to Congress. On 23 March 1948 Marshall wrote to Forrestal:
'The political effect of this comparison would be very serious in
Europe, especially the number of weeks it would take Russia to reach
the Atlantic and the Pyrenees'. He added that France would be par¬
ticularly disheartened and that much of the good abroad done by
21
Truman's 17 March speech would be undone.
Forrestal, apparently taking Marshall's advice, omitted the contentious
comparison from his text. From his diary it is not clear what made the
Defense Secretary change his mind. Marshall made four basic points,
any one of which, or some combination, may have been decisive. First,
anything tending to reduce West Europeans' will to resist aggression
would be a loss to the United States and a gain for the Soviet Union.
Secondly, the failure to sound a note of confidence in the ability of
'free Europe', backed by America, to give pause to the Russians would
have 'a direct effect on ERP'. Thirdly, estimates of Soviet military
strength were dismissed as a combination of U.S. guesswork and Soviet
propaganda. Finally, Marshall suggested that Forrestal's statement,
as originally drafted was 'more a preliminary to war than a proposal
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for preparation to avoid war'. Whatever the reason, Forrestal's
actual statement to the Armed Services Committee contained no material
of which Marshall would have disapproved. Forrestal presented a
straightforward request for an augmentation of some 30 per cent to
manpower levels (comprising 350,000 regulars and 220,000 selective
service draftees) together with the beginnings of the proposed UMT
programme, 850,000 men between 18 and 19 for one year's training. In
the event, Congress accepted only the need for the re-introduction of
selective service.^
Marshall told Forrestal that while the United States could not afford
to bluff, the tension between East and West was still 'in its political
phase'. Every effort must therefore be made not to make any suggestion
that there was substance to the Soviet charge that 'imperialist America'
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was attempting world domination. Equally, nothing was to be said or
done to give credence to West European suspicions that, in the event
%
of a war, United States forces would vacate Europe immediately. The
President could recommend UMT and selective service as 'unmistakeable
evidence to all the world that our determination is to back up the will
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to peace with the strength for peace'. But as he, Marshall and
Forrestal knew, that scarcely squared with existing military plans.
Although the reality could not be kept from West European governments,
those same authorities had a vested interest in maintaining the belief
that the United States would defend Western Europe, if the moment ever
came to do so. However, West Europeans would have been stunned by a
public declaration that there was little that American military planners
felt could be done in the event of hostilities, initially at least,




Bernard Brodie, the first academic to consider the problems of strategy
in the nuclear age, wrote in 1946 that U.S. military decision-makers
'continued to think in terms of peacetime military establishments,
which are simply cadres and which are expected to undergo an enormous
2S
but slow expansion after the outbreak of hostilities'. The comment
applies equally well to 1948 and remained true until the opening of
the Korean War. That event forced Truman to authorise the massive
rearmament programme recommended by the National Security Council in
its report, known as NSC 68 and completed in 1950. Until that moment
there was a serious gap between military posture and the foreign policy
objectives it was presumably designed to support. America's capabil¬
ities simply did not match its declared intentions. There was nothing
to be gained, and much to lose, from advertising military realities
to the publics of Western Europe.
During the first half of 1948, only the British and Canadian govern¬
ments were -aware of the full extent of the gap. The Department of
Defense could not avoid taking these two into its confidence: Canada,
because of the joint responsibilities to defend the Western Hemisphere,
a prime consideration in any war plan; Britain, because the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff continued to consider the British Isles as the only
available launching pad for an eventual re-run of the Normandy landings
should Western Europe ever fall. In the British case, the old wartime
Combined Chiefs of Staff committee (CCS), officially dormant but still
unofficially active through the British military attaches in Washington,
provided a precedent for joint planning which continued to operate with
27
a degree of cooperation that was probably not officially sanctioned.
The American journalist, Joseph Alsop, was nearer the truth than
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hyperbole when he wrote in this period that if the Anglo-American
alliance were ever to be disbanded, 'every military plan in the
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Pentagon would have to be torn up'. Documentary evidence gives
some support to this proposition. General Stephen J. Chamberlain,
Director of Army Intelligence, was told that an emergency war plan,
drawn up in April 1948 after a meeting between American, Canadian
and British planners, was a fully combined plan involving the three
armed forces of all three countries, but that it did not appear to
be so:
The US planners would take their plan and use the
British and Canadian forces all the way through.
The British would take the same plan and the same
concept and with the same forces write a British
plan around it. It amounts to exactly the same as
a combined plan. However, should one pick up a
US or a British paper he would not be able to tell
that the US had planned with the British.
Earlier, in Janu&ry, an instruction to American planners said:
'There should be no US paper in the CCS files indicating concerted
action in preparation for World War III' , despite large-scale planning
and such detailed preparations as joint American and British biological
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warfare trials in the Pacific.
Although Anglo-American military collaboration appeared to be close,
certain differences did exist. The British placed comparatively
greater emphasis on controlling the oil-rich territories of Southwest
Asia and were most interested in the period 1950-55 and beyond. For
their part, the Americans concentrated on continental Europe and were
preoccupied with the need for contingency planning for meeting a
surprise attack. General Hollis, a member of the British delegation
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at the Pentagon talks in March, remarked in London that U.S. military
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thought was 'a blowback from Pearl Harbour'.
The basic problem facing American military planners in 1948 was that
they had insufficient money, equipment and manpower to fulfill the
requirements of an emergency war plan for Europe. Thus, just two
weeks after the distribution of the Pentagon Paper - which meant
almost nothing if the United States did not have the physical
resources to back up a political commitment - the Joint Chiefs of
Staff approved a war plan based on the premise that Europe could
not be defended to the extent of deterring aggression. There would
have to be a reinvasion. It was just this which worried West
Europeans, especially the French. The Truman Administration was
mindful of their worries but felt unable and unwilling to do a great
deal more. The President was determined to cut defence expenditure.
In fiscal year 1947 it was held to $14.4 billion; in fiscal 1948 it
dropped to $11.7 billion and for fiscal 1949 the budget was proposed
at $11 billion. Marshall told Bevin that, rather than increase the
military budget, Truman was prepared to cut it in order to safeguard
ERP. Lovett told the French Ambassador in Washington that the only
way to get more money for the Pentagon was deficit financing, and
that the President would not countenance. He added that from Europe's
point of view the two worst things which could happen in 1948 would be
a return to deficit financing: it would cause 'the immediate abandon¬
ment of ERP' and might fuel Congressional exasperation that West
Europeans were not carrying their share of the security burden that
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Americans 'would revert to isolationism'.
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The discrepancy between resources and commitments, and the priority
given to the Marshall Plan, meant that - in military terms - it was
not possible for the conclusions of the Pentagon Paper, and the
assumptions which underpinned them, to be explicitly stated in the
Vandenberg Resolution. Nowhere is this more clearly evident than
in the emergency war plan approved in the wake of the Pentagon talks.
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It was code-named HALFMOON.
As originally drafted, HALFMOON was approved by American, British
and Canadian military personnel during talks in Washington from 12 to
21 April 1948. They agreed that it would serve as the basis of
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'unilateral but accordant' planning in each country. Had the
French known about the plan's precise contents it would have con¬
firmed all their suspicions - dating from de Gaulle's wartime diffi¬
culties with Churchill and Roosevelt - about an Anglo-Saxon condominium.
Simply stated, the plan was predicated on a number of assumptions.
The occupation troops of the three countries would withdraw from con¬
tinental Europe virtually the moment hostilities occurred. The
Western hemisphere was to be insulated against attack. The United
Kingdom was to be made secure, initially by the British alone,
subsequently assisted by U.S. and Commonwealth forces. And, lines of
communication to and from Middle East oil terminals through the
Mediterranean Sea were held to be of overriding importance in the
later stages of World War III. It was assumed that the British
Commonwealth, the continental Western Union nations and countries in
Latin America would be allies of the three powers. In addition,
Turkey, Spain, Norway, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the
Yemen would become allies if attacked by Soviet forces.
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From a purely American standpoint HALFMOON was the basis of all
military judgements which had to be made in 1948. It was the
yardstick against which demands for greater U.S. commitments were
measured by the Pentagon. However, the plan was not definitive.
First, it had to be put together without any political guidance from
the Truman Administration. The following war objectives were there¬
fore not sanctioned: to compel a Soviet retreat to pre-1939 boundaries
and to ensure that the Soviet Union abandoned policies of political
and military agression. The plan was thus not Truman's military
version of John Foster Dulles' policy in the 1950s of 'rollback' and
liberation in Eastern Europe. Secondly, while the plan was signif¬
icant because it represented the first time U.S. military officers
from all Services found themselves in agreement on basic principles,
there were fierce arguments about roles and missions currently taking
place. HALFMOON was an outline emergency plan. It had yet to be
filled out by subsidiary plans from each of the armed services; there
was no guarantee that these could be integrated into the overall con¬
cept. Thirdly, HALFMOON was the basis for major procurement programmes:
new bombers for the Air Force; larger carriers for the Navy. If
budgetary stringency forced the abandonment of, or serious modification
to, such programmes the plan itself would be effected. Finally, there
was no room in the plan for those smaller-scale contingencies - in
Greece, Palestine or Korea - which many military men regarded as the
most likely to threaten the non-communist world.
Nevertheless, HALFMOON had a considerable bearing on the immediate
future shape of transatlantic relations. If the Pentagon Paper
represented what some State Department considered to be desirable
HALFMOON was what the Defense Department as a whole presented as the
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optimum. The absence of any undertaking to defend Western Europe
on the River Rhine meant that the French and the Benelux nations
were being abandoned for the time being. Their cooperation - assumed
in the Pentagon Paper - in such arrangements was thus most unlikely.
They believed that World War III would be like World War II only
worse. No plan so redolent of the previous war and their experience
of military occupation could hope to gain their acceptance. However,
they could not know that in participating in HALFMOON the Americans
had conceded that, notwithstanding the atomic bomb, the United States
could not go it alone. If they could convince the United States to
deal with them on the equal basis apparently accorded to the Canadians
and British, their security could be assured. This they succeeded in
doing when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. But before that war
plans had to be modified.
The American planners were well aware that HALFMOON had some major
flaws. The first of these was a consciousness of the expected failure
to bring another general war centred on Europe to a rapid and success¬
ful conclusion. The plan covered only the first year of fighting but
rested on the presumption of a long war. Ironically although this
could scarcely reassure the West Europeans, the Russians - if they
knew of HALFMOON through British or other sources - could take some
comfort from this. Had they confronted a United States that was con¬
fident of a quick victory, that believed as everyone had done in 1914
of the 'short war', their grounds for fear would have been multiplied
many times. It is axiomatic in the study of international relations
that wars are usually not begun by a state unless a swift and satis¬
factory result is believed possible by its leaders. HALFMOON carried
no offensive threat, nor did it connote an American willingness to
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defend Western Europe. It stood instead as a promise that at some
point after the vast U.S. war-making potential had been mobilised,
American forces would cross the Atlantic for the third time in the
twentieth century to rescue the Europeans from the consequences of
their internecine rivalries. It was probably with regret and conviction
that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the sentence in HALFMOON
which stipulated 'occupation troops will be withdrawn from Europe as
expeditiously as possible' when an invasion from the East was deemed
to have begun.^
The second of the flaws was related to the period of conflict and
concerned the atomic bomb. With the limited forces available there
seemed no way to avoid a costly and lengthy war. UMT was designed
to shorten the period in which U.S. reserves could reach combat
readiness. Particularly striking, in the light of the subsequent
heavy bias towards nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy of defence and
•
deterrence, is the way in which American planners had no confidence
in 1948 that the atomic bomb provided a potential solution to their
problem. Nor did the planners equate military effectiveness with
the destructive power offered by the American monopoly over atomic
%
bombs:
It is difficult to forecast the duration of...the
war since there is no yardstick or formula known
whereby the over-all effect of the atomic bomb can
be calculated, this being particularly applicable
to the psychological effect [on the Soviet Union].
HALFMOON assumed that permission to use the weapon would be obtained
and that the stockpile available on the day of mobilisation would be
delivered as quickly as possible to selected targets in the Soviet
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Union. But the planners did not assume this air offensive would stop
the Soviet Armies' advance. They agreed with the American planners'
earlier assessment that 'a successful treatment of the USSR with
atomic and conventional bombs would materially reduce Allied
requirements'. In short, the atomic bomb would allow the Allies to
inflict upon Soviet cities the kind of destruction visited upon
Tokyo, Hamburg and Coventry during the last war but at a lower cost
in men, equipment and time. They took the view later popularised
by the British scientist, P.M.S. Blackett, that the atomic bomb was
just another weapon: it was not the single or sufficient condition
„ 36
of military success.
Nevertheless the atomic bomb's importance was not discounted entirely.
Henry Kissinger recalled: 'We added the atomic bomb to our arsenal
without integrating its implications into our thinking, because we
saw it merely as another tool in a concept of warfare which knew no
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goal save total victory, and no mode of war except all-out war'.
But American planners still wanted to use bases in Britain, India,
the Middle East and the Japanese archipelago to launch 'an air
offensive in strength, exploiting to the utmost the destructive power
and psychological effects of the atomic bombs'. The Secretary of
Defense, James V. Forrestaltdeplored later what he called 'a mistaken
idea of the value of atomic bombs' and he poured scorn on the notion,
prevalent amongst officers of the U.S. Air Force, that a plane leaving
Maine, loaded wi-1"'! atomic bombs, aiming to fly over the Kremlin, would
make Stalin 'roll over and quit'. But he also recognised that the
atomic bomb was the only weapon the United States had which could be
used quickly.^
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Although atomic weapons were only a part of HALFMOON's overall concept,
their importance can be gauged from the fact that Truman vetoed the
entire contingency plan precisely because of the atomic weapon component.
For some time, the Armed forces had been trying to gain control over
the custody of the weapon, but as Truman told David Lilienthal, 'As
long as I am in the White House I will be opposed to taking atomic
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bombs away' from the Atomic Energy Commission. He told Forrestal
that he did not propose 'to have some dashing Lieutenant Colonel
decide when would be the proper time to drop one'. On 6 May 1948,
Truman rejected HALFMOON and asked that an identical plan be prepared
but without the assumption that atomic weapons would be used. He
would not sanction the bomb even for planning purposes because, as
his chief military adviser, Admiral William D. Leahy, recorded in his
diary, firstly, a way might be found to outlaw atomic weapons through
the United Nations and, secondly, Truman felt that American public
opinion 'would not permit the use of the bombs for aggressive
, 40
purposes .
It was not until 13 September 1948, that Truman would agree to the
planning of the use of atomic weapons as an integral part of U.S.
preparations for war. According to Forrestal, he told a White House
meeting of the JCS and Service Secretaries that he prayed he would
not have to make a decision to use them again 'but that if it
became necessary, no-one need have any misgivings but that he would
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do so...' But by then the Soviet blockade of Berlin had greatly
intensified the Cold War. By September, even George Marshall, who
earlier had been against the inclusion of atomic weapons as part of
planning, had changed his mind. He quoted John Foster Dulles with
evident approval as having said that the use of atomic weapons in
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the event of war was a foregone conclusion because 'the American
people would execute you if you did not use the bomb'. He wrote
that he had told the Norwegian Foreign Minister on 20 November 1948
that in his judgement:
[T]he main deterrent to Soviet aggression has been
the possession by the United States of the atomic
bomb. I added that until recently I thought the
Soviet leaders probably had felt that the American
people would never permit the use of the bomb but
that in the light of developments of recent months,
including Berlin, and of developments here that I
felt the Soviet leaders must now realise that the
use of this instrument would be possible and hence
the deterrent influence now was perhaps greater
than heretofor
Such views, however, were not being generally expressed by Truman,
Marshall or the State Department in April.
Their actions and statements in mid-1948 seem to have been conditioned
by the cautiously optimistic assessments of the intentions of the
Soviet Union then being made by American intelligence agencies.
Contrary to Kennan's later claim that the 'war scare' of March 1948 -
in the wake of the coup in Czechoslovakia - had been irresponsibly
engineered by the military and intelligence establishments, the
Central Intelligence Agency told President Truman on 30 March: 'The
preponderance of available evidence and of considerations derived
from the "logic of the situation", supports the conclusion that the
USSR will not resort to direct military action during 1948'. The
CIA suggested that the Soviet Politburo did not want war because the
politicians involved were 'always suspicious of the military. War
would again bring the military to the fore and might constitute a real
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or imagined threat to the Party leaders'. The Joint Intelligence
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Committee based at the American Embassy in Moscow felt that war was
not probable in 1948 but 'far more likely to develop between one and
two years' later. However, even this conclusion was heavily qualified:
[The] inability of the Soviet Union to defeat
the United States within a period of a few years
and to prevent widespread devastation of Soviet
territory would jeopardise the life of the
Communist regime....In any case, it would appear,
at the present time, as though the eventual out¬
come of a long war would be a gamble and therefore
to be undertaken by the Kremlin only as a last
resort.
The Joint Intelligence Committee felt the Soviet Union would risk war
only if it felt that the combined United States and Western European
military strength were slowly being built up, putting the Soviet Union
to increasingly greater disadvantage. If, however, the Soviet Union
was confronted with 'a rapid and positive growth of United States and
Western European strength', then the Kremlin would 'defer military
action'. It would concentrate instead upon the consolidation of its
hold over its satellites while putting pressure on the West's colonial
and dependent areas in the Middle and Far East and awaiting 'the natural
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weakening of the capitalist system'.
The essence of this interpretation was that time was on the- side of
the United States. This contrasted with the gloomier forecasts of
military and intelligence personnel based in Washington. On 16 March,
the CIA advised Truman that war 'was not probable within sixty days'.
Two weeks later this tenuous forecast was extended, though the USAF
was reportedly unwilling to associate itself even with that slight
45
extension. The Moscow-based analysts took a longer view. With the
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pessimism of all military men, the Joint Intelligence Committee felt
bound to say that war was always a possibility but, equally, felt that
the Kremlin, 'with the usual patient historical perspective of
Communists', would await a more favourable moment in the future before
initiating the 'inevitable' collision between communism and capitalism.
This, in turn, would give the United States time to institute 'compul¬
sory military training, expeditious implementation of the Marshall Plan
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and the extension of military guarantees to Western Union'.
Although not instigated solely because of the Moscow Embassy's
recommendations, these three proposals became the main supports of
American foreign policy. Selective Service was extended, but, as
some had predicted, UMT failed to get through Congress; ERP legis¬
lation was hurried through after the communist coup in Prague. However,
the extension of military guarantees to Western Union was not accom¬
plished until the North Atlantic Treaty "Organisation was fully developed.
Military guarantees required a much closer degree of joint planning
than that represented by HALFMOON. Nevertheless, during April 1948
there was the beginnings of an awareness within the Pentagon that
the strategic concept of HALFMOON - retreat from Europe followed
sometime later by liberation - was completely at variance with U.S.
foreign policy and national objectives. When every effort ought to
have been made to preserve Western Europe, in line with every public
statement on foreign policy made by the President and his two Secretaries
of State since the war, James Byrne, and George Marshall, HALFMOON
abandoned Western Europe to the oncoming Soviets without more than a
token struggle.
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This inconsistency between foreign policy objectives and military
planning was noted by one of the most independent thinkers in the
U.S. military establishment, Admiral Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval
Operations. He argued that a strategy to retain at least part of
Western Europe was not only necessary but also feasible because of
the creation of Western Union. He therefore urged that a realistic
and appropriate strategy would be to assist, as far as resources
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allowed, Western Union to establish a defensive line on the Rhine.
He pointed out that any other strategy meant that the manpower,
economic resources and industrial capacity, together with the benefits
of ERP, would be handed over to the Russians. The concept of operations
on which HALFMOON was based could only spread despair and defeatism
in Western Europe. It would also do virtually nothing to protect oil
supplies. However, Denfeld reserved his strongest arguments for the
reliance on the atomic bomb to diminish Soviet war-making and war-
fighting capabilities. He doubted that defeat could be imposed in
this way: 'We shall have lost so much territory, so many allies,
strategic positions and vital resources, and so much time as seriously
to jeopardize the possibilities for ultimate victory'. He added that
Soviet capabilities had been unnecessarily overestimated and the
opportunity for sabotage and subversion in the United States itself
48
was unduly pessimistic.
At first, Denfeld's ideas fell on stony ground. Military posture was
seen to be so weak as to preclude any such ambitious plan, no matter
how desirable. In a Presidential Directive of 13 May 1948, Truman
reviewed his 17 March speech. He explained that because of the
shortage in trained Army personnel there would soon have to be a
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withdrawal of American troops from Korea while the occupation forces
in Japan and Germany were at a 'minimum'. The Army was losing its
strength at the rate of about 5,000 men per month and Truman observed
'our mobile forces available for movement abroad or for home defence
were only 30,000'. It was pointed out that the British could barely
keep the peace in Palestine with more than 90,000 men, most of whom
had seen some action during the Second World War. James Forrestal
told a group of Congressmen in April that the Army situation was
'alarming', particularly its inability to supply trained and usable
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troops to seize or hold bases overseas'.
Nevertheless, as time went on, Denfeld's point became more respectable
within the Pentagon. Even HALFM00N planners had acknowledged that
the shortcomings of the plan were the inadequate provision of assist¬
ance to the countries of Western Europe. Consideration was even
given to holding the Rhine or a large foothold on the continent, but
the weight of the plan fell behind the evacuation of American troops
from Germany and Austria through France and Italy and the evacuation
of British troops through Dunkirk. A start had been made, however,
and from late April American planners began to think in terms of
involving themselves in the Western Union planning activities.
General Gruenther was told on April 26:
We cannot under any circumstances permit Britain,
France and Benelux to go forward with military
plans in which we do not participate. They will
be allies in war and it would be military folly
to let them plan in such a way as not to com¬
plement US plans. They might actually peril
our own plans.^
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No doubt put this way, the idea of substituting Western Union-American
planning for the Anglo-Canadian-American version was attractive to the
JCS. But the implications worried them. They advised Forrestal if
such planning with Western Union resulted in 'action in advance of
adequate military readiness on our part should lead unavoidably to
major military commitments', the consequences would be 'very grave
indeed'. They wanted no agreement which 'might unduly influence or
jeopardize our optimum over-all global strategy in favor of either
direct military assistance or distribution of equipment'. More than
anything else, the JCS wanted to ensure that the United States was
precluded from 'being drawn into any command arrangements capable of
being expanded prematurely into an allied control council for global
strategy....It is essential that we retain maximum freedom in strategic
matters'.^
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had foreseen what no-one else had,
namely that joint planning with European Allies would result in
Europeans having a considerable voice in American military policy
as a whole, not merely with respect to the defence of Western Europe.
They agreed that Western Union needed arms aid from the United States
and recognised this as being a desirable aim for future accomplishment
but they opposed any large-scale shipments because they would interfere
seriously with the already depleted supplies available to American
armed forces. Nothing was to be allowed to meddle with the primary
task of satisfying American arms needs. There should be no distortion
of strategy just because arms aid was needed to meet foreign needs
without regard to existing strategic plans.
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Within the military wing of Truman's Administration two clear positions
had been taken regarding America's possible response to the perceived
threat from the Soviet Union. By April 1948, the military planners
had taken the rather hopeless view that, at least in the short term,
there was nothing the United States could do in the event of a Soviet
attack into Western Europe or anywhere else. At the same time, res¬
ponsible elements in the intelligence community considered such views
to be alarmist and inappropriate because the implementation of the
proper steps soon would preclude such an attack from taking place at
all. But these two schools of thought did not embrace all official
opinion relating to U.S. military policy. As David Lilienthal remarked
of policy-making within the National Military Establishment (NME),
the Pentagon was an area of 'chaos and conflict and carnage confounded',
a remark which applied equally well to matters of defence and national
security generally.^
This became especially apparent when the National Security Council
(NSC) entered the debate on 30 March 1948. Under the National
Security Act of 1947, the NSC had been given the responsibility of
reporting to the President on 'the integration of domestic, foreign
and military policies ' in order that all branches of the Executive
concerned with defence and national security could cooperate together
effectively. The NSC's job was to reconcile for Truman the debates
within the State Department about policy towards Western Europe with
the debates within the Department of Defense and NME, while at the
same time recognising the constraints on military policy which Truman's
budgetary limits had necessarily imposed on both Departments. Not




During March, the NSC had considered the whole question of 'The Position
of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism'
and its report bearing this title, was circulated to State and Defense
on 30 March, known by its reference number NSC 7. The opening sentence
of the report set the tone: 'The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed
world communism is the domination of the world'. Outside the rumblings
from the U.S. Air Force about the need to launch a preemptive atomic
strike against the Soviet Union, NSC 7 was the purest expression of
militant anti-communism voiced at a high level within the Truman
Administration in the first half of 1948:
The United States is the only source of power
capable of mobilizing successful opposition to
the communist goal of world conquest. Between
the United States and the USSR there are in Europe
and Asia areas of great potential power which if
added to the existing strength of the Soviet world
would enable the latter to become as superior in
manpower, resources and territory that the prospect
for the survival of the United States as a free
nation would be slight. In these circumstances the
USSR has engaged the United States in a struggle
for power, or 'cold war', in which our national
security is at stake and from which we cannot
withdraw short of eventual national suicide.^4
The NSC felt that frustration of the Soviet Union's global goals could
not be achieved by a 'defensive policy'. In an argument which pre¬
figured John Foster Dulles' opposition to containment in the early
1950s when he espoused the 'New Look policies', the NSC said: 'A
defensive policy by attempting to be strong everywhere runs the risk
of being weak everywhere. It leaves the initiative to the Kremlin...'
Instead, the United States had to organise 'a world-wide counter
offensive against Soviet-directed world communism'. This, it was
envisaged, involved 'mobilizing and strengthening our own and anti-
227
communist forces in the non-Soviet world' and also undermining the
strength of the communist forces in the Soviet world by supporting
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underground resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain.
The NSC recommended three broad areas in which Western strength could
be built up, all of which involved domestic and foreign considerations.
Firstly, there had to be a 'strengthening of the military potential of
the United States', above all by the maintenance of 'US superiority in
atomic weapons'. Steps were to be taken promptly to establish some form
of compulsory military service and the armaments industry was to be
reconstituted. Machine tools and technical information were to be
sent abroad to facilitate the reconstitution of the arms industries
of 'selected non-communist nations' and to provide for the standard¬
isation of armaments. Secondly, the 'counter-offensive' required the
immediate adoption and implementation by Congress of the Marshall Plan.
Western Union was to be endorsed strongly and its development and
expansion actively encouraged 'as an anti-communist association of
states'. An 'appropriate formula' was to be worked out to use U.S.
military action in the event of an unprovoked attack on Western Union
and to provide for the opening of formal military conversations with
these countries. Thirdly, there was to be a large-scale propaganda
campaign; a 'vigorous and effective idealogical campaign', both at
home and abroad. This was to include a programme to suppress the
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communist 'menace' within the United States.
The significance of NSC 7 was not that it represented the distilled
essence of American hysteria about the Soviet threat but that it was
almost immediately rejected, on the grounds that it had no bearing on
American diplomatic goals and ignored the reality of American military
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weakness. Attacks by the State Department and Defense Department,
were perhaps inevitable: the very existence of the NSC represented
a threat to the primacy each department claimed over its own affairs.
Nevertheless, their objections were substantial and cannot be regarded
as institutional wounded pride. Lovett, acting in Marshall's absence,
thought the paper 'inadequate' and wanted changes to be made to avoid
giving the 'false impression' that NSC 7 represented the definitive
statement of American foreign policy aims. He agreed with George Kennan
and the Policy Planning Staff that Kennan and Marshall should redraft
the paper before it was submitted for final approval. Most of all, the
PPS was concerned with the wide-ranging nature of the NSC report: its
conclusions were 'too general' and its recommendations 'not clear and
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specific enough'. Despite this appearance of partial approval, it
quickly became apparent that Bohlen, Kennan, Hickerson, Henderson and
Dean Rusk were opposed to virtually every part of the report.
On 7 April 1948, Lovett received the first of a number of objections
to NSC 7. Written by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
Willard L. Thorp, William C. Clayton's successor, it was also the most
damaging. Thorp was distressed by the wholly negative approach of the
NSC. He cited as a special example the idea that Western Union ought
not to be regarded as 'an anti-communist association of states' but
rather as a 'Pro-Democratic' group which demonstrated a welcome
'reduction in nationalism' in Western Europe and which would help
greatly in the development of 'an integrand Europe'. Thorp condemned
the notion of supporting only those individuals and parties 'who seem
to represent most exactly the political and economic ideology that has
been successful in America'. He added, with obvious reference to Bevin
and Spaak, that this meant giving support to the moderate Socialist
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parties of Europe1. 'It is not enough', wrote Thorp, 'simply to cut
off the heads of communists wherever they appear'. Instead, satis¬
factory conditions had to be created which would counteract the strong
appeal that Communism would naturally exert in the conditions of post-
,, x. r. 58
war Western Europe.
Thorp attacked NSC 7 for not being in line with the twin aims of
American policy towards Western Europe embodied in the Marshall Plan:
building a strong, single economy and a strong, unified political unit.
The opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was based on different
arguments. While expressing general agreement with NSC 7's aim of
organising a world-wide counter-offensive, the JCS distanced itself
from any implications literally involving military action of any con¬
sequence at this time, since appropriate readiness was an essential
prerequisite to such action: 'From a military viewpoint the JCS must
point out the extreme importance to our national security of keeping our
military capabilities abreast of our military commitments.' The JCS
attacked the NSC plan to rebuild Western Union's armaments industry by
sending machine tools and know-how on the grounds that, firstly, this
would interfere with American rearmament and, secondly, such machinery
would be readily captured by an advancing Soviet Army. The JCS did
not object to the theoretical problem of adopting NSC policy as being
inappropriate to military strength but protested on practical grounds.
Whether from fear or conviction, the Joint Chiefs felt that the dif¬
ference between America's declaratory policy, as perceived by the NSC,
and actual military strength was so great as to invite an attack upon
Western Europe or elsewhere. They felt that a 'counter-offensive',
unaccompanied by appropriate readiness, would cause the Soviet Union
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to consider as mandatory an 'immediate initiation of open warfare'.
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A major reason for the NSC coming under such attack for failing to
recognise the goals of American diplomacy, or to account for the
military limits to American power, was that the NSC prepared its
report without reference to the two Departments principally involved.
With its next major venture, NSC 9, a study of how the United States
could support Western Union, the national Security Council took a less
controversial option and adopted a Policy Planning Paper (PPS 27) on
00
the same subject, making only minor amendments of its own. NSC 9
was circulated on 13 April, only two weeks after NSC 7 had been dis¬
tributed. Basing its conclusions on PPS 27, the NSC adopted a new,
much milder tone and instead of insisting upon a world-wide counter-
offensive, of which aid to Western Union was to be but a part, now
spoke in terms of some kind of transatlantic treaty. Instead of seeing
only the negative side to the Soviet threat, it now emphasised the
positive side, saying that fear of 'Soviet-Communist aggression' would
notionally help to persuade Western European countries 'to cooperate
in close association provided military aid was forthcoming from the
United States'.
Although NSC 9 was to be the subject of a spirited attack from George
F. Kennan when he returned to the Department after his absence in the
Far East and subsequent illness, on the grounds that it was too far-
reaching and altogether misguided, it was broadly in keeping with
Marshall's diplomacy. The drafters of NSC 9 had concentrated upon
what the United States could do realistically 'to give effect to the
declaration of 17 March by the President', rather than give vent to an
emotive, all-embracing anti-communism. Its conclusions were consequently
more cautious and placed stress upon what Europe could do for itself and
not merely upon what the United States could do for Europe and everyone
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else. It recommended that Western Union be enlarged to include Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and, if the elections in Italy were 'favourable',
Italy. Following Truman's promise to nourish 'unity in Europe' with
the support which the situation required, the NSC felt that the United
States should not become a member of Western Union. Support was to
be offered in two ways: by exploring the possibility of a 'North Atlantic
Collective Defence Agreement' between the United States and an enlarged
Western Union, plus the addition of Canada, Eire and Portugal as purely
'North Atlantic' states; and by initiating immediately military con¬
versations with Western Union in order to strengthen collective security
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through the co-ordination of military production and supply'.
In contrast to the lack of consultation with, and subsequent attacks
from, other departments which had characterised NSC 7, NSC 9 seems an
assiduous attempt to appease all concerned. NSC 9 represented the path
of least resistance. The Atlantic lobby within the State Department
was acknowledged by the recognition that Western European weakness
compelled a military response from the United States in the form of a
treaty. This was immediately qualified by the reservation that the
United States would be the final arbiter on American actions in the
event of an attack. Those within the State Department who wished to
build Western Union into something greater, and not see it submerged
by an Atlantic agreement, were mollified by the recommendation that
Western Union be enlarged and remain a separate entity within a still
larger Atlantic group. Thp military establishment were told that the
purpose of giving military aid was not just to encourage unity in
Western Europe. Military help, the NSC made clear, was to be given
on a reciprocal basis, thus forcing •'resolute action' on Western Union's
part and so, by implication, reducing the demands upon American resources.
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And the JCS had already come to the conclusion that American military
planners ought to be present at Western Union's planning councils.
NSC 9 also included recognition of the special importance and larger
global reach of the Anglo-American relationship: there was to be an
announcement by the President that the non-inclusion of Greece, Turkey
or Iran in the arrangements ought not to be interpreted as a neglect
by the British or American governments of these three states' political
independence or territorial integrity. The deep concern of James
Forrestal and the JCS for the strategic importance of the Middle East
was embodied in the suggestion for some general Middle East security
63
system.
NSC 9 contained no alarmist assessments of the speed with which the
Soviet Armies could reach the Pyrenees. The NSC now felt that a
North Atlantic Collective Defence Treaty would be 'the instrument...
to preserve Western Civilisation'. It relied greatly on the promise
of American military help being sufficient to deter a Soviet invasion
and to build on the work of the Marshall Plan to restore confidence
in Western Europe generally while doing nothing to upset the progress
towards unity within Western Europe as a whole. In short, bearing in
mind the depressing reality behind U.S. military plans, the NSC managed
to make it appear that American diplomacy and military policy were
moving in the same direction. It did this by resorting to a large
measure of bluff, a bluff which could work only if both the Kremlin
and Western Europe were taken in and accepted Washington's p jmises
at face value.
On 20 April 1948, the Acting Secretary of State, Lovett, cabled Marshall
/
in riot-torn Bogota with the news of NSC 9 and of the early talks with
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Vandenberg about a Senate resolution. The cable makes it clear that
opinion within the State Department was beginning to harden in favour
of a transatlantic treaty, a suggestion first made by the Policy
Planning Staff (in the absence of George Kennan), picked up in the
Pentagon Paper and subsequently enshrined in NSC 9. Marshall was told
of a statement Truman could make to begin developments along this line:
invitations would be issued to Western Union's five countries, the
four Scandinavian nations (other than finalnd), Eire, Italy and Portugal
to attend a conference to examine the general idea of a multilateral
treaty based on U.N. Charter Article 51 and following the basic lines
of the Rio Treaty. The President would also make some reference to
the desirability of enlarging Western Union and expressing American
willingness to discuss military aid and to participate in military
conversations.
Before replying three days later, Marshall consulted his military
advisor in Bogota, Lt. General Matthew B. Ridgeway. He accepted
Ridgeway's view that it was undesirable to express publicly a will¬
ingness to participate in military talks. Marshall also cautioned
against giving anything which could be interpreted as a military
guarantee to Greece, Turkey or Iran. It would be unwise, he cabled,
'to involve the danger and the invitation for a dispersal of our
forces when concentration appears to be the wisest course especially
in view of our present limitations.' He did not want to 'spread
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our activity over far too widespread an area'. During the Second
World War, he had been the greatest exponent of the Clausewiztian doc¬
trine of concentrated forces in battle and it is worth noting that if
Marshall ever did accept the implications of 'Mr. X' George Kennan's
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strategy of 'the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at
a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,
corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy' then he
00
did so against his deepest military instincts.
Marshall arrived back in Washington on 24 April and immediately
involved himself in the conversations with Vandenberg and Dulles.
He told them he was anxious that the planned resolution could be
justified in terms of the Monroe Doctrine and he cited arrangements
during the two world wars which might be used as precedents. He now
firmly rejected the idea of a separate arrangement for the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East, saying that Greece and Turkey
already enjoyed American protection - the Truman Doctrine still
applied - but that anything more would be 'an empty gesture on which
we might be called and thereafter disclose our inability to make good'.
From this point, the end of April, it may have seemed that the path
towards a North Atlantic treaty would be straightforward. The State
Department as a whole regarded a treaty as the least that could be
done; the NME felt it was the most that could be offered; and the
NSC had endorsed both positions. Marshall was not opposed to the
general idea and the Western Europeans were only too happy to see their
wishes granted. But now Kennan returned to his desk and, on bringing
his considerable influence and intellect to bear on the proposal,
attitudes changed rapidly within the State Department. It was this
change which Hickerson communicated to the British at the close of the
Pentagon talks when he indicated that the idea of a treaty was meeting
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serious opposition in the Department.
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On 29 April, Kennan addressed a memorandum to both Marshall and
Lovett, giving his and Charles E. Bohlen's thoughts on the work
done so far regarding Western Union:
I believe that the appeals from Bevin and Bidault
spring primarily not from a worry about whether we
would be on their side in the event they are attacked
by Russia, but from this feeling that we do not have
any agreed concept between ourselves and themselves
as to what we would do in the event of a Russian
attack, and particularly what steps, if any, could
be taken to save the continental members of the
Brussels Union from the dual catastrophe of Russian
invasion and subsequent military liberation. I
suspect that their fears on this account have been
heightened by reports of the attitude prevailing
in some parts of our military establishment and of
the U.S. press to the effect that there would be
absolutely no point in our considering plans for
stopping or delaying a Russian advance anywhere in
Western Europe, since the Russians "have the cap¬
ability of overrunning all of Europe and the Middle
East"®^
Kennan felt that there was no need for 'a public political and
military alliance* because the very presence of American troops
between Western Europe and the Russians was an adequate guarantee
that the United States would be at war the moment a Soviet attack
took place. What was needed were 'realistic staff talks to see what
can be done about their defence*. He opposed 'the sort of thing
which has been under discussion this week with Senator Vandenberg
and Mr. Dulles', at least for the moment:
I fear that to advance along these l^nes before we
have gone into the military realities may not only
fail to achieve our main purpose of giving the
Western Europeans an adequate sense of security but
may even open up rifts among the Western Europeans
which would he highly undesirable at this moment.
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Kennan wanted the Western European-American 'exploratory staff talks'
to determine what could be done to co-ordinate military measures in
the event of war with Russia. He wanted 'further exploratory soundings
on the political level', to establish precisely the nature of the
Western European outlook.
Kennan felt that if the staff talks proved satisfactory, there would
be an end to the pleadings of Bevin and Bidault for American guarantees
in the form of a treaty. To this end, Kennan urged that the U.S.
military establishment be persuaded of
the desirability, from the immediate political
and psychological standpoint, of convincing the
Western Europeans that we have not made up our
minds to complete defeatism with respect to
Western Europe and are willing to explore with
them all serious suggestions as to how a Russian
advance could be at least delayed and impeded in
the early stages and possibly eventually halted
at some point or another.
In effect, Kennan counter-proposal to the NSC's reliance upon bluff
was to change American war plans so as to provide U.S. help to stop a
Soviet advance into Western Europe. By giving the peoples of free
Europe the assurance of American military support, their governments
would stop making impossible military demands on Washington. Although
Kennan subsequently claimed that his 'Mr. X' article had been misunder¬
stood because he never intended to preach the value of military con¬
frontation with the Soviet Union as he saw the Soviet threat in
political terms, manifesting itself mainly in fermenting unrest
generally and by subversion, the memorandum quoted above suggests
still another dimension to the story. The reason Kennan felt compelled
to advocate a greater American military commitment to Europe was not
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that he saw an immediate and present danger of a Soviet demarche but
rather that European fears and expectations were so high, and so
centred on military matters, that the United States was left with no
option in the matter.
If either Marshall or Lovett formally replied to Kennan's memorandum
then copies of their replies seem to be missing from the State
Department archives. However, the records do show that from early
May, Kennan's views began to be translated directly into action. There
was no attempt to stop the Senate resolution from being presented but
Lovett began to emphasise the importance of military aid and the co¬
ordination of military production and supply, rather than holding
out prospects of an Atlantic Pact. This was the line taken by
Ambassador Lewis Douglas in London in conversations with Bevin.
Lovett continually told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
the United States did not intend to join any new regional arrangement
but would only be 'associated' with it. This point emerged strongly
from the eventual debate on the Senate floor on Resolution 239, it
being generally agreed that whatever might occur in the future, any
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arrangement with Western Europe was 'not to go as far as the Rio Treaty'.
As Marshall said, American policy would be limited to helping Western
Union's inalienable right to self defence, recognised by the U.U.
Charter, but only promised American 'encouragement and support to
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such arrangements'. Despite a well-reported speech by Louis St.
Laurent, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, strongly
supporting the creation of an 'Atlantic Pact' on 28 April, Marshall
and Lovett continued to hope that the passage of the Senate Resolution,
coupled with Staff talks in Europe, would be all that would be required
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to give effect to Truman's speech on 17 March.
The opportunity to open 'realistic staff talks' was greatly helped by
developments in London. On 5 May, Marshall was informed of the planned
formation of the Western Union Defence Organisation, designed to be
like a four-storey building:
On the top floor are the National Defense Ministers:
the third floor has the Chiefs of Staff; the second
floor the ambassador's Committee of London with a
permanent Secretariat...; the first floor, committee
of special military representatives...
Western Union had invited 'an American observer' and the special military
committee was to draw up reports 'using similar methods to those employed
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for the Marshall Plan (seeking out what they have and what they need)'.
Lovett had told the Ambassadors of the Western European countries that
American aid would have to be limited to the co-ordination of military
production and supply together with a general commitment along the
lines of the Truman Doctrine but now strengthened by a Senate Resolution
and covering all Western Europe. Senator Vandenberg proved helpful
over the need to restrict the resolution to approving 'associate'
status and Western Union had finally begun the difficult task of
integrating Western Europe's disparate military forces. The newly-
formed defence organisation in London not only would serve as the
focus for the projected military talks but Western Union members had
already accepted the need to det rmine first of all, as with the
Marshall Plan, what Western Europe could do for itself before asking
for specific military aid and materiel.
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There was also a significant reduction of tension within the State
Department. The long-running disagreement between George Kennan and
John Hickerson appeared to be over at last, with Hickerson seeming to
capitulate entirely to Kennan's views. Hickerson now abandoned his
earlier belief in the primacy of an Atlantic Alliance as outlined in
the Pentagon Paper and NSC 9. In a major review of NSC 9, later coded
NSC 9/3, Hickerson and Kennan considered the idea of such an Alliance
as a last resort, to be contemplated only if all other efforts 'to
bolster public confidence in Western Europe' failed. Instead, all
efforts to strengthen Europe's confidence and 'to reduce the risk of
war' by deterring possible aggressors, were to be augmented by U.S.
military representatives observing the London Five Power military talks;
their task was to help draw up combined war plans and the necessary
logistical supply arrangements. The Americans were not to participate;
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merely to observe and give advice.
Central to the joint Kennan/Hickerson proposal was the idea that the
United States should
...seek to convince [Western Union] of the wisdom
of proceeding with military talks during the next
several months without seeking any U.S. commitment
more formal than that given in the President's
March 17 message and the Senate Resolution at least
until there has been more time for the development
and practical implementation of the Brussels Treaty
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system. '
Lovett used the same words when communicating this policy to the
American embassies in Western Europe. It was a restatement of
Marshall's earlier ideas about holding back on American commitment
pending closer integration in Western Europe. A more formal commitment,
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possibly but not necessarily in the form of a treaty, would be a
reward for progress towards Western European unity. As such, it was
entirely in keeping with the Truman Administration's constant search
since the end of hostilities for the minimum military effort required
to prevent communist aggression. The Marshall Plan precedent had
again been followed: the United States would screen estimates only
when Western Union had determined what it could do to help itself.
In keeping with the precedent of ERP, there now appeared another
reason why the arguments of the Atlantic lobby lost some of their
former force. Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas reported from London at
the end of April that the British Government was apparently playing
exactly the same game in the Western Union military talks as it had
played in Paris the previous year during the preliminary talks on
the organisation and distribution methods of Marshall Aid. Douglas
reported that:
Benelux representatives felt they were disposed to
go faster and further than the British in endowing
Western Union with effective power and cited as
example British tendancy to limit role of permanent
organ and secretariat....Western Union had taken
shape remarkably quick and intimated it would be a
pity to slow down or lose momentum because of
British reluctance to have adequate authority
granted to the organisation.^®
This was unwelcome news to Marshall. He replied that while he wished
to see 'any concrete progress toward greater unity of thought and
action between the nations of Western Europe', he felt, as he had done
earlier, that any public statement to that effect was 'not appropriate'.
To make such a statement would be to appear to meddle with the internal
affairs of Western Union and to interfere with British policy, a
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course plagued with risks.
Nevertheless, Marshall did not want to see Britain pull out of, or
even weaken. Western Union. If the United States now came out
strongly in favour of the Atlantic approach, the British would in¬
evitably see this as an excuse to downgrade the importance of the
Brussels Pact. The Pentagon Paper embodied the kind of Atlantic
co-operation - albeit without the participation of the continental
Europeans - which provided exactly that opportunity. Existing
military plans were also a considerable embarrassment in this connection:
Britain could not be expected to play the leading role in Western
Union if the Anglo-Canadian-American intention to evacuate troops
from Europe became known publicly. The British had an even longer
tradition of aloofness from European affairs than the Americans. If
the United States demonstrated that an arms-length relationship with
Western Europe suited its purposes best, then the United Kingdom -
occupying its self-determined, mid-Atlantic position - would be com¬
pelled to do likewise. As Kennan pointed out, rumours about HALFMOON
were both accurate in their essentials and most destructive of European
confidence and morale. As a first step towards a political repudiation
of that plan, Douglas told Marshall on 4 May 1948 that he had arranged
an early meeting with military planners in London to discuss a
commitment to establish a clear defensive line on either the Elbe or
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Rhine rivers.
Neither Douglas' cable containing this news, nor Marshall's acknowledge¬
ment, gives any hint of the momentous importance of this step. It was
not until after the Korean War that actual American plans were to change.
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Nevertheless, the importance of the new policy in the State Department
can scarcely be overrated. Prior to this, American policy towards
Europe had been in chaos. Truman may have promised 'the support
which the situation deserves' but he left considerable scope for
American action or inaction and, of course, omitted any reference to
U.S. strategic plans. Bevin may have been promised that 'good progress'
at the Five Power Military talks would be rewarded with an American
willingness to join, at an early date, discussions on military pro¬
duction and supply. But there was no scheme to increase American
military output except to build a 70-group airforce and, even then,
Bevin was told specifically that 'no consideration was being given to
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make heavy bombers available' to Britain or Western Union. The
Senate might have been preparing the Vandenberg Resolution but the
French, in reply to a question as to whether the United States was
'contemplating guaranteeing the frontiers of Western Europe, were
told by Theodore C. Achilles that the United States was 'very
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definitely not thinking of any such thing'. Marshall might have
told Kennan that the French 'are secure....as long as the three power
occupation of Germany was of unforseeable and indefinite duration, thus
offering protracted security guarantees', but this did not take into
consideration Truman's deep concern about the declining numbers in
the U.S. Army and the effect this reduction was having on the occupation
forces' effectiveness.^^
Western Europe's safety might, ultimately, have depended upon the
American monopoly over atomic weapons but, in May 1948, the President
refused to consider even the possibility of their use as outlined in
HALFMOON. NSC 9, originally planned toprovide the blueprint for
an Atlantic Alliance, became NSC 9/3 under Kennan's influence which
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proposed little more than the promise of military equipment and joint
war planning with the Western Union's newly-established defence
organisation. In that this might have left Western Europe reliant
solely upon the atomic bomb, the French were sceptical. Bidault
felt that the Russians would discount the bombs ever being used by
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the American 'naifs' who would 'wait too long'; Even the limited
proposals of NSC 9/3 came under attack from the JCS:
We should not be committed to any military plans
that might unduly influence or even jeopardize
optimum overall global strategy in favor of
either directggilitary assistance or distribution
of equipment.
NSC 9/3 eventually became the basis on which the American military
delegation was sent to London in late June to participate as observers
in the development of Western Union's military planning.
But it was from the moment that Douglas announced the change in
Anglo-American plans that the American commitment to the defence of
Western Europe really began. The rejection by the State Department of
a full-scale withdrawal followed by a replay of the Normandy landings,
and the subsequent decision to compel the NME to alter its own plans
in line with American diplomatic goalsfmarked the decisive moment in
the development of the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States was
committed by deeds, not merely promises. This crucial change had
been brought about not by fear of an imminent Soviet attack but by
the clear-eyed recognition that if the United States did not plan to
defend a line at the Rhine, Western Union would not long survive as a
unit. Given, in Lewis Douglas's words, 'our interest in Western
European unity', the British tendency to stand aloof from Western
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Europe would have to be undermined. This could only be done by giving
a military commitment to the defence of Western Europe as a whole.
For good or ill, the United States of America had become entangled in
the affairs of Europe.
* * *
In tracing the developments which preceded the Senate's acceptance
of the Vandenberg Resolution, two apparently contradictory impulses
can be seen to have come together. On the one hand, there is the
tendency on the part of the United States to stand back and thereby
compel the West Europeans to do more for themselves, and ultimately
create a politically lasting, economically self-sufficient and
militarily secure coalition. The phrase 'self help and mutual aid'
sums up the American attitude described in the previous chapter and
it is consistent with the views already noted of Marshall and Lovett
from the beginning of 1948. On the other hand, in this chapter, it
is clear that military considerations muddied the seeming clarity of
those American objectives. The putative allies of the United States
took little or no comfort from their superpower patron's atomic
monopoly. They remained, quite simply, frightened. The Brussels Pact,
as its founders had known from the beginning, could not defend Western
Europe without direct U.S. assistance. Yet at that moment existing
military plans promised only chaos if hostilities broke out. Western
Union forces would be moving eastwards to meet the challenge, including
the British, who over and above their undertakings in HALFMOON would
probably have honoured their continental commitment. At the same time
U.S. forces were to be withdrawn westwards because logistically they
could not be sustained. There was thus no choice but to harmonise the
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respective plans of the Anglo-Canadian-American group with those of
the Anglo-French-Benelux group.
The result of the two impulses fusing was paradoxical: if the United
States was ever to succeed in convincing the West Europeans to stand
on their own feet, it would have to be seen by them to do more on
their behalf. That paradox was fundamental to a succession of develop¬
ments, beginning with the Vandenberg Resolution. It lay at the heart
of the North Atlantic Treaty, the emergent structure of NATO, and the
decision to increase U.S. force levels in Europe in the early 1950s.
It also served as the basis for the long list of complaints emanating
from Washington that the NATO allies were taking a 'free ride' at the
expense of the American taxpayers. In the context of this thesis,
the paradox also explains why European pressure on the United States
did not relent during the negotiations which led to the North Atlantic
Treaty. It is to those that attention must now turn.
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CHAPTER 6
PREPARING TO NEGOTIATE : FORMULATING U.S. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Four distinct sets of negotiations preceded the publication of the
North Atlantic Treaty text on 18 March 1949. From July to September
1948 there were exploratory talks on Atlantic security in Washington.
In London, U.S. observers contributed to intra-Western Union discussion
about military measures. From the end of 1948 to March 1949, substan¬
tial negotiations took place to finalise the text of the treaty.
Finally, discussions running in parallel with all three were held about
a military version of the Marshall Plan, sometimes on a bilateral basis,
at others a multinational setting.
The American part in the first two of these four diplomatic exchanges,
forms the subject discussed in this chapter. The focus is rather
different from that of most recent writers on NATO's origins, specif¬
ically Sir Nicholas Henderson, Lawrence S. Kaplan and Escott Reid."'"
In their respective studies, the predominant assumption is that the
Atlantic community of nations was seeking a more formal, permanent
expression in the postwar period. According to this view, the North
Atlantic Treaty was the natural, if not automatic, result. From this
it follows that, once agreement has been reached, all parties to the
treaty shared the same view of what had been decided upon. In order
to bring this satisfactory state of affairs to fruition, diplomats
and the governments they represented, did not pursue national interests
where these were seen to conflict with the general good. Thus the French -
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who threatened to sabotage the whole enterprise if the treaty did not
recognize Algeria as an integral part of Metropolitan France - are
revealed in the Kaplan school as the exception, not the rule. It
cannot go unremarked that each of the writers mentioned was either
directly concerned with the negotiations or in government service at
the time. Each has remained a staunch supporter of the Atlantic idea
ever since. Whether unconsciously or by design, this background seems
to have fostered a tendency to minimise transatlantic differences.
The argument in this chapter proceeds from another assumption: that
the United States pursued its own national interests - frequently
different from those of the Atlantic colleagues - with a singleminded-
ness equal to that of the French. What separated the two was that
the Americans showed more finesse than the battle-shocked French in
doing so. However, the argument of this chapter is not propounded as
superior, or more 'true',than the one more usually made. Both have
their contemporary function. The 'Atlantic community' view helps
explain the longevity of NATO and can be cited as the essential under¬
pinning to numerous decisions taken by NATO natiors since 1949. The
alternative view helps one to disentangle the reasons why NATO's
%
history has been dogged by argument, suspicion, bad faith and dis-
2
appointed expectations. In historical terms, both interpretations
are valid. To date, however, one has had rather more attention than
the other.
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The blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union and its Allies began on
24 June 1948. Twelve days later talks started in Washington about the
formation of an Atlantic Pact. The two events were not consequential.
It is true that, had there been no perception of a challenge from
Eastern Europe, such talks would never have taken place. However,
the decision to hold them was made after the passage of the Vandenberg
Resolution and before the sudden interruption of road and rail links
with the old German capital. The talks ended on 9 September with the
completion not of a draft agreement - as the European participants
would have wished - but of an 'agreed statement' on the nature of the
North Atlantic security problem and 'the steps which might be practical
3
to meet them'. Despite the facts that the Berlin blockade persisted,
and that tension between East and West remained high, for Marshall and
Lovett the agreed statement - known as the Washington Paper - followed
the pattern of the Pentagon Paper and the Vandenberg Resolution: it was
essentially non-commital.
The start of the negotiations coincided with the end of the Congressional
session and the beginning of the presidential campaign in earnest. The
immediate consequence of this was that no treaty could be laid before
the Senate until January 1949 at the earliest. Technically, Congress
could be recalled but, from an American viewpoint, there was no hurry.
Given that a new president was expected to replace Truman, political
prudence suggested that no new major departures be agreed to in the
interim. Furthermore, foreign policy was a bipartisan issue. The
November elections were expected to produce a Republican President and
a Republican Congress. Thus far, neither John Foster Dulles nor
Governor Dewey, respectively the Secretary of State - and White House
incumbent-in-waiting, had shown enthusiasm for the idea of a Pact.
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Vandenberg was known to be wary. In fact during the campaign in his
major address on foreign policy, Dewey carefully avoided all mention
of military alliances and instead concentrated on the need to create
a 'United States of Europe'. As George Kennan remarked to Marshall
and Lovett: it was important 'not to encourage the [Pact ]project to
4
a point where we arouse false hopes'.
In an election year, public opinion was clearly of transcendent
importance to the Democratic Party leadership. According to the
opinion polls, the American people were satisfied that the West
Europeans required U.S. military assistance. Nevertheless, as shown
in the previous chapter, many - if not most - tended to back away from
5
a commitment to 'go to war'. Moreover, as the campaign progressed,
polls began to show resistance to anything which might lead to higher
taxes, such as a 'military ERP'. The West Europeans wanted not only
a cast-iron American commitment. They wanted arms as well, and just
at the time when Truman had reason to think he had military spending
almost under control.
When the Republicans regained dominance in Congress during the mid¬
term elections, they did so in part through their straightforward
appeal to traditional Republican virtues of a balanced budget, low
personal taxes and reduced expenditure by central government. Whether
or not he disagreed with some of the implications of that approach,
Truman was in no electoral position to argue. These clo+hes he had to
steal and wear himself. As the Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, was
aware, Truman had decided on ruthless control of military spending as
part of his national economic programme. It was the natural target:
in postwar America, defence outlays have consistently been the largest
item on the federal budget.
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The table below shows that in the financial year (FY) 1948, ending on
30 June, coincidentally just days before transatlantic talks began,
Truman had cut total expenditure from the previous year by some $493
millions but had less success in cutting military spending. That was
taking in real terms, a greater percentage share of the total federal
bill. (The next largest item on the account in 1948 was Veterans'
U.S. Defence Expenditures as a Percentage of the Federal





Total as % of Fed. Budget
1946 61738 44731 72.5
1947 39631 13059 35.4
1948 36493 13015 35.7
1949 40570 13097 32.3
1950 43147 13119 30.4
Source: The Statistical History of the United States: From Colonial
Times to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 1976) p.116,
adapted. (The totals are all outturn figures.)
benefits and services, which represented almost 18 per cent of the
total.) There was more to this than the tinkering of accountants in
the U.S. Bureau of the Budget. There were votes to be lost if control
of expenditure was demonstrably absent. In any case, Truman himself
did believe in balancing the budget, 'New Dealer' though he may have
been. As Forrestal said, the President was 'a hard money man' at
heart. Thus, for so long as the Europeans linked an American
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commitment to arms supplies and other military help, and until the
financial cost of that assistance was known, the U.S. negotiators had
no choice but to play for time.
The uncertainty within the Truman Administration about the desirability
or otherwise of a treaty added to the instinct for caution. Marshall
and Lovett had been beset by conflicting advice in the early part of
1948, not just on matters of emphasis but on issues directly germane
to U.S. security. Now an uneasy compromise had been reached, based
on a National Security Council document (NSC 9/3) which appeared to
reconcile the pro- and anti-treaty factions as well as the depart¬
mental 'don't knows' and the doubters in the Pentagon. In fact the
compromise could not stand too much close examination; differences
remained. Marshall had become unwell with the kidney problem which'
was to force his early retirement. He was thus not able to give the
kind of leadership which would resolve such disputes. As for Truman,
he was otherwise engaged on the hustings. His Administration was
hobbled by indecision on those foreign policy matters which were not
pressing. Where urgency was required, as over Berlin or the recog¬
nition of Israel, things moved swiftly. But the Atlantic Treaty was
not such an issue. If it was to appear at all much would depend on
the drafting skills of the negotiators.
The text of the Washington Paper was hammered out during the course
of some 20 meetings between early July and early September. These
were of two kinds. First, setting the framework for discussion was
the Ambassadors' Committee, comprising the senior representatives of
the Brussels Treaty powers (the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxumbourg). Canada was represented by Lester B.
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Pearson, the civil servant in charge of the Canadian Department of
External Affairs. The American delegation - the target - was led by
Robert A. Lovett, supported by Bohlen, Kennan, Butler, Hickerson and
Achilles. This meant that unlike the March discussions in the Pentagon,
the U.S. representatives reflected the spectrum of views about an
Atlantic Pact which had emerged since the beginning of the year.
Bohlen and Kennan were the sceptics; Lovett was an unmovable 'don't
know'; while the other three were enthusiastic Atlanticists. Secondly,
a smaller gathering known as the Working Group was given the all-
important task of drafting the agreed text and amending it in the
light of the Ambassadors' comments. Members of this group were
officials below ambassador rank: at various times all of the Amer¬
icans except Lovett participated.
From the recollections of participants, and the minutes and trans¬
cripts of the seven-power negotiations, it.is clear that the role
of Lovett was pivotal. Sir Nicholas Henderson, then a Secretary at
the British Embassy, recalled the American Under-Secretary's style of
chairmanship.
Lovett was always friendly and courteous, but he
was also consistently cautious. He would talk
urbanely and without notes, illustrating his
remarks with anecdote and metaphor. He would
dilate upon U.S. policy in general, the American
constitution, the strained U.S. economy, and the
need to avoid building a 'fire trap' in Europe.
But it was a Herculean tack trying to squeeze
from him any positive statement of what the U.S.
were prepared to do towards the security of
y
Western Europe.
He was 'a past master at circumlocation' and was unwilling to lead
the discussions, preferring to let them ramble. As Henderson observed,
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all of this was probably deliberate, partly for the political reasons
already discussed in this chapter, and partly because of Lovett's
conviction - shared by Marshall - that witholding support was a useful
lever vis-a-vis the Europeans. It is particularly striking that
Henderson should recall Lovett's use of the phrase 'avoid building a
fire trap in Europe'. This was the exact form of words used by John
Foster Dulles in his seminal speech on 9 January 1947, in which he
put the American case for European federation as the precondition of
long-term disengagement from the Old World.
The first Ambassadors' Committee meeting consisted largely of Lovett
informing the 20-odd career diplomats present of the conditions under
which the United States was participating in the inter-governmental
discussions. He reminded his listeners that the purpose of the exer¬
cise was to give substance to what Bevin had suggested in January:
United States' backing for an arrangement whereby the political,
military, economic and spiritual forces of Western Europe were inte¬
grated into 'some form of union, formal or informal'. To that end,
Lovett explained that two principal inhibitions dominated State
Department thinking; one was political, the other constitutional.
It was politically essential, Lovett said, to ensure that any agreement
had 'the backing of the vast majority of the American people'. A brief
statement to the press would be made about the talks being held -
itself a departure from the March discussion in the Pentagon. But
no further details would be given. The minutes record his remarks.
He emphasized the need for absolute security. A
leak, particularly during the political campaign in
the United States, might throw the whole enterprise
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into jeopardy. Political heat in this country
will increase up to election day, and scars will
be left afterwards. Any leak as to the subjects
of discussion in these meetings, therefore,
might cast a cloud over the whole plan.®
What had to be avoided was the kind of situation which had surrounded
the negotiations leading to the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, when
the journalist James Reston published a daily and accurate account of
9
the supposedly secret proceedings.
On the constitutional question, Lovett explained that two options
had been considered. An agreement could be reached and sent to the
Senate to approve before the Presidential ratification, or the whole
Congress could be asked for advice on policy through consultation
prior to an agreement. The latter option had been chosen and the
result was the Vandenberg Resolution. (The House of Representatives'
Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously supported the resolution but
legislative problems made it impossible to put it before the full
House prior to the end of the legislative session). Lovett described
this 'as an extraordinary paper in American history, as a statement
of policy in advance' The basic condition of U.S. association
with regional and other collective arrangements were that the bene¬
ficiaries of that association had to show determined and continuous
efforts at self-help; equally they must be prepared to participate
in central aid arrangements involving the United States. This last
point represented a significant shift in Lovett's thinking since he
had helped draft the resolution six weeks before. Then 'self-help and
mutual aid' had referred exclusively to the West Europeans' expected
progress towards the quintessential American virtue of self-reliance.
Now mutual aid included the United States: transatlantic assistance
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was to be a two-way street. Any other formula risked the Senate's
rejection especially as the Republican majority was reputed to be
increased in November.
For obvious reasons, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State did not include
in his address the point that all of these political and constitutional
inhibitions suited his Department's interests very well. Given that
the Truman Administration as a whole had yet to make up its mind about
an Atlantic Pact, it was clearly prudent to keep anything which might
be construed as an American commitment from the press and public; if
details of proceedings leaked out, the Europeans could use that as
a lever against the United States. Moreover, Vandenberg was still
widely tipped as the Republican presidential hopeful who would defeat
Dewey for the nomination in the coming convention of the Grand Old
Party. Lovett knew Vandenberg well as a working colleague and was
aware of his reservations about a formal pact. It was not part of
the State Department's job to bequeath to an incoming Administration
a contentious commitment to Western Europe, known in advance to sit
uncomfortably with the neo-isolationism of John Foster Dulles (the
likely future Secretary of State) and the wariness of Vandenberg.
In one important respect Lovett was not a supporter of the Status quo.
He did wish to see permanent, constructive change occur in Europe.
He could not know - few in government did in 1948 - that the creative,
armed stalemate in Europe, built on the division of Germany by East
and West, would be the method by which world peace was assured. What
he sought was change in that part of the continent still open to
American influence. He therefore told the Ambassadors' Committees'
'The United States would endeavour in these talks to develop thoughts
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of closer military, political, economic and spiritual union between
12
the countries of Western Europe 1. European security based on the
Brussels Pact as the hard core, would have to be rebuilt on a much
sounder basis than in the past. He had yet to discover that 'a much
sounder basis' meant in practice precisely the long-term commitment
which the existence of a united Western Europe was supposed to obviate.
There were four further meetings of the Ambassadors' Committee before
the Working Group got down to the job of drafting. The Americans
suggested an agenda, to which all agreed, the four items of which
served as the subjects for the four discussions. These were:
(1) the situation in Europe as it affected security, including estimates
of Soviet intisitions; (2) security measures taken or to be taken in
Europe by the Western Union powers; (3) security relation with other
West European countries; and (4) the nature of the U.S. association
under the Vandenberg Resolution with European security arrangements.
As Henderson observed, discussions did tend to ramble and the agenda
was not rigidly kept. Hence, for the sake of clarity, the four talks
are best taken as a whole, basing discussion and analysis on the agenda
but keeping the themes discrete regardless of which meeting in which
they appeared. To give just one example of why this is necessary: the
most interesting interventions about Soviet intentions were not made
during the meeting devoted to that subject. There was some argument
about the structure of the agenda: the French wanted to discuss first
of all how the United States was going to end the feeling of insecurity
in Europe. Lovett disagreed: the agenda reflected very much an
American perspective. Perhaps sensing this, no other European
representative supported the French call for a new agenda.
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Lovett had excluded 'military problems' from the discussions at the
outset. These were to be dealt with by Western Union countries in
London. However, the nature of the Soviet threat could not be avoided
as a subject of debate on those grounds. The new British Ambassador,
Sir Oliver Franks, opened the discussion with a succinct statement
of the European view. The internal logic of the Soviet system, he
argued, demanded an attempt at world domination, beginning with the
countries on the eastern shores of the North Atlantic. The countries
on the western seaboard would be immediately threatened and it was
this which created a 'community of interest' in the North Atlantic area.
The Russians had two techniques: aggression and subversion. The
threat was real, he said, and suggested that if the talks failed to
create an adequate demonstration of a collective will to deter overt
13
aggression the threat would grow.
Lovett confined himself to a general acknowledgement of the threat's
impact on western democracies' policies. He left Bohlen and Kennan
to discuss Soviet intentions more thoroughly. This was natural; they
were the two senior State Department experts on the subject. Both were
fluent in Russian. Kennan had served with distinction in the U.S.
diplomatic mission in Riga in the 1930s and subsequently in the
Moscow embassy during the war. Bohlen had served as Roosevelt's
personal interpreter at Yalta and had replaced Kennan in Moscow when
the latter was recalled to become the Department's first permanent
14
incumbent of the new Russian desk. As became apparent during the
exchanges, the scepticism of both men about the need for an Atlantic
Pact reflected their educated belief that the Soviet threat was less
than their colleagues imagined.
258
Bohlen expressed the opinion that the Russians were now alarmed that
they were losing ground. Their hopes for getting control of Germany
were diminishing; the blockade of Berlin was cited as evidence of this.
He also said that the Soviet Politburo did not have separate military,
political and economic policies; all were integrated. This meant that
the West had to guard against 'undue apprehension' about a Soviet
invasion. The Kremlin would not easily expose more troops in the Red
Army to the comparative pleasures of Western life. This had been the
cause of substantial desertions during the Great Patriotic War. The
Soviet Government, Bohlen said, 'was more preoccupied with the main¬
tenance of the regime in Russia than with any other problem and was
13
aware of potential dangers at home'.
Kennan supported that contention and gave further reasons. The Soviet
leaders had not yet repaired these parts of Russia so lately devastated
by the German invaders. The people were weary of war. The Kremlin
knew only too well that the lesson of both world wars was that no attempt
to dominate the continent of Europe could succeed unless the North
American industrial potential was knocked out or neutralized first.
Kennan argued that nothing justified the belief that the Russians were
ready, willing and able to conquer the world by armed force. They were
not operating to a fixed timetable; parallels between fascism and
communism, or Hitlerism and Stalinism, were dangerous. However, Kennan
did point to the danger that the Soviet Union might resort to war:
'The greatest danger would be in an abrupt weakening of their power
in Eastern Europe'. Barring that the real 'war' was political and
currently in progress. It was the cold war and could be won by the
West. The task facing the United States was how to give the maximum
encouragement to the West Europeans and discouragement to Moscow.
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Kennan concluded by drawing a distinction between the readiness of
the United States to go to war if forced to do so and the long-term
trends of the Western democracies winning the political and •''ideological
16
confrontation between East and West.
The Canadian representative, Lester Pearson, tried to shift the
discussion away from Soviet intentions. He suggested that an Atlantic
Pact should not be closely tied to what the Russians were supposedly
trying to do. The worry was that if the Soviets embarked on a 'peace
offensive' the rationale for the Pact would be weakened. He suggested
that the Atlantic idea was based on wider considerations of shared
values, interdependent economies, common heritage, political systems
and social concern. Kennan responded by saying that he agreed with
the notion that a community of interests existed which had a wider
base than military necessity. The problem there, he suggested, was
that traditional, historical and other links between the two sides
of the Atlantic were no argument for a military alliance. Such an
argument had to be grounded on realistic perceptions of the Soviet
threat. If the threat was palpable and immediate, then military staff
talks were the solution, not another military alliance. Lovett later
added the observation that too much weight ought not to be placed on
the Vandenberg Resolution. That, he said, represented the 'absolute
maximum' to which the United States might go: 'the final result might
differ markedly from the concept contained in the Vandenberg Resol-
, . , 17ution'.
If the Europeans failed to get a satisfactory response from the Amer¬
icans on the question of the Soviet challenge, the tables were turned
on the issue of what security steps were being taken by the five members
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of Western Union. Lovett's own response was vividly described by Sir
Nicholas Henderson. The French Ambassador, Henri Bonnet, made one of
his frequent and vociferous requests for an early U.S. commitment to
the Brussels Treaty powers. According to Henderson, Lovett replied
with a rhetorical question.
'How could the U.S. deal with the maintenance of peace
and the prevention of war with a group whose capabilities
were unknown?' A little cold water spilled suddenly in
this way after the usual warmth of his words and manner
had the effect of ice.-*-®
In effect, Lovett was carrying on the American search for the actual
meaning and purpose of the Western Union. State Department officials
from Marshall downwards had complained that Bevin had never explained
what he meant ever since late January when the subject was first
publicly broached. During the Pentagon talks in March, Hickerson had
made the American position plain: Western Union was expected to
become the 'United States of Western Europe', possibly of all Europe
19
eventually. This expectation remained and the U.S. representatives
wanted evidence of progress in that direction.
Hickerson asked the question which most interested the Americans: what
was the extent of the Europeans' progress on the pooling of their
military resources and the conclusion of financial arrangements to
that end? Sir Oliver Franks told the meeting that little had been
achieved to date because 'no yardstick for such arrangements had yet
been made'. He did, however, run through the steps taken to modify
or create various bodies designed to carry out the objective of
military integration foreshadowed in the Brussels Treaty. He mentioned
the establishment of the Permanent Consultative Council which included
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a permanent Military Committee, a Standardisation Committee and various
subsidiary advisory bodies. He also revealed that inventories were
being compiled of current military readiness and potential military
strength. This last task was likely to take some time, said Franks,
because it involved working out a balance between manpower, industrial
capacity and economic resources available for defence and for the
normal economy'. He noted that war production resources on the con¬
tinent had been either destroyed or reconverted to civilian purposes
and reminded all that 'military potential depended on a healthy
, 20economy'.
The U.S. response was in two parts. First, Lovett pointed out that
industrial production in the United States was running at full speed
with shortages in materials and manpower. The American reconversion
programme had also been implemented for 'world needs'. The largest
U.S. manufacturer of explosive for shells during World War II was now
making fertilizer for Europe as well as for domestic consumption;
some aircraft fabricators had turned to agricultural machinery pro¬
duction, again for Europe as well as the United States. The point
was made that if the Europeans were to be supplied with war production,
their economic recovery would suffer. Secondly, Lovett indicated
again the salience of the phrase in the Vandenberg Resolution, 'con¬
tinuous and effective self-help and mutual aid'. He recognized that
U.S. 'association' meant more than military land-lease. Some sort
of regional pact 'similar to the Rio Treaty' would be desirable from
the American standpoint. He might have added - but did not - that
such an arrangement would place much of the burden on the Western
Union while not committing the United States to the use of armed force
against aggression in Europe. At no stage did he give the Europeans
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any suggestion that the Brussels Treaty, with its much stricter casus
foederis, could be equally acceptable as the blueprint for an Atlantic
Pact.21
However, the U.S. clearly did see the Brussels Treaty as directly
applicable to other West European countries. That was why Lovett
had wished to discuss the security relationship between Western Union
and its neighbouring countries before discussing the nature of the
American commitment. The Europeans took issue with this. The French
Ambassador, Bonnet, pointed out that politically unstable countries,
such as Italy, would be liabilities; he urged the discussion turn to
ways of strengthening the Brussels Pact through transatlantic links.
The Belgian Ambassador, Baron Silvercruys, said that the key to the
third agenda item currently being addressed was the fourth item, the
American commitment. For the British, Sir Oliver Franks put a more
sophisticated case. He suggested that there were two levels to the
problem:
[T]here were certain countries with a vital interest
in, and of vital interest to, the security of the
North Atlantic area; this was the bigger plane. The
other plane was European: there were countries which
might be associated with the Brussels Pact, for
instance Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Italy.
This was not an exhaustive list, he said, but 'the readiness of the
Brussels Powers to enlarge and of the others to join was conditioned
by the attitude of the U.S. and Canada' toward the last item on the
Ambassadors' agenda, the nature of North American associations with
22
Western Europe under the Vandenberg Resolution.
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Lovett was not moved. Following U.S. policy, he insisted that Western
Union's relationship with other West European countries and this
security could be discussed independently of what the United States
and Canada might eventually decide. As far as the United States was
concerned the ultimate criterion' of U.S. association was whether or
not 'its national security was enhanced by such an arrangement. He
pointed out that Greenland and Iceland were of greater significance
to the United States (and Canada) than some nations in continental
Europe. The minutes record his view:
Mr. Lovett said that unless the Western European
nations showed a high order of determination to
solve their problems through some form of union
based on self-help and mutual aid, the enterprise
would not possess the degree of assurance for the
future which the U.S. expected. He reiterated
that the U.S. could not "rebuild a fire-trap",
that wars in this area had twice involved it, and
that now the people of the United States desired
to avoid mistakes of the past and make a con¬
structive contribution to world security.
The Europeans could not have»failed to receive the message: the ending
of isolationism was not, in Lovett's mind, synonymous with the kind
of Atlantic arrangement being sought by the West Europeans. Picking
up a proposal made earlier by Kennan, he suggested different levels
of membership. There might, for example, be three groups of nations:
North American, Western Union and 'others', the last of which would
include Greenland, Iceland and Portugal (because of the Azores), the
so-called 'stepping stones' across the Atlantic. Implicit in such a
system was the notion that obligations would be less onerous depending
23
on geographical and other factors. In the later drafting stages of
the actual treaty the Europeans finally succeeded in persuading the
Americans to abandon this idea of graduated membership.
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The division of opinion between the North Americans and the Europeans
was even wider on the fourth agenda item. Lovett stated that the
present need was 'for some fairly precise indication of the type of
organization with which the U.S. might be dealing in the future'.
Bonnet replied the Europeans were waiting to hear what kind of assoc¬
iation was contemplated by the United States under the Vandenberg
Resolution. Lovett thought that it would be 'unprofitable at this
time to try to be too precise as to details' of the American position.
He emphasized that under the U.S. constitutional system there could
be no event such as aggression against an ally which could automatically
bring the United States into war. The constitutional prerogative of
Congress to declare war was non-negotiable. The Vandenberg Resolution
did not alter this; nor could there be any unilateral guarantee to
the Western Union.
At this point Lester Pearson mediated. He suggested that the Rio
Treaty formula was appropriate. Under it, an attack against one was
to be considered an attack against all but this did not mean that each
party was obligated automatically to go to war if one of the others
was attacked. The obligation called for 'assistance', not a declaration
of war. Similarly, each country would decide for itself whether an
attack - as the occasion for 'assistance' - had occurred. All of this
should satisfy the Americans. However, he added that when the Rio
Treaty was being formulated, the United States had not considered that
the other signatories were to supply in advance details of the military
assistance they could render to the Americans and the other signatory
nations. Different rules should thus not now apply. Lovett demurred,
saying that while the Rio Treaty was 'a take-off point' for discussion
it did not meet the specific requirements of a North Atlantic Pact.
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The inter-American relationship had a long history and while the
assistance to the United States was minimal in some cases, at least
the Latin American states could supply raw materials. The West
Europeans in contrast, would require such raw materials. But he did
concede that the expansion of the Brussels Pact might take place
simultaneously with the creation of an Atlantic arrangement for
24
collective security.
Without that concession it is difficult to see how further progress
could have been made. It overcame the problem noted by Hickerson
that from an American perspective the Brussels Pact was not broad
enough in membership yet too broad as to obligation. It also avoided
the difficulty discussed by the Canadians of political factors exclud¬
ing certain countries while strategic factors made their inclusion
imperative. Moreover, it enabled the Europeans to concentrate on
Atlantic arrangements as a priority and the Americans to continue
with their preoccupation of a lasting settlement in Europe.
Kennan emphasized this point, supported by Hickerson. He said that
in the long term the United States looked to changes in Europe which
%
would permit a general unification of the whole continent, including
the countries behind the Iron Curtain.
It was necessary that when the Marshall Plan period
came to an end, or even earlier, there should emerge
an economically self-supporting Europe which was on
the road to greater political unity and which was
militarily capable of taking care of itself.
The United States did not wish to see a return to prewar conditions in
Central and Eastern Europe. What Kennan called 'petty nationalisms', or
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very small alliances, which could not survive once push came to shove,
were of no use by virtue of their impermanence. It followed, he
argued, that discussions should not concentrate solely on the issue
of a military guarantee against a military danger which would be
25
mitigated in the course of time.
At the end of the discussion of the American commitment, the Ambassadors'
Committee agreed that the next stage was the examination of the issues
which discussion on the four agenda items had raised. For this the
Working Group was formed, comprising the Ambassadors' seconds-in-
command. The Americans were mostly Atlanticist in outlook: Hickerson
and Achilles, plus two of their staff members, Samuel Reber and W.J.
Galloway; Kennan was a regular attender, Bohlen less so. Differences
in the U.S. camp were therefore inevitable although this did have a
constructive effect:
By washing their dirty linen in front of the
Working Party, the Americans concealed nothing.
The other representatives always knew exactly
what the troubles were on the American sides
and who was in favour of this or that.^6
The consequence was that the Americans avoided any possibility of
arousing suspicions. British and Canadian participants later credited
27
the success of the Working Party's efforts to Hickerson and Achilles.
However, it is clear from the record that Bohlen and Kennan made a
major contribution, without which the results would have probably been
more to the liking of the Europeans.
The product of the joint labours was the Washington Paper, approved by
the Ambassadors on 9 September, for distribution as an international
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discussion document. It took some 15 meetings of the Working Group
to agree on a draft. In most of these there was a tendency for debate
to ramble around the issues, and arguments were frequently repeated.
Comment and historical analysis can therefore most usefully focus on
the end product, elucidating it by back reference to the discussions
on the sticking points.
The Washington Paper was a three-way compromise. It showed the
influence of the West Europeans (who were represented in the actual
drafting by the British diplomat, Sir Frederic Hoyer-Millar), the
Hickerson-Canadian vision of an Atlantic community, and the Bohlen-
Kennan view that the threat was neither as immediate nor as military
as others suggested. But there was a fourth, disembodied presence
in the discussions: the U.S. Senate. During a meeting of the Working
Group on 12 August, 1948, Hickerson made what a Canadian described as
'a solemn and serious statement'. Hickerson reminded the group that
the fact talks were taking place was indicative of 'the most radical
change in United States foreign policy that have ever taken place'.
He therefore explained :
[l]nso far as the State Department was concerned,
its officials were unwilling to risk failure in
implementing this new United States foreign
policy. It would be disastrous if they were to
put forward to the Senate an unacceptable pact
or treaty. It would be almost equally disastrous
if a pact or treaty were to be ratified with a
series of hampering reservations after protracted
debate.
Kennan, who chaired most of the meetings of the Working Group, expressed
some bitterness at this attitude in his autobiography. He recalled an
occasion when Lovett crushed a European suggestion on the grounds that
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Senators would not accept it. The objection was apparently final but
Kennan rather wished that 'one of our European friends had stood up at
this point and said, "Mr. Lovett, if you and your colleagues in the
State Department cannot speak responsibly for American foreign policy
29
in this matter, will you kindly introduce us to the people who can?"'
These sentiments were probably shared by Lester B. Pearson, an avowed
advocate of 'quiet diplomacy' and the separation of domestic and foreign
30
policy issues. However, in political terms such attitudes were a
luxury. The Senate had to be considered a power in international
relations in its own right. As Truman himself recognized, the Europeans
remembered the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations and wanted
the United States to deliver after this second world war what Senator
31
Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. and colleagues had denied them after the first.
All seven countries represented at the talks had a vested interest in
ensuring that the eventual outcome was fully acceptable to the Senate.
The three-way compromise was engineered in a way familiar to the
American contingent. Rather than make hard choices between competing
priorities and points of view, all were found a place in the finished
document. (This is what happened when Lewis Douglas ensured Marshall
got his way on the administration of ERP and the formula adapted in
32
the preparation of both NSC 9 and the Pentagon Paper.) The outcome
was that the Washington Paper was satisfactory to all parties because
no fi^al decisions were taken. This led to a certain awkwardness in
the presentation of the arguments. Three examples make the point.
On whether a treaty was needed, the document included the statement:
'No alternative to a treaty appears to meet the essential requirements'.
But this was heavily qualified by the observation: 'As will be clear
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this paper represents no firm conclusions'. On the question of the
Soviet threat, the Soviet Union was identified as 'statistically
capable of dominating Europe by force' and that this, combined with a
'self-admittedly expansionist' ideology, made the current situation
'extremely insecure'. However, the likelihood of war was said mainly
to depend on the Soviet leaders miscalculating Western intentions and
on the undermining of their influence in Eastern Europe. Finally, on
the issue of the American commitment, the West Europeans were said to
be anxious that the assistance given should be immediate, and military
as well as economic and political. Yet all agreed that constitutional
consideration had to be observed and that it would be up to individual
countries to decide how and whether to give assistance. At the same
time it was acknowledged that the presence of U.S. troops in Germany
made the United States effectively a European power, thus involving
the Americans in most contingencies, including armed conflict, from
33
the outset.
There was no necessary inconsistency among these and other points in
the argument but no attempt was made to resolve them either. This
was especially evident in the first section which outlined 'the
provisions which might be suitable for inclusion in a North Atlantic
security pact'. Instead of drafting the actual provisions, the Working
Group was content to note the main headings - membership, geographical
area, obligation clause, relation to the U.N. Charter, and the like -
and make reference to the relevant par*:; of the Vandenberg Resolution,
the Rio Treaty and the Brussels Treaty. At least two of these sources
was cited for each heading. As the discussion on the resolution and
the Pentagon Paper in Chapter 4 already makes clear, this meant that
34
the division between the Americans and the Europeans was still wide.
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The United States had moved towards the European position but not past
the terms of the Rio Treaty which obliged signatories to 'assist' in
meeting the attack. The Europeans on the other hand preferred the
tighter obligation of the Brussels Treaty to 'afford the party so
attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'.
They had not moved despite the knowledge that the Senate could not
35
endorse an Atlantic Pact based on the Brussels formula.
This fundamental difference of view, already apparent during the March
talks, was not finally resolved until the following March. It is one
reason why the North Atlantic Treaty took so long to draft and why its
operational clause - as read by a strict constructionist - was heavily
qualified. The difference is also the major reason why the search for
NATO's origins ought not lead to the discovery of anticedents where
there are none. Two European scholars have argued:
At the end of June 1948 the situation was as follows:
the resistance within the State Department to an Atlantic
alliance had almost vanished, the NSC was unanimously
in favour and the Vandenberg Resolution meant that the
American administration could safely start negotiations
on an Atlantic Alliance.3®
It is the case that resistance to the idea of an alliance had crumbled.
But that still left the substantial issue of the kind of alliance -
and its raison d'etre - undecided. To a West European that may matter
little: the principle had been agreed. To the legally-minded American
negotiators at the time, however, the meaning of 'alliance' had not
yet been determined.
The division of opinion within the State Department about the need
to concede to European requests for an American security commitment
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focussed on that problem of definition. Bohlen and Kennan had not been
swamped by the views of Hickerson and his colleagues; they merely
shifted to higher, legal ground and continued their efforts from there.
In his autobiography, Bohlen does not mention his role as a dissenter;
37
he simply states that NATO was a necessity. Kennan was more frank,
describing his opposition in general terms. It is therefore ironic
that in his own memoirs he castigated 'that mixture of arid legalism
and semantic pretentiousness that so often passes, in the halls of
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our domestic-political life, for statesmanship'. Writing shortly
after his premature departure from the State Department in 1950, he
made an attack on "the legalistic approach to international affairs',
which he regarded as the besetting sin of 20th century American
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diplomacy. During the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations, however,
the only way he could tackle his departmental opponents and rivals
was to adopt their methods.
%
For much of the early meetings of the Working Party, Kennan and Bohlen
worked hard to change the views of their European colleagues. Hoyer-
Millar, for the British, put the standard line: that 'one of the
ultimate intentions of the Russians was domination of the United States,
having first obtained control over the European nations lying in its
path'. Bohlen's response as chairman of the gathering was comprehen¬
sive. He argued that events in Yugoslavia - Tito's communist revision¬
ism - showed the Soviet Union as 'dangerously over-extended'. While
the U.S. military establishment was disintegrating between 1945 and
1947 - under the impact of the demobilisation programme - the danger
to Western Europe had been great. Now the American public was alert
to the Soviet challenge and, he reminded the group, the Russian Army
had not moved beyond the line referred to as the iron curtain. At a
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later meeting, he said that 'the U.S. Government considers that our
position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is better now than at any time
since the end of the war'. Asking for confirmation from Lovett that
the talks were exploratory and that 'even indirect commitments' were
not on the table, the Under-Secretary replied with a characteristically
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cryptic comment: 'OK'.
Lovett also agreed that from an American point of view, the Washington
talks were really to find out 'how far the Europeans themselves had
gone in the direction of mutual self-help for the protection of the
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entire free European community'. However, at these meetings of
the Working Group not attended by either Kennan or Bohlen, such matters
were pushed to one side. At such times, Hickerson led for the
Americans. His preference was to urge national representatives to
discuss subjects freely without feeling that they were committing
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their governments. By doing this he freed himself to explore areas
which would otherwise have had to be avoided. However, when the dis¬
cussion turned to the central issue of the nature of an American
association with the Western European countries and Canada, Hickerson
requested a postponement until Bohlen could be present to outline his
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views. This was partly because Bohlen was senior to Hickerson, and
partly because the absence of Bohlen and Kennan from the Pentagon talks
had enabled them to disown the results. The price to be paid was that
the views of the dissenters had to be respected in the final text of
the Washington Paper.
With the distribution on 9 September of that paper, there was an hiatus
in the formal progress towards some sort of Atlantic Pact. The 'very
tentative proposals' of the Ambassadors' Committee, as Sir Nicholas
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Henderson called them in retrospect, 'spent the next three months in
44
the Brussels Treaty machine'. The Committee was reconvened, with
its Working Party, on 10 December when it became clear that American
attitudes had changed considerably. The Europeans immediately noted
that Lovett now wanted to make rapid progress with a view to concluding
a treaty by February 1949. What caused that change was more than the
result of the Presidential election in November, although that was a
factor. To a greater extent it emerged from the second of these
clusters of considerations mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
namely the London military conversations together with the continuing
interest in European unity. Although both issues were handled outside
the formal discussions about an Atlantic Pact, they constituted the
essence of U.S. interest in Europe during late 1948.
The problem confronting the United States (and Canada) in the London
talks was characterised by Averell Harriman, formerly Truman's Commerce
Secretary, now his Special Representative in Europe to monitor the
Marshall Plan operation. In a cable to the Secretary of State on
14 July 1948, he wrote from Paris:
There is general acceptance in Europe that the
U.S. will fight if Western Europe is attacked, but
the almost universal comment is that "Western
Europe will be over-run by the Russians, eventually
the U.S. will defeat Russia and liberate Western
Europe, but in the meantime most of the better
people, and therefore, their civilization will
have been destroyed". Appeasement psychology, ^
like'isolationism in the U.S., is not deeply bulged.
Harriman argued that shipments of token military supplies were necessary.
He reminded Marshall of the disproportionate effect on British morale
in 1940 when a million rifles were sent to the beleagured United Kingdom.
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Economic support like ERP helped to meet the threat of internal
subversion and aggression but it was military support which strength¬
ened the will to meet external aggression. And it was this which the
West Europeans needed. He added that secrecy was not helping and that
to wait for Congress to reconvene in the new year would be to invite
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a weakening of such resolve as currently existed.
The short-term answer was the kind of harmonization of military planning
that Douglas had been instructed to get under way. During one of the
early Ambassadors' Committee meetings, Sir Oliver Franks announced
that the British, American and French commanders-in-chief in Germany
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had already began 'to make concerted plans for emergencies'. The
U.S. Commander in Germany, General Lucius I. Clay, was informed on
16 July 1948 by the Army Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, of the
objective:
You are authorized to set up a joint planning
staff to begin the coordinated planning
necessary for operations involving initial
withdrawal to, and occupation of, positions
on or near the Rhine.
Clay was warned however, the plans were tentative only; discussions
with the British and French were to be conducted with the clear under¬
standing that such tentative planning for emergencies 'may later
require extensive revision by reason of decisions taken at a higher
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level' . This kind of qualification was shortly to be formalised
with reference to the distinction between peacetime planning and war¬
time operations. In practice, the plans Clay was asked to help draw
up were a political necessity because of West European fears. In
military terms, they were in no way replacements for the emergency
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warplan, HALFMOON. To the Americans it was always clear that actual
control would, in the event of hostilities, be removed from the Western
Union chiefs-of-staff and passed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The
only question then was whether the French should be admitted to the
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counsels of the CCS.
The medium-term answer was to send a small military delegation to
London in order that the U.S. Government could monitor developments
within Western Union. The delegation was led by Major-General Lyman
L. Lemnitzer, hitherto involved in planning for the U.S. Army and
subsequently NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in the
1960s. He left for London on 17 July 1948 having received the previous
day, detailed instructions and terms of reference drawn up jointly by
the Departments of Defense and State. Because of the importance
invested in the Western Union's own deliberations, these instructions
can be taken as embodying official American views on the subject in
mid-1948.
Lemnitzer's team was composed of representatives of U.S. air, maritime
and ground forces but, as befitted such a mission, it was the Army
which was in overall charge. (The U.S. Army Chief of Staff in Washington
acted as the executive agent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff). The
general terms of reference were given as the Vandenberg Resolution and
the European Recovery Programme. All political matters were to be
referred back to Washington but Lemnitzer was not authorized to make
military commitments of any kind. His team's participation in the
London military talks was undertaken with a view to contributing to
'conversation On military plans' and on the coordination of military
supplies. Drawing directly from the compromise text of NSC 9/3
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Lemnitzer was informed that with respect to the Western Union nations:
(1) they must first plan their coordinated defense
with the means presently available; (2) they must
then determine how their collective military
potential can be increased by coordinated production
and supply, including standardization of equipment;
(3) we would then be prepared to consider and screen
their estimates of what supplementary assistance
from U.S. was necessary; (4) we would expect reciprocal
assistance...; (5) and legislation would be necessary
to provide significant amounts of military equipment
but the President would not be prepared to recommend
it unless the foregoing conditions had been met.^
In short, the Marshall Plan formula for maximising European self-
sufficiency through self-help was the fundamental basis of Lemnitzer's
mission, but this time with a military rather than an economic emphasis.
On the specific issue of defence planning the U.S. delegation were
given two instructions. The first was to avoid all mention of the
policy or plans of the United States about the use, or threatened use,
of atomic weapons in wartime. No reasons for this were given but
clearly the security of such information was a consideration, as was
the fact that the Pentagon were not yet authorized by Truman to make
such plans. The second was that the delegation were not to disclose
any U.S. strategic concept to the West Europeans but were to give the
impression that the U.S. JCS had fixed on no rigid course and would
welcome suggestions about developing strategic concepts which could
be acceptable to all. This involved a certain amount of sleight of
hand by Lemnitzer. He could not disclose the reality of American
military planning to the continental Europeans because that would
destroy the point of the exercise by worrying them still further. He
also, in company with the British and Canadians, could not reveal the
fact that talks had taken place in March from which the French in
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particular had been specifically excluded. The conclusion of the
Pentagon Paper - that a treaty-based pact was desirable - would have
pleased France and the Benelux countries, but not the way in which
they were reached.
Lemnitzer was not told to lie to the Europeans by saying that the
United States was fully committed to the forward defence of Western
Europe on German soil. Rather, he took his cue from the Western
Union nations themselves when they stated in May that this strategic
concept was to fight as far to the east in Germany as possible, to
buy as much time as was available, thus giving a breathing space for
American military power to intervene decisively. He was told to give
a liberal interpretation to this: American forces for the defence of
Europe would initially consist of the U.S. occupation forces and
nothing else but that over the longer-run Western Europe would be
defended, even though forces for that purpose might be deployed to
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other areas. The U.S. delegation were reminded that the United
States had global responsibilities, which in wartime would involve,
at a minimum: securing sea lines of communication; conversion
of American industry once again to build another arsenal for democracy;
and the prosecution of the war in extra-European theatres. Lemnitzer
thus could not acquiesce in any plans which might 'jeopardize or
even unduly influence optimum overall global strategy' or any command
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arrangement for an allied military council for global strategy.
This was the military aspect of the 'self help' theme. As suggested
in Chapter 1, during the discussion of the Truman Doctrine, the
United States was apparently ready to use its power to help contain
Soviet expansionism on a world scale, but Western Europe would have
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to be responsible for its own backyard. The corollary was that
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the Americans were anxious to do what they could in the way of supply¬
ing arms and other forms of military assistance to the Western Union
powers in order to enhance the worldwide flexibility of the U.S. armed
forces. In this connection, Lemnitzer's main task was therefore to
help coordinate a mutually beneficial supply plan. The 'paucity of
currently available supplies' did not help and threw even greater
stress, in American minds, on the Western Union members ' announced
promise to pool their resources, establish combined commands and the
achievement of maximum standardization of equipment. Standardization
would also involve commonality with U.S. equipment, although Lemnitzer
was informed that a 'somewhat closer standardization relationship may
be expected to develop between the United States, Britain and Canada
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than with the continental powers'. He was also told to guard
against the possibility that standardization by Western Union on U.S.
equipment types ought not to place the United States in a position
where it became dependent on Western Union sources for the supply of
major items. In other words, the Europeans were to be helped but not
to the extent to which they could dictate terms to the Americans.
One of the first things done by the Lemnitzer team was to receive a
visit from Lt. Col. Charles H. Bonesteel, a special assistant to
Averell Harriman. The purpose of the meeting was to ascertain the
nature of Lemnitzer's mission and its objectives. Bonesteel indicated
to Lemnitzer that the presence of U.S. services personnel at the
Western Union military talks 'harmonized fully with objectives toward
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which Mr. Harriman is working' in the administration of Marshall aid.
While Lemnitzer was not formally a participant but an 'observer', he
found that in practice he became more closely involved than was perhaps
compatible with the ultimate objective of a self reliant Western Europe.
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From his reports back to the Pentagon, it is clear that he regarded
the European military representatives as less than competent. During
a lengthy discussion on supply problems he evidently intervened by
reminding all present that this could not be properly discussed unless
logistics were recognized as a factor: little thought had been given
to the function of bases, port facilities, air fields, transportation
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and communication, he argued. This was probably an unduly harsh
judgement, for the European military men had seemingly received no
unequivocal instructions from their parent governments to initiate
genuine collective measures for their common defence.
On 31 July the Pentagon received the first full report of the London
talks. Written by Lemnitzer, it revealed the extent to which the
United States was being involved, despite every determination to the
contrary. His cable read, in part:
As result of experience and observation here
to date I consider US participation in Western
Union Military Committee discussions could
not be withdrawn without serious damage to
Western Union structure....In addition, and
without attempting to forecast what US attitude
or alignment towards Brussels Treaty Powers
might eventually take, I believe it would be
unwise even to abandon or neglect taking full
advantage of opportunity to observe and
influence their military planning.
He even suggested that when the time came to replace him, a two-star
general be appointed because to do otherwise would be interpreted as
a 'waning of US interest in Western Union with consequent harmful
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effect on activities of the Military Committee'. (This was done
in late August when it was announced that Major-General A. Franklin
Kibler would lead the U.S. delegation.)
<f
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Crucial to both military planning and cooperation on supply was the
Western Union's defence effort-in-being. The U.S. delegation reported
to Washington the degree of integration that had been achieved or
planned by the end of July. On ground forces, the armies of the
'Brussels Five' had agreed in principle that standardization of
equipment was to be achieved as rapidly as possible. The first priority
was improving combat capability by the adoption of common tactical
and training doctrines. This had not progressed much beyond the
occasional exchange of officers. Communications - techniques, codes
and procedures - were to be adapted to a common format. In the mean¬
time the inventories of military strength were being compiled. On
naval and maritime air forces, undertakings were made about the
harmonization of communications, the pooling of naval intelligence,
the common use of ports and refit facilities, and the standardization
of new ship construction. On Western Union's air forces, Lemnitzer
said: 'It is currently evident that continental powers, including
France, intend restriction of their air forces to air defence and
tactical air purposes. They are sufficiently realistic at this point
to accept the necessity for relying upon U.S. and British strategic
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air [power ]'.
All of this was described by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as
'generally in accord with U.S. strategic concepts'. They believed
that the denial of Western Europe to Soviet occupation was 'well
within the capabilities of the West European nations to fill th
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military vacuum in Western Europe within a very few years'. For
this reason the JCS, on the advice of the State Department, refused
permission to the U.S. delegation to agree to a French proposal that
an American general be appointed to command the combined forces of
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the Western Union. All that they would agree to was the appointment
of General Clarence R. Huebner to sit as an observer on the newly-
created Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee. The chairman of
this was British, Field Marshall, the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,
supported by a British Air Marshall, together with a French General
and Admiral. This also accorded with the prevailing official American
view that Western Union should be led by the British. Ironically, the
French idea of an overall U.S. commander-in-chief was adapted once NATO
was formed with General Dwight D. Eisenhower becoming the first Supreme
Commander Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR) in 1950. But during 1948,
the Truman administration did what it could to remain aloof from such
a public demonstration of American involvement.
From the Truman Administration's point of view there were two flaws in
these Western Union developments. The first was that members of
Western Union showed a disturbing propensity not to take their task
seriously enough. Given the shortage of equipmentjthe Pentagon was
annoyed to learn that Denmark (not a Brussels Treaty signatory) needed
some 60,000 rifles urgently. Britain and France claimed they could
not help but it emerged that they intended exporting 100,000 rifles to
the United States 'for sporting purposes'. The JCS acknowledged that
there were balance of payments benefits in this but felt that it hardly
represented earnest endeavours on the part of the two leading West
European nations to build military strength in their part of the world.'
In this case the sale was stopped. One that went ahead was just as
aggravating to the Pentagon: Britain sold some scarce jet engines to
Sweden on the grounds that the contract could not be broken despite
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the admitted shortage of military aircraft in Europe.
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The second flaw was that the Anglo-American military relationship was
beginning to cause problems for the coherence of U.S. defence planning.
On the one hand, the British were expected to take the lead in Europe,
which meant in effect a contraction of the United Kingdom's defence
responsibilities worldwide and an enhancement of the continental
commitment. On the other hand, the coordination of U.S. and British
troop activities in Germany had been organised on a bilateral basis
as part of the global regulation of the two countries' joint efforts.
If the British made their European interests proportionately more
important, there was a distinct risk that the United Kingdom would
not be able to carry out its obligations agreed to in the emergency war
plan HALFMOON. This was especially relevant to security interests in
the Middle East where Britain's continuing role as custodian of the
Persian Gulf, and its oil-rich littoral, was held to be vulnerable to
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Soviet attack in wartime.
This mismatch between resources and commitments was recognized but
nothing was done about it immediately. It was not until December that
the State Department decided on Britain's place in the global scheme.
Lovett wrote to Harriman on 3 December to clarify matters somewhat by
putting the problem in a wider perspective:
It is essential for the British to take the lead
in working towards closer European integration.
However, at least at the present time it would
be unwise both for them and for us were a
posit-" Dn of strong European leadership to
require a lessening in British ties with this
country and the Dominions. By a series of
overlapping but not necessarily co-extensive
groupings, e.g. Brussels Pact, North Atlantic
Pact, it should be possible to provide assurances
to the British that real steps towards closer union
with Europe can be taken without prejudice to their
commonwealth relationships or their particular
CZA
ties with this country.
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In retrospect it is clear that this view was a mistaken one: the
British were not prepared to take the lead in European integration,
whether military or otherwise.
However, different messages were being received in Washington. During
the final stages of the Washington Paper text preparation, Gladwyn
Jebb, the British official most closely associated with the Western
Union Permanent Commission, told the Working Group that Bevin wanted
nothing to slow the progress of the European nations 'toward that
union which all believed is so essential'. In November, Jebb said
that the British Government was actively pursuing the idea of European
unity and so resisted the notion of merging Western European countries
into a wider political entity which included the United States and
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Canada. What is interesting about Jebb's remarks is not that they
were less than frank, but that he felt it necessary to make them. It
is yet another indication that the West Europeans - and certainly the
British - were aware that the way to impress the State Department was
to use the language of European integration. That had been Bevin's
purpose in Western Union from the beginning: it created a good impres¬
sion, pending the conclusion of an Atlantic security arrangement. It
was an acknowledgement that such an arrangement was less likely to
emerge if the Europeans showed themselves hostile to American pre¬
scriptions for European unity.
To a large extent, therefore, the American 'error' in investing the
European union ideal with more military and political reality than it
warranted was the result of taking the Europeans at their word. The
State Department had monitored the meeting held during May at the
Hague, under the joint chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak and Winston S.
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Churchill, to coordinate the activities of the various pro-European
union movements. Despite Spaak's presence, the Hague Congress was an
unofficial gathering, which for reasons of protocol limited the American
response to Marshall's comment that the United States welcomed 'any
concrete progress toward greater unity of thought and action between
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the nations of Western Europe'. Two months later another meeting
in The Hague received greater U.S. interest. This time the gathering
was composed of the five Western Union foreign ministers, supported
by their respective staffs. Ambassador Lewis Douglas was sent from
London to report on progress. He identified for Marshall the two
themes which touched American interests. The first was a double
recognition in Europe that the United States could not promise to act
in any way which might contravene the U.S. Constitution, but that the
Rio Pact was an inadequate basis for a North Atlantic Alliance. The
second was that Georges Bidault formally tabled a proposal - the first
by a serving minister - for a European federation based, in the first
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instance, on economic integration. Bevin opposed this along with
the Benelux representatives on the grounds that such a union would
contain 'a large block of Communists' belonging to the national com¬
munist parties of Western Europe. In what Douglas recognized as an
effort to undermine the case for some kind of supranational European
authority, Bevin's counterproposal was for what became known as the
Council of Europe, a forum for inter-governmental exchange at min¬
isterial level.^
No senior U.S. official seems to have drawn the conclusion from this
that the British might sabotage any attempt to unite Western Europe
if they were allowed to 'lead in working towards closer European
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integration', as Lovett put it. However, American efforts were
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redoubled. In a press release of 27 August 1948, the State Department
announced that it favoured the taking by the Europeans themselves of
any steps which promoted the idea of European unity or which promoted
the study of practical measures to that end. Explaining this to the
Embassies and Legations in Western Europe, Lovett cabled:
While avoiding premature endorsement of French or
any other specific proposal looking unification of
Europe we intend to encourage publicly and privately
the progressively closer integration first of free
Europe and eventually of as much of Europe as possible.
There is danger that unless progress can be made rapidly
American efforts to help free Europe get back on its
feet will have been wasted. There is also danger that
partial recovery will produce complacency and reduce
European willingness to take bold measures essential
to establish real and continuing prosperity. Annual
ECA debates in Congress will bring strong pressure
since Congressional willingness to appropriate funds
will be materially influenced by extent of progress
towards integration. We wish our missions in free
Europe to press in all appropriate ways for encourage¬
ment of the idea of European unity and for formulation
and implementation of practicable proposals to bring
about its integration. We would naturally welcome bold
leadership from any free European quarter.^
It is notable that this cable was the product of the Division of
European Affairs. Achilles-and Hickerson, its two principal members,
already saw European unity as the indispensable complement to Atlantic
security arrangements, of which they were the State Department's
strongest advocates. Europeans separated the issues of integration
and security; Americans saw them as mutually supporting.
Two aspects of Lovett's message were continuations of past themes in
U.S. diplomacy since 1947: the general interest in European unity and
the more specific threat that Congress would stop, or severely curtail,
ERP operations if evidence of integration was unforthcoming. Three
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aspects were novel however. First, the State Department had decided
to mount a Western Europe-wide campaign through diplomatic channels
with a view to promoting the idea of European unity. (The cable was
sent to London, Paris, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, Oslo,
Copenhagen, Stockholm, Lisbon and Bern.) This represented a small
but significant deviation from Marshall's previous policy of being
seen to interfere as little as possible. Secondly, the campaign
was largely inspired by the fear that the West Europeans were in
danger of becoming complacent through the partial success of the
Marshall Plan to date. Given that Lovett and Marshall had always
intended to see a reduced U.S. involvement from 1952 onwards, this
was an incentive to adopt more robust attitudes towards the Europeans.
Finally, because this cable was prepared and sent at the same time as
the Washington Paper was almost complete, it is strongly suggestive
that the United States had indeed come to accept that there was no
necessary contradiction between the promotion of European unity and
membership of an Atlantic Pact. The former was the ultimate objective
towards which the United States was prepared to accept the latter as
a temporary expediency. All that had to be done was to ensure that
the operational clause of an Atlantic Pact was not binding on the
United States.
Lovett's cable of 27 August is of interest for a further reason. It
shows that the rhetoric of the Presidential election was having its
effect on the State Department. I" the midst of the most notable
period of postwar bipartisanship, there were very few differences of
view on foreign policy issues between Truman and Dewey. In only one
respect was there any deviation. The Republicans advocated a hard
line approach to European unity. The Democrats, in contrast, said
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virtually nothing on the subject. (As suggested in Chapter 1, this was
almost certainly because the cause of European unity was widely assoc¬
iated with Senator J. William Fulbright, who was on record as having
called for Truman's resignation. In a difficult campaign the issue
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was best left undisturbed.)
On 30 September, Dewey summed up the points he had made thus far in
his campaign about American hopes for Europe. Referring to the ERP
he said that this programme of European aid must not be just relief:
We shall use it as a means for pushing, prodding
and encouraging the nations of Western Europe
towards the goal of European union...we have
waged two wars and now three years after the
second war, we are having to pour out our resources
to reinforce a Europe once more threatened by
aggression.
He proposed that 'a third great peaceful power1, strong enough to
deter an aggressor. should stand between the United States and the
Soviet Union, thereby introducing an element of stability in a
devastated and divided Europe. What was needed, he argued, was 'a
United States of Europe'. This was to be the major objective of his
foreign policy. ERP would be 'used creatively for this great permanent
good'. To do otherwise would be to fritter away the billions already
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spent on European rehabilitation, he said.
Judging from the reaction of the British Embassy in Washington, thes .
remarks and others like them were interpreted by West Europeans close
to the State Department as more than merely incidents in the election
campaign. In a long despatch to Emest Bevin, Sir Oliver Franks wrote,
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on 23 October 1948, that Dewey was determined after the election 'to
make a lasting name for himself as President', to go down in history
as one of the great Republican leaders , rivalling perhaps even the
memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He could not hope to emulate the
latter in domestic affairs, argued Franks, so he was intent on building
a place for himself in history by his foreign policy. The crusade for
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European unity was his chosen route to that objective. Plenty of
presidential hopefuls had wanted to make their mark one way or another
in the past. What made Dewey's aspirations more significant was that
he was universally expected to win. Writing as though the Republican
contender had already moved into the White House, Franks suggested
that 'Mr. Dewey will naturally be more cautious in his approach to
foreign problems than were Presidents Roosevelt and Truman'. Anxious
to preserve the 'American way of life', and conscious that nothing
jeopardized this more than the possibility of a third world war, Dewey
had determined to 'build up a strong "third force" in the shape of a
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federated Europe'.
So firmly did Franks believe that this would be the future shape of
American policy that he suggested, with due deference, that Bevin
alter the direction of British policy. Franks assumed that European
federation was neither immediately attainable nor desirable as the
ultimate objective. Nevertheless, he did think that constructive
counterproposals should be made rather than the kind of negative approach
adopted by the British Foreign Secretary during a speech to the House
of Commons on 15 September. In that,Bevin had been at some pains to
demonstrate the near-insuperable problems that lay in the path to
federation. At a minimum, Franks suggested, the United Kingdom should
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talk in terms of a periodic gathering of European political leaders on
the model used by the British Commonwealth countries. Even so, he
added, it would 'not be easy to persuade American opinion to accept
such a plan in preference to their own ideas of federation'. The
Americans were, after all, 'convinced of the merits of their own
system'and - rightly or wrongly - believed that postwar democratic
Europe faced a similar situation to that confronted by the thirteen
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American states between 1776 and 1787.
* * *
In considering the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty the Danish
political scientist, Nikolaj Petersen, concludes that it is difficult
to uphold the common European view that the United States were 'gulled,
dragged or lured' into the Atlantic Pact by anxious Europeans. He
argues that U.S. policy was primarily determined by State Department
decision-makers' perceptions of the national interest. The North
Atlantic Treaty, he suggests, was the creation of an initial coalition
76
based on perceived shared interests in Atlantic security. The
argument of this chapter supports this interpretation to a certain
extent: the idea that the West Europeans exercised decisive influence
is vulnerable on a number of grounds, not least because Europeans had
access only to particular sections of the State Department. As shown
in the previous chapter, the U.S. military had began to consider
changes in strategy and concepts of operations in ways which found
favour in Western Union circles, but that had less to do with European
pressure than with the acceptance by the JCS of some over-riding military
imperatives. For their part, Congress, the White House and the American
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public were not at all susceptible and were in many cases suspicious
of, even hostile to, the Europeans.
However, in other respects this chapter points to a different con¬
clusion. The Washington Paper, a non-binding discussion document,
certainly signalled that a treaty was now widely regarded by the Truman
Administration as both necessary and desirable, and probably inevitable.
What it definitely did not do was to determine the nature of such a
treaty. The United States may have moved from a willingness to discuss
an Atlantic security pact to an obligation to negotiate a formal docu¬
ment . But no attempt was made to resolve disputes about the nature and
immediacy of the Soviet threat, number of members and geographical
scope, non-military aspects and the all-important operational clause.
These disputes reflected not a confluence of interests but a divergence.
Again and again, Lovett emphasized during the Washington Exploratory
Talks the United States1 interest in the development of West European
self-sufficiency. For their part, America's putative allies had a
vested interest in minimizing progress towards that end because to
reach it would obviate the need for a U.S. commitment without which
they felt strategically naked.
This difference of view was reflected in the fact that, while European
hopes were centred on the Washington talks, the Americans were more
interested in developments on the other side of the Atlantic, notably
the London meetings of the military representatives of the Western
Union. European (and Canadian) scholars have thus naturally tended to
fcAe
concentrate on formal negotiation^when considering NATO's origins.
A
American scholars in turn have largely ignored both the negotiations
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and the U.S. interest in Western Union, mainly because of their equally
natural concentration on U.S.-Soviet relations. As a result both
groups of scholars have missed the point that, by September, the State
Department had been manoeuvred by Lovett into a position which was
fully prepared for the expected Republican take-over in November.
Lovett's cable to European capitals on 27 August - which.called for
the Europeans 'taking steps which before the war would have seemed
beyond the range of practical politics 1, was very much the line pushed
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by Dewey in the campaign. As Pearson remembered, the U.S. contingent
on the Ambassadors' Committee and attendant Working Party expected a
Dewey victory and consequently indicated resistance to a broadly-based
Atlantic treaty. Consequently, nothing in the Washington Paper pre¬
cluded the emergence of a security pact described by Pearson as having
three parties, the United States, Canada, and the United States of
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Western Europe. But neither was there anything which compromised
the caution already demonstrated by the Truman Administration from
the beginning of 1948.
On the eve of the election it is fair to say that European unity -
an important element of which in the American mind was inextricably
bound up with the hoped-for success of the Western Union - was the
ultimate goal towards which the United States was working. The
conclusion of an Atlantic Pact was now regarded as a way of assisting
this by removing the West Europeans' most acute fears. On that basis,
Americans were prepared to pursue an Atlantic treaty energetically.
But they would do so for reasons which were essentially different from
those of the Canadians and Europeans. A 'community of interests'
there might have been on the general question of containing Soviet
expansionism; the more specific issue of how containment was to operate
in Europe had yet to be 'resolved.
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CHAPTER 7
THE NEGOTIATIONS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE : MAKING THE
ALLIANCE, MINIMISING THE COMMITMENT
The Brussels Treaty powers informed the U.S. Government on 29 October,
four days before the Presidential election, that they had agreed in
principle to negotiate a North Atlantic Pact with the two North American
nations. They cited the Washington Paper, produced during the earlier
exploratory talks and circulated on 9 September 1948, as the basis for
discussions; they suggested the U.S. capital as the most suitable place
for these to take place.""
The American response was immediate and consistent with the conduct of
U.S. foreign policy since the beginning of the year. Speaking for the
Truman Administration on receipt of the message, John D. Hickerson
pointed out that representatives of the U.S. Government had not been
from the start, and were not now, in a position to commit the United
States, either in principle or in some other way. Before making any
recommendation to the President, the State Department needed to know
two things. The first was 'the detailed results' of the Western Union
foreign ministers' meeting which had, among other things, produced the
agreement in principle. As it had done many times before, the U.S.
Government thus signalled its abiding interest in European self-help:
any steps which could reduce the level of U.S. involvement would not
be pre-empted by the United States acting precipitantly. The second
thing the State Department and Hickerson wanted to know was the
2
reaction of political and Congressional leaders to 'this whole matter'.
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The State Department was already aware that the American public drew
a distinction between helping the Europeans defend themselves and
promising to go to war on their behalf. A treaty in which that
distinction was not respected stood little chance of ratification,
especially if - as expected - the Republicans captured both the
3
Presidency and the two Houses of Congress in a few days' time.
Four days after the election, in which Truman triumphed and the
Democrats regained control of the Senate and the Houses of Represent¬
atives, some of this hesitancy disappeared. On 6 November, the President
approved 'the general principles' of the Washington Paper; he took it
4
with him to study during his post-campaign holiday in Florida. This
was interpreted in the State Department as indicating that any re¬
visions or firm proposals produced during the resumed exploratory talks
would have to be cleared by him. In practical terms, this meant that
when the time came to resolve the problem left open in the Washington
Paper - whether the Rio or Brussels Treaties should be the model -
Truman wielded decisive influence. This did not obviate the need to
court Congress. Lovett briefly renewed his contacts with Senator
Arthur H. Vandenberg but realised that a similar relationship was now
needed with the new Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator John Connally, if anything was to find expression as a treaty.
Talks started again on 10 December when it was decided to stop calling
5
the talks 'exploratory'. Their subject was not whether there would
be an alliance but what kind of arrangement could be devised to meet
the differing requirements of the countries participating in the talks,
and any who might subsequently join. Negotiations between governments
were finally underway.
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This chapter concerns the American side in the last two sets of
diplomatic exchanges which preceded the formation of the postwar
Atlantic Alliance. These are the formal, inter-governmental neg¬
otiations which produced the final draft treaty, and the less structured f
but equally important, discussions on military assistance. To the U.S.
Government the joint outcome - the North Atlantic Treaty and the
Military Assistance Programme - was designed to bridge the gap between
American security commitments and responsibilities on the one hand,
and the resources which could be devoted to them on the other. Foreign
policy and defence posture would be mutually supporting, serving the
desired objective of security without extravagant outlay. This was
also the Europeans' aim for themselves; they saw in an American commit¬
ment the opportunity to avpid making the kind of extra military effort
commensurate with their fears of the Soviet Union. To the Americans,
almost everything depended on the Allies doing more for themselves; to
the West Europeans, virtually nothing depended on that. Therein lay
the difference. It was thus appropriately ironic that the U.S. Marine
band, which played softly throughout the signing ceremony on 4 April
1949, should have included the Gershwin numbers 'I got plenty of
0
nothing' and 'It ain't necessarily so'.
* * *
On his last trip to Europe as Secretary of State, George C. Marshall
explained his belief that the United States' possession of the atomic
bomb, coupled with the ability to deliver it, constituted the basis of
West European security. His remarks, to Halvard Lange, the Norwegian
Foreign Minister, during November, appear in Chapter 5 in another
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context; they are worth paraphrasing to bring out the different effect
the American nuclear monopoly had upon the U.S. negotiators on the one
7
hand, and the West Europeans on the other. Marshall said that the
main deterrent to Soviet aggression was the American atomic capability.
He admitted that in the past the Soviet leaders may have thought there
to be little risk of the weapon being used against their country but
that now, following the events of 1948, such calculations were less
likely to be made in the Kremlin. In the language of the 1950's,
nuclear deterrence had become credible. Although Halvard Lange did not
apparently make the point, the West Europeans had much less confidence
in these new weapons of mass destruction. Their anxiety to conclude
an Atlantic security arrangement was evidence of this: American weapons
might be used too late, to prevent a Soviet blitzkrieg, or they might
not be politically effective. Even Japan - well on the way to defeat
by 1945 - was not persuaded to desist from war after the attack on
Hiroshima; it took a second bomb to do that. Thus for the Europeans,
the American nuclear monopoly was an added incentive to get a binding
treaty. But for the Americans the incentive worked the other way.
It was against this background that the State Department prepared the
most illuminating report on American-West European relations to appear
in 1948. It took the form of an answer to a series of questions
addressed to Marshall by W. Averell Harriman, the President's Special
Representative in Europe charged with overseeing the European Recovery
Q
Programme. The reply was ready on 3 December 1948, signed by Lovett
(due to Marshall's absence in hospital for a kidney operation) and
endorsed by both Kennan and Achilles, of the Policy Planning Staff and
Office of European Affairs respectively. It provided Harriman with a
useful guide to the views held by senior State Department officials
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responsible for arguing the American case in the North Atlantic Pact
negotiations due to begin the following week. It is therefore directly
germane to the interpretation contained in this study. Harriman had
asked for details about the form of organization of Western Europe the
U.S. Government was hoping to see developed; how the Atlantic Pact
fitted into or around that; and what was policy regarding the rearmament
of Western Europe. He also asked about the development of policies
towards France and Germany. In the reply, Lovett pointed out that 'the
uncertain and fluid state of world conditions' made it impractical to
have 'fixed and rigid policies'. He also said that final determinations
of policy might require further consultation within the State Department
and with other Departments. In fact, the points put to Harriman could
have been written any time between the promulgation of the Marshall Plan
9
and the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty.
On the desired organization of Western Europe, Lovett said that the
United States did not yet know 'what form of permanent over-all
organization will best meet the needs of free Europe'. He explained
the delicacy of the United States' position:
Integration must be developed voluntarily by the
free European countries; it should not be imposed
from without. However, the European governments
are unlikely to take the bold and difficult measures
essential to accomplish effective integration in the
absence of continuing pressure, and assistance,
from us.-*-®
The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was ideal:
it was of European origin but dependent on the flow of U.S. dollars
under the Marshall Plan. It provided opportunities for leverage. The
OEEC existed in order to ensure the success of the Plan but, to the
Truman Administration, its long-term purpose was to foster the habit
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of economic cooperation, pending the closer political integration of the
participating countries. However, the OEEC was not enough; it needed
augmentation by a North Atlantic security pact. Harriman was told that
such a pact 'should be considered a supplement to and in no sense a
replacement for the efforts toward European unity...'. While the OEEC
was to encourage economic integration, the Brussels Treaty system was,
said Lovett, regarded as Bevin originally described it, 'as the nucleus
of a Western European union' .^
Lovett thought the role of the United Kingdom to be crucial. Britain
had special difficulties. India had achieved independence yet the
British worldwide responsibilities remained vast; at the same time,
Western Europe could not be secure unless and until Britain played a
full part in Europe's defence. For the State Department, an Atlantic
Pact appeared the answer to these conflicting pressures. As already
shown in Chapter 6, Lovett told Harriman that it was 'essential for
the British to take the lead in working towards closer European
integration'. However, Lovett acknowledged that for the present
Anglo-American and Dominion ties should not be weakened. It was
suggested that instead 'a series of overlapping but not necessarily
co-extensive groupings', such as Western Union and an Atlantic Pact,
could make it possible for the British to lead the movement towards
integration without prejudicing Anglo-American or Commonwealth relation-
12
ships. Apart from any other factor, Britain held the key to the
solution of the German problem in the West European context. The United
States recognized that any long-range plan of integration which was
vague about the future of Germany, or which Implied admission of the
Germans as 'second rate members', was unrealistic. And France, 'the
keystone of Continental Western Europe', could not be persuaded to
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take a healthy and constructive attitude towards Germany's rehabilitation
unless the British did likewise. The difficulty, beyond the reach of
the United States, was that the French wanted a 'European Assembly' with
a measure of supranationality, while the British advocated a 'Council
13
of Europe' as a forum for intergovernmental exchanges.
The British had certainly received the message. Reporting to London on
18 November, Sir Oliver Franks, speculated about the effect on U.S.
policy preferences about European 'federation' following Truman's re¬
election. Franks argued that just because Dewey had departed the pol¬
itical scene it would be wrong to conclude that the United States'
enthusiasm for West European unity would disappear. Pressure might
decrease but not go away. Congressional deliberations on annual ERP
appropriations, and on 'military lend-lease', would almost inevitably
include discussion of the European unity theme. He repeated his
earlier suggestion that the British Government put forward 'some
constructive proposals...directed towards closer political cooperation
14
between the countries of Western Europe' . A more robust response
was that of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. Addressing the subject
of a 'United States of Europe' as popularly recommended in America, he
told the House of Commons in September:
A written constitution is suggested now and we are
told in America and elsewhere that we are fools
because we do not run after them. I am not being
unkind even to the United States, but it is well
to remind them that it took 11 years to deal with
their constitution.^
That he had little intention of going any further was disappointingly
evident, to the United States, from his Council of Europe proposal.
However, the real point is that his speech was a tacit acceptance,
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after the distribution of the Washington Paper, that good Anglo-American
relations were largely dependent on Britain's declaratory and perceived
policy on European integration. It must have seemed a long way from
earlier in 1948 when the British Ambassador in Washington proposed a
military treaty between the United States and Britain, reviving the
X s
wartime cooperation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
That proposal had been refused, leaving Bevin to develop the Western
Union as a way of winning confidence in Washington. The signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Assistance Programme were
evidence of his success. But while these measures brought the United
States two steps closer to 'entanglement', American objectives remained -
on the eve of the final negotiations - what they had been on VE Day.
As George Kennan put it, and as approved by George Marshall, on 24
November 1948: U.S. foreign policy was still directed toward 'the
eventual peaceful withdrawal of both the United States and the U.S.S.R.
from the heart of Europe, and accordingly toward the management of the
growth of a third force which can absorb and take over the territory
17
between the two'. This was central to U.S. thinking and amounted
to the post-World War II version of 'normalcy'. The fact that matters
turned out very differently is indicative of how - superpower status
and atomic monopoly notwithstanding - the United States was constrained
by European realities to the point where basic policy was abandoned.
All this did not occur until the early-1950s. In November 1948, the
European situation still seemed quite straightforward: Russian intentions
were directed towards a political conquest of Western Europe, which
could be avoided if the West Europeans maintained the struggle for
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economic recovery and internal political stability. A North Atlantic
Security Pact, wrote Kennan, would 'affect the political war only
insofar as it operates to stiffen the self-confidence of the Western
Europeans in the face of Soviet pressures'. While such stiffening was
desirable and necessary, it did encourage 'a general preoccupation with
military affairs to the detriment of economic recovery...'. This was
regrettable, argued Kennan (again with no disagreement from Marshall),
because it was addressed to what was not the main danger:
We have to deal with [this military preoccupation] as
a reality; and to a certain extent we have to indulge
it, for to neglect it would be to encourage panic and
uncertainty in western Europe and to play into the
hands of the communists. But in doing so, we should
have clearly in mind that the need for military
alliances and rearmament on the part of the western
Europeans is primarily a subjective one, arising in
their own minds as a result of their failure to
18
understand correctly their own position.
This was another way of expressing Lovett's point to Harriman that an
Atlantic Alliance amounted to a supplement to the Marshall Plan, not a
replacement for it. According to this view, a North Atlantic Treaty
if built on the American concept, would be no more, and no less, than
'a formalization, by international agreement of the natural defence
relationship among the countries of the North Atlantic community'.
Long-term justification for this was not dependent on a particular
19
interpretation of Soviet intentions and capabilities.
Recalling this memorandum in his memoirs, Kennan cultivates the impression
that his was a lone voice, that he could 'no longer effect the movement
toward a treaty'. He is dismissive of 'the gentlemen of the Office of
European Affairs', who, he said, wanted to extend an Atlantic alliance
'as far as possible to jam it, so to speak, as close as possible to
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the Soviet Borders.1 This is obviously a continuation of the earlier
disagreements between himself and Hickerson, which are discussed in
21
Chapter 2. However, it is also clear that Kennan's own objections
to a treaty were weak, essentially for the kind of domestic political
reasons which he felt should not influence foreign policy.
Marshall and Lovett understood the domestic context. The Secretary of
State appreciated the arguments put by Kennan - the latter omits
mention of this in his memoirs - but simply did not regard them as
decisive. Kennan thought it wrong that Senators constituted 'the
final and unchallengeable arbiters' in treaty proceedings, his view
being that the State Department should not be put in a position of a
22
lobbyist before Congress. For Marshall, whatever kind of treaty
eventually emerged, the Senate had the power to prevent ratification,
and Congress had been fed on a diet of anti-communist rhetoric since
the Truman Doctrine was announced. The Administration was now having
to ride that tiger. Furthermore, public opinion could not be ignored.
One opinion poll, taken after the election and circulated in the State
Department, showed popular attitudes as more or less equally divided
on the issue of going to war in support of the West Europeans. But a
clear majority (54 per cent to 39 per cent) were in favour of sending
military supplies. This majority turned into a minority of 39 per
cent when the question was asked as to whether the respondents still
favoured military assistance if it meant an increase in U.S. personal
23
taxation. These results suggested that popular opposition would
attend any policy designed to supply materiel commensurate with Western
Europe's reasonable requests. As Kennan acknowledged, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were already exercised by the widening discrepancy between
resources and commitments; it followed that there was little 'spare'
capacity to offer.^4
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The net effect of these three factors - the Senate's role; popular
resistance to spending money on West European defence requirements;
and shortfalls in U.S. military capabilities - strengthened the
Europeans' case. Now, only one way of boosting confidence in Western
Europe seemed available: to conclude a treaty embodying a political
commitment, backed by the retaliatory power of the atomic bomb, to the
security of Western Europe.
By November 1948, the U.S. public expected a treaty but not an expensive
one. There was nothing accidental about this expectation. Although
Kennan argued that the American people, and not the Congress, should
be the object of the Department's domestic attention, it was his
25
opponents, not he, who cultivated popular preferences. From the
summer of 1948, Theodore C. Achilles began a series of briefings with
journalists representing Associated Press and United Press International.
As Achilles recalled, the newspapermen were discreet: they
...never pried on controversies in the discussions
and such points as they did raise I would answer
by referring to a provision of the Rio or Brussels
treaties or the Vandenberg resolution. It sounds
banal but well before the treaty was made public
its general nature was fully known to anyone who
read the daily press carefully and many who read
it only occasionally.^®
This kind of briefing led journalists to anticipate a pact almost before
it was drafted. Walter Lippmann, for example, commented on the
announcement that transatlantic negotiations were about to begin: 'After
many months, the project of a pact among the nations on both sides of
the Atlantic is ready for formal negotiations. It is a great event'.
Perhaps remembering his days as a young assistant to President Woodrow
Wilson, when he helped draft the Fourteen Ftoints he added: 'This is a
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recognition at long last, that the government and people are ready to
27
apply the lesson of this bloody and tragic century'.
The State Department reached four conclusions from its extensive
reading of published opinion in the week prior to the opening of neg¬
otiations. First, a cross section of the total population strongly
favoured strengthening American security. Secondly, the public like¬
wise favoured 'continued firmness' in dealings with the Soviet Union.
Thirdly, there was no serious opposition to a collective security
arrangement in the North Atlantic area. Finally, while Americans
overwhelmingly wanted the build up of U.S. armaments and strongly
supported the Marshall Plan, there was clear disquiet about the value
of sending military supplies to Europe (or China), with only one third
28
of the population showing outright support. This was very much what
Marshall and Lovett wanted to hear, and the activities of Achilles in
particular made sure that the most influential columnists had the
'right' things to say. It left the U.S. negotiators with a virtually
free hand. What was acceptable to the West Europeans would be approved
by the American public - provided the commitments given did not violate
constitutional imperatives. The American treaty makers were well aware
that the right of Congress to declare war had to be respected. They
also knew that this could be exploited in the effort to achieve the
ultimate objective: the emergence of a united Western Europe militarily
strong enough to deter an aggressor without the assistance of U.S.
conventional forces. In late-1948, with defence expenditures under
tight Presidential control, this seemed the only viable option left
open to the U.S. negotiators. It was part of what one historian,
Robert H. Ferrell, describes as the embarrassment of trying to manage
29
foreign policy 'during the nadir of America's military power'.
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The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were seriously perturbed by the prospect
of a treaty being concluded. It was their view that 'every effort
should be made to avoid actual United States commitment, in the sense
of committing any of our armed forces to military action, unless and
30
until preceded by adequate preparedness1. This argument went on:
As the Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated,
the great importance to our national security of
keeping our military commitments abreast of our
foreign commitments...cannot be overemphasized.
This is to be construed not as non-concurrence with
any phase of United States foreign or international
policy but simply as recognition of the responsibility
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for national security...
[and] that current United States commitments involving
the use or distinctly possible use of armed forces are
very greatly in excess of our present ability to ful¬
fill them either promptly or effectively.
This was the first time the JCS had an opportunity to make a formal
contribution to the Administration's deliberations on Atlantic security
since April 1948. As senior military men - whose peacetime job was
primarily to protect their respective Services and budgets - they
naturally lost no chance to make the case for more money being
allocated to defence. But on the prospect of an Atlantic Pact, their
arguments reflected undeniable military realities. 'Prudent insurance
against disaster' was best taken, they said, in the form of improve-
32
ments to the U.S. armed forces' state of readiness.
No other group within the higher ranks of the Truman Administration
took this view. It was obvious that Truman would not abandon his
method of providing for the military discussion of national security
by residual financing - giving to the military what was left after
other expenses of central government had been met. The way forward
for the Administration - including the military - was therefore to
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place reliance on the one potential growth area of defence spending,
that of Western Europe as a whole, once the immediate objectives of
the Marshall Plan had been achieved. Because priority had to be given
to economic recovery, and because West Europeans insisted that the
military danger would become pressing without an unequivocal American
commitment to themselves, the United States opted to gain time by
becoming the indispensable founder member of the Atlantic Alliance.
This implied no abrogation of the former interest in the progress of
Western Union. On 24 November, the JCS reported to James V. Forrestal,
the National Security Council and the Department of State that the
33
institutional structure of the Western Union was at last taking shape.
A Defence Committee, Military Supply Board and a Permanent Commission
(based in London under the chairmanship of Gladwyn Jebb, the British
Foreign Office representative) had been established. A Western Union
Chiefs of Staff Committee had also been formed, under the chairmanship
34
of the British Field Marshall, Viscount Montgomery. Studies were
well in hand to determine the level of assistance required. Reviews of
six relevant subjects were promised for delivery in Washington by
December. These were (1) the steps taken to deter an aggressor with the
means currently available; (2) the progress made towards standardization
of equipment coordination of production and pooling of resources;
(3) estimates of forces to be maintained and of reserve levels; (4) the
extent to which these could be equipped, without jeopardizing the ERP,
from present stocks, new production with or without external economic
aid; (5) the extent of outside assistance needed; and (6) the extent to
35
which this might be obtained from other than the United States. It
was this evidence of movement in Western Union - and movement in the
right direction - which was welcomed in Washington. That the movement
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was more apparent than real emerged only later and was not suspected
at the time. Consequently, the United States Government felt more
confident about continuing the policy of offering rewards for progress
towards the consolidation of Western Europe. This could be done by
making a commitment to West European security of a kind which rep¬
resented the least cost to the United States and the minimum which
would be accepted by the Allies-to-be.
It was for all of these reasons that the West European representatives
were pleasantly surprised, on 10 December when the Washington talks
resumed, by the changes in the attitudes of their American counter¬
parts . There was now a determination to arrive at the actual text
of a treaty as quickly as possible: the meetings were no longer desig¬
nated 'exploratory'. Robert A. Lovett again took the chair, stipulating
the procedure to be followed. After the text had been prepared in draft
form, the President would be asked for his opinion and judgement,
30
followed by consultation with Congressional leaders. In practice
this became a two-stage process. A draft text was sent to participating
governments (seven at that time) on 24 December; this was amended and
the finished version published on 18 March 1949.
Most of the drafting was done outside the Ambassadors' Committee; once
more, the smaller group of the Working Party were asked to prepare
texts on the basis of policy points raised at the higher level. This
gave John D. Hickerson the most consistent advocate of an Atlantic
Alliance in the State Department, considerable influence. Dean Acheson,
Marshall's successor, acknowledged this obliquely after the signing
ceremony in April 1949. According to Hickerson he said:
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Well Jack, I think this treaty is going to work.
If it works there will be arguments in the United
States as to who more than anybody else is
responsible for it, but if it doesn't work,
there will be no damn doubt, you did it.^
Although the crucial role has elsewhere and variously credited to
Georges Bidault, Ernest Bevin, Robert A. Lovett and Eelco van Kleffens,
Acheson's judgement as to the individual chiefly responsible is by no
38
means implausible. Although Hickerson did not have the intellectual
stature of a George Kennan, he did have persistence. During the course
of 1948, the Truman Administration - though for reasons wider and deeper
than those articulated by Hickerson - came to accept his policy pres¬
criptions. His influence was also practical: from the beginning of
the final drafting stage, he insisted that simple and straightforward
language should be used throughout the text. The test to be applied
was whether an 'Omaha milkman' could readily understand the treaty when
39
it was published. The aim was to minimise popular controversy and
this was certainly achieved. In the long-term this approach had a
price: the treaty document was clear for immediate purposes but un¬
helpful over the longer run. In the interests of clarity, contentious
issues which could not be resolved were, in effect, left to the North
40
Atlantic Council to be established under the treaty's auspices.
Some issues raised few difficulties for the U.S. negotiators. North
American and West European participants all agreed that the United
Nations had to be acknowledged in the treaty as having the 'primary
41
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'.
There was no serious dispute over the length of the period to be
covered by the treaty. The Europeans would have preferred a 50 year
term (following the Brussels Treaty president) or at least 'a generation';
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the Americans and Canadians wanted a shorter period. The United States
accepted a compromise that the treaty included reference to a 20-year
42
term with provision for a half-way revision. On the question of
whether there should be non-military aspects to the new alliance - an
idea enthusiastically backed only by Canada - the United States agreed
to a form of words which referred generally, but without commitment,
to the strengthening of democratic institutions and the encouragement
of economic collaboration. Regarding the matter of the North Atlantic
Council, the 24 December draft said that the task of the new body would
be 'to deal with matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty';
43
on U.S. insistence, 'to deal with' was replaced by 'to consider'.
This was more than a minor word change: it deprived the Treaty
Organization of any coercive powers. To the United States, supra-
nationality had its uses in a European setting but not in an Atlantic one.
The question of membership was less easy to resolve. The earlier draft
had stipulated that, after agreement, any other country in the North
Atlantic or West European regions could be invited to join. The
Americans insisted on the removal of the phrase 'North Atlantic', thus
restricting new members to Western Europe, and on the insertion of the
words 'unanimous agreement', thus stressing each signatory's power of
44
veto on new accessions. Agreement on this had been reached largely
in order to protect the decisions taken already after long arguments
about which countries - in addition to those negotiating - should be
invited to join the new Atlantic Alliance from the outset. As Lovett
made clear, 'if the treaty were to appeal to American opinion, member¬
ship should not be confined to the seven countries now represented at
45
the talks'. The American preference was to invite only those
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countries 'whose homeland or insular territories are washed by the
waters of the North Atlantic, or which form part of a close union of
46
states which meets this description'. This last criterion for
membership was designed to enable Luxembourg, integral member of the
Benelux and Western Union, to be part of the wider arrangement. It
was a formula by which all the strategic transatlantic 'stepping stones'
would be encompassed: Portugal's Azores, Denmark's Greenland, Norway's
Spitzbergen, as well as Iceland and Eire.
What the formula did not do was enable countries having only a
Mediterranean seaboard to claim membership. To the American negotiators
there were five considerations to be taken into account on this issue.
These were the problems of presentation to the U.S. people and Congress,
the Latin American dimension, the drawing of what was called the 'hold
line', the piace of Italy in the new security scheme (given that,
unlike Luxembourg, Italy was not part of Western Union and thus not
belonging to an alliance with an outlook on the Atlantic approaches),
and what to do about the Algerian departments of France.
The State Department was well aware that, whatever the final shape of
the military pledge undertaken by the United States under the Atlantic
Pact, the U.S. isolationist tradition, like appeasement psychology in
47
Europe, was 'not deeply buried'. A commitment had to be made, and
seen to be made, but prudence counselled that wherever possible the
European connection had to appear as of less importance than the
Atlantic one. This could most easily be achieved if the only signatories
to the treaty were those rimming the North Atlantic. For this purpose,
Portugal could more readily be included than Italy, even though the
former was a dictatorship and the latter a renewed democracy of the
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kind the Atlantic Alliance was supposed to protect. It was also
necessary to be clear about the treaty area in view of the reaction of
various countries in South America. At first the United States showed
some inclination to link the Rio Treaty with the new pact by including
Brazil in the North Atlantic area. The Europeans objected on the
grounds that an. invitation to that effect was 'likely to cause un-
48
desirable complications 1. By December most members of the Inter-
American Alliance had become 'apprehensive lest, through the formation
of the North Atlantic Pact, they might more easily be involved in con¬
flict'. The American calculation was that a specifically North Atlantic
arrangement, rather than a looser, wider system, would lessen such
fears. It also had the virtue of keeping the Rio Treaty, the latest
49
expression of the Monroe Doctrine, untouched by European involvement.
More troublesome was the general question of where on the European map
to draw the line. This had been recognized as a problem from the
9
beginning. In March 1948, George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff
put the point:
Since concentration of U.S. effort is essential in order
that our strength will not be wasted by dispersing it too
widely, the problem is to phrase a statement about U.S.
military assistance in such a way as to cover these
countries whose continued freedom is most essential to
U.S. security, and at the same time to avoid a statement
that might invite Communist aggression against countries
not included in such a first priority list.^0
By April 1948, it had already been decided that Greece and Turkey were
adequately provided for by the Truman Doctrine. To re-emphasise this,
a declaration by the President, coinciding with an Atlantic Treaty,
would stipulate continuing interest in these countries (and Iran) even
though they were to be outside the formally defined treaty area. The
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Washington Paper had included the same recommendation on 9 September
1948. It seemed the best way to devise an arrangement which would meet
the security needs of the signatory nations, plus those in geographically
contiguous regions, while not over-extending U.S. military capabilities.
This formed the basis of the area definition of the finished treaty and
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its accompanying declaration on Greece and Southwest Asia. On what
was to become known as NATO's northern flank there were fewer problems:
Sweden wanted no part in the new arrangement, while Finland was debarred
because of the terms of the recently-concluded Soviet-Finnish treaty of
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friendship. The Irish Republic excluded itself by insisting that the
price of Irish accession was American pressure on the British Govern¬
ment to relinquish control in Northern Ireland.
The real difficulties in defining the 'hold line' concerned Italy and
North Africa. During the negotiations Italy had been the subject of
a wide variety of views. In the case of the French this had meant a
change from passionate opposition to Italian membership to staunch
advocacy of inclusion. The United States was steadier in its approach.
It opposed Italy's membership but eventually bowed to French pressure.
Lovett said in December that his Government had no firm position. On
the one hand it recognized, with the British, that Italy could not
contribute much to military strength as a result of the peace treaty
limits on the Italian armed forces. On the other, the Truman Adminis¬
tration had already taken on security responsibilities in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and had occupation forces in Trieste, and would have to
make some reference to an American interest in Italy's territorial
integrity. To do anything else would weaken the pro-Western political
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parties which had won so convincingly in April 1948. Lovett
favoured a two-stage solution. First, Italy would be included in the
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declaration on Greece and Turkey, perhaps even suggesting a Mediterranean
Pact later. Secondly, Italy would become a member of Western Union,
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thus overcoming the country's seeming isolation. This idea was
particularly appealing to U.S. policy-makers. Concurrently under
discussion was a proposal for a French-Italian customs union; were this
to be realised it would supplement the Benelux union and go some way
towards satisfying the wider American aspirations for Western Union.
The Italian Government let it be known in Washington that it was
prepared not only to join the Brussels Treaty Powers but also 'to enter
55into an organization for [the political] integration of Western Europe'.
Curiously, although the Italian membership question was ostensibly a
matter for dispute, the real issue was North Africa. As the Dutch
negotiator Eelco van Kleffens pointed out, the inclusion of any
territory on the southern shores of the Mediterranean would necessarily
entail Italian membership. And the French insisted that the Algerian
departments were to be included as part of metropolitan France. The
United States objected on a number of grounds; as Lovett remarked,
'To get into Africa would open up a limitless field'. Neither Greece
nor Turkey felt entirely safe and wanted to join. They could hardly
be left out, Lovett thought, if Algeria was included. If Algeria
came in, it would be hard to refuse Belgium's inclination to have the
Belgian Congo - with its important reserves of weapons-grade uranium -
included as well. Even the Dominion of South Africa had shown an
interest in membership on the same basis as Canada. A momentum could
easily develop which would expand the boundaries of the new Alliance
beyond the point of which the American public would support it, and
at which the strain on U.S. military resources would be so great as to
be obvious to all, thereby destroying the purpose of the exercise.
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As Lovett told the Ambassadors' Committee in December 1948, 'the basic
concept in the State Department had been that of a relationship with
the signatories of the Brussels Pact'; and North Africa had not been
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included in the Brussels Treaty.
Behind these points of detail lay a principle which could not be dis¬
regarded by the Americans. This was the issue of European colonialism.
By late 1948, the United Kingdom had impressed the United States of
its commitment to decolonisation, following the granting of indepen¬
dence to India. Marshall remarked in November that the British had
given 'abundant evidence' of this good faith in leading dependent
peoples towards self-government and independence. They were therefore
sponsored by the Americans at the United Nations to assume the trustee-
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ship for the former Italian colony in Libya. Other European nations
did not enjoy this measure of U.S. support. The Dutch desire to restore
the prewar relationship with its colonies found no favour in Washington,
%
in spite of American recognition that the continuing ability of the
Netherlands to service its debts was almost entirely dependent on the
dollar-earning capacity of the Dutch East Indies.^ This was to create
particular problems on the eve of the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Regarding Belgium's African possession, Lovett cabled Brussels:
'We do not consider North Atlantic Pact could possibly cover Congo...'
despite the fact that uranium made the security of that colony 'of
utmost importance in US strategic thinking'. The United States recog¬
nized that the Belgian Prime Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, would have
difficulty defending the Pact in his Parliament if the Congo was
excluded, but felt this could be overcome if all Africa was left
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outside the treaty area. The question of Spanish Morocco did not
arise because Spain, although having an Atlantic coastline, could not
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be considered until the particularly unacceptable nature of the Franco
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regime had altered sufficiently to remove the stain of fascism.
Much of the agonising over the geographical extent of the projected
alliance reflected American uncertainties about the United States'
willingness and ability to undertake new security obligations.
President Truman's budgetary stringency meant that adequate forces
did not exist - and could not be generated - for current mission
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requirements, embodied in the emergency war plan HALFM00N. Strategy
had thus to conform to capabilities, not vice versa, and this meant
that commitments could not be extended. This was why the Americans
insisted on a casus foederis in the North Atlantic Treaty which was
unspecific on whether and when U.S. military assistance or reinforce¬
ments would be available to Western Europe.
For the U.S. Government, the fundamental issue was the financial
ordering of domestic priorities. President Truman presented his
budget recommendations for fiscal year 1950 to the Congress on 10
January 1949. 'I am convinced', he said, 'that we should plan our
military structures at this time so as to insure a balanced military
program in the foreseeable future at approximately the level recommended
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in this budget'. He had already determined that $14.4 billion was
the maximum that the National Military Establishment could be allocated
He reportedly brushed off the collective demands of the Pentagon and
military chiefs, for a minimum of $16.9 billion, with the remark that
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what they had said was 'all very interesting'. James V. Forrestal,
the Secretary of Defence, persuaded Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary
of State in Marshall's temporary absence due to ill health, to state
formally that 'forces supportable by $16.9 billion would provide a
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military posture and state of readiness better calculated... to instil
the necessary confidence in democratic nations everywhere, than would
64
the reduced forces in a more limited budget'. Truman was unmoved.
Instead, he followed his instincts and the advice of George C.
Marshall, who pointed out in October 1948 that, so far as Western Europe
was concerned, care had to be taken to conserve U.S. manpower and that
full advantage had to be derived from Western Europe's 'military
potential'.^
Marshall's remarks were indicative of the American approach to the
division of labour in the proposed Atlantic Pact. They might be
interpreted as confirming what an eminent and experienced U.S.
Ambassador, Charles Yost, later defined as the three objectives of
American diplomats: to presume national security; to avoid a major
war; and to win domestic approval, thus assisting the Government to
00
succeed in its over-riding aims - that of staying in power. Truman,
strengthened by electoral success in November, won this round of
budgetary wrangling, largely as a result of the fact that his policy
of imposing rigid upper limits on military expenditure enjoyed wide-
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spread approval. He received full support from Marshall in pursuing
this policy, before and after the election. Congress endorsed the
policy by authorising military appropriation for fiscal 1950 at slightly
lower overall levels than Truman had asked for (although an attempt was
made to put proportionately greater resources at the disposal of the
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U.S. Air Force). Had the Pentagon's demands been met, the Federal
budget would have become adversely unbalanced, forcing the Administration
to resort to deficit financing or to higher taxation. Although strong
enough now politically to try either option, Truman saw no international
trend, emerging from the events of 1948, which led him to follow his
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military advisers' prescriptions. It was a calculated risk but, again,
Marshall spoke for the President: 'We must expect for the current
fiscal year a situation which is neither better nor worse than that
which we have faced in 1948 insofar as it affects the ceiling of our
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military establishment'.
At the moment when the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations entered the
final phase, General Dwight D. Eisenhover was recalled to government
service, as he put it later, 'to relate the strengths of our forces
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to the probable situation we might encounter in war'. His main
job was to ensure for Truman that the budget bidding process for
fiscal year 1951 did not include submissions by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff which were based purely on military requirements and which took
no account of what the Administration as a whole, and the Bureau of
the Budget especially, took to be the nation's capacity to pay. This
is what had happened in 1948 with the preparation of the 1950 budget.
Eisenhower therefore decided to change the military plan which served
as the basis for the Pentagon's financial requests. In January 1949
he authorised the preparation of a new emergency war plan to replace
HALFM00N. Its code name was OFFTACKLE and the JCS was instructed to
base calculations on the forces expected to be available under the
President's budget estimates for fiscal year 1950.
OFFTACKLE thus embodied the reality of U.S. military planning, based
on capabilities, as against the intentions supposedly being incorporated
in the North Atlantic Treaty during the negotiations concurrently in
progress. As soon as the planners began work on OFFTACKLE disagreements
arose about how much reliance should be placed on the American nuclear
monopoly, whether the United Kingdom was an appropriate base for
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offensive operations and the extent to which carrier-based aircraft
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should be used in strategic bombing missions. Eisenhower moved
quickly, in February 1949, to lay down policy guidelines - approved
by Truman - which would over-ride these disagreements and inter-
Service rivalries. The Joint Strategic Plans Group were told:
The security of the United States requires the
pursuance of a definite policy to insure, at
the earliest possible moment, the holding of a
line containing the Western Europe complex
preferably no farther to the west than the Rhine.
The logical extension of this line involves the
United Kingdom on the left flank and...Cairo-
Suez on the right flank.
However, Eisenhower pointed out that this desirable military objective
could not be achieved with the forces available, and not even when
selective service measures had begun to swell military manpower
resources appreciably. He therefore set two less ambitious objectives.
The first was to establish 'a substantial bridgehead', probably in
south-west France and north-east Spain, to be held in Western Europe.
The second followed from the likely difficulties of achieving the
first: to evacuate continental Western Europe with the intention to
'return, at the earliest possible moment...in order to prevent the
communization of that area with long term disastrous effects on U.S.
national interests'. Eisenhower then added a list of what he termed
'musts', namely the primary tasks of the American military in war:
to secure the United States, Iceland, and Greenland; and to protect
the lines of communication to the United Kingdom, Straits of Gibraltar,
72
Alaska, South America, Okinawa and Japan'.
This was less a matter of what John Erickson has called 'that tired
joke about generals preparing to fight the last war all over again',
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than a realistic assessment of what United States military power could
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accomplish in the late-1940s. Furthermore, although OFFTACKLE was
not completed until late-1949, the judgements and assumptions on which
it was based were largely shared by British and Canadian planners.
As with HALFMOON, the same strategic concept for the defence of
continental Western Europe served as the basis for the national mil¬
itary plans of the three countries. Differences of emphasis there
were - notably over the strategic importance of the Middle East - but
the degree of cooperation between the nations which had made up the
tripartite, wartime Atlantic Alliance continued to be stronger and
more effective than anything achieved by NATO in its formative years.
Recognising the unfavourable east-west balance of what soon came to
be called conventional forces, the three extra-continental defenders
of Western Europe opted for greater reliance on nuclear retaliation.
For the Americans, OFFTACKLE included a new targeting plan, prepared
by the U.S. Air Force, intended not merely to be used 'against' the
Soviet war making capacity (as in HALFMOON) but to 'destroy' it. The
number of atomic bombs and targets involved remains a classified
secret but it is clear from the stated military objectives that the
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proposed atomic retribution was to be awesome and terrible. Although
planned outside the arrangements mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty,
this stress on atomic weapons was later taken up by NATO itself and
marked the beginnings of the Alliance's nuclear bias.
In the context of the American origins of NATO, the direction of U.S.
strategic thought and planning, represented by OFFTACKLE, was influential.
Assessments of present and projected force capabilities were as much of
interest to diplomats as to the military policy-makers at a time when a
security alliance - of unprecedented characteristics for all concerned -
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was under construction. OFFTACKLE confirmed that the kind of deterrence
offered by the United States on behalf of Western Europe was different
to that to be presented by the West Europeans to the Soviet Union. The
Pentagon's strategic assumption was that the Europeans would have to
acquire, develop and maintain a credible capacity for barrier defence
(keeping their borders inviolate). This was the first layer of deter¬
rence. The second was to be provided by the Americans in the form of
atomic weapons, coupled with long-range air power, and unmatched
industrial resources, which would be mobilised to inflict unacceptable
75
costs on the occupying power in Western Europe. The crucial differ¬
ence between the two levels of deterrence was one of time. Americans
hoped to establish a defence line on the Rhine but had much stronger
expectations of an immediate withdrawal and a subsequent return in
approximately two years after the opening of hostilities. The condition
of 'self-help and mutual aid' mentioned in the Vandenberg Resolution
meant that barrier defence was a European responsibility but that the
United States would assist with the supply of military equipment.
Growing out of the London conversations of July and August 1948,
attended by the U.S. Lt. General Lyman Lemmitzer, this help became
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the Military Assistance Programme of 1949. Agreed in outline form
on the very eve of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, it was
designed to assuage West European fears about the practical strength
of the obligations undertaken by the Americans in the treaty. From an
American standpoint the supply of 'military ERP' was also designed to
reduce the Pentagon's demands on the federal budget.
During the last stages of the treaty negotiations there was a tendency
for the Europeans to talk about the 'guarantee clause' while Americans
preferred the term 'the pledge'. The difference is instructive: a
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guarantee has legal connotations of contract; a pledge, especially in
international relations, is an assurance or solemn promise with no
legal implications (though there may be strong moral obligation). For
the British, Ernest Bevin seems to have discounted the distinction.
He told the Cabinet in February 1949 that 'in the end, I suppose, it
is the existence of prepared common plans, rather than paper commit¬
ments which usually prove effective in determining a government to go
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to war in aid of an ally'. There was obvious truth here but little
comfort to Western Europe as a whole: as shown in the previous chapter,
U.S. military planning was of two sorts. First, there was peacetime
planning of the variety which General Lucius I. Clay pursued with
his fellow commanders-in-chief in Germany, for the preparation of
positions on or near the Rhine. This was largely for political con¬
sumption by West Europeans and bore little relation to the calculations
being made in Washington. Secondly, there was the more serious planning
for wartime operations (of the kind discussed above) which, despite
relatively sophisticated concepts of operations, in reality would have
borne out the truth of the remark by the French president, Henri
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Queuille that America would be 'liberating a corpse'. Applying
theories of deterrence - the pledge - was one thing; reassuring West
*
Europeans about their immediate future - a guarantee - was another.
The obligation clause contained in the North Atlantic Treaty was an
attempt to do both. The precise wording emerged in two stages, some
three months after the treaty negotiations were reconvened on 10
December 1948. The first stage was completed on 24 December with
distribution of a draft treaty text to the seven participating govern¬
ments (United States, Canada and the Western Union countries). The
second stage ended on 8 March 1949 when a new draft was circulated to
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the same countries and to Norway.
The fortnight of talks which preceded the despatch of the draft treaty
on Christmas Eve 1948, marked the high point of the influence wielded
thus far by the West Europeans themselves and John D. Hickerson's
'Atlanticist' Division of European Affairs within the State Department.
The Pentagon Paper of 1 April 1948 included a pledge that was sub¬
stantially weaker than the one contained in the Rio Treaty (under which
a majority decision of the parties could impel all signatories to take
diplomatic and economic action - but not military action - against an
aggressor). The Pentagon Paper included the following draft clause:
...each party shall regard any action in the area
covered by the agreement, which it considers an
armed attack against itself and that each party
accordingly undertakes to assist in meeting the
attack....
The phrases in italics represented to the West Europeans the kind of
loopholes which had to be closed; too much scope existed for unilateral
action on the part of the United States. Accordingly, in the Washington
Paper of 9 September 1948, a compromise between the 'hair trigger'
clause of the Brussels Treaty - which the Europeans would have liked
duplicated in the Atlantic Pact - and the looser formula of the Pentagon
Paper. The September draft stated that an armed attack would be con¬
sidered an attack on all; each of the signatories 'should consequently,
in accordance with its constitutional processes, assist in repelling
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the attack by all military, economic and other means in its power...'
With the drafting of the version circulated on 24 December (the
Ambassadors' draft treaty) the effect of the Atlanticists' argument
was even more prominent. If an armed attack occurred, the signatory
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nations 'will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith
such military or other action, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, as may be necessary to restore and assure the security of the
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North Atlantic area'. As written the clause was as watertight as
the West Europeans could have hoped for. The Americans had apparently
conceded that the pledge need not include the notion of each signatory
having the right to determine whether an armed attack had occurred.
They had also included explicit mention of military assistance. However,
the Ambassadors' draft made a major concession to the views of the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff: during the drafting of the Pentagon Paper in
March 1948, General Gruenther had insisted that the American military
'retain freedom to carry out action against [an ] aggressor in accord-
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ance with [U.S.] strategic concepts'. In effect, nine months later
the Ambassadors' Committee agreed that a European country under attack
by the Russians only had the right to expect its allies (including the
United States) to launch retributive assaults on the Soviet Union, and
not to provide direct assistance to itself.
Like the previous versions, the Ambassadors' draft had the status of
an international discussion document. For matters to proceed further
on the American side copies had to be sent for comment to military
policy-makers and to key Senators. The despatch of these copies marked
the beginning of the second stage in the development of the obligation
clause.
Admiral Louis Denfeld, that incisive critic of U.S. defence planning,
presented the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State Depart¬
ment on 5 January 1949. Their general response was warm: the idea of
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collective Atlantic defence would be 'an essential feature of a United
States policy directed toward preservation of our national security'.
What concerned the JCS was that the scope of the treaty "should not be
such as to result in undue disparity between our commitments and our
present and prospective strengths". This was a familiar theme but
they were pleased that the weight of the obligation clause fell on the
phrase 'as may be necessary to restore and assure the security of the
North Atlantic area', Denfeld commented:
Wording less general in nature might tend dangerously
to affect our freedom of planning and action with
respect to global strategy, it being manifest that
direct assistance alone might well be neither
practicable nor so effective as steps taken in
consonance with over-all strategic concepts.
The JCS were opposed to any Mediterranean or North African territories
being included. But their real objections were two telling points of
detail. The first was their criticism of• any wording in the final
treaty which might give the impression that a commitment to consult
other signatories about taking action amounted to a commitment to
take such action. The second concerned the phrase 'armed attack'.
Because this could be taken to mean internal or external aggression,
the JCS wanted further refinement in the definition. From a military
point of view, in Denfeld's words, 'the limitation of mandatory commit¬
ment, where reasonably practical, is good business in terms of future
military contingencies'.^4
Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally reacted to the Ambassadors' draft.
The treaty negotiators were given the substance of their views on 8
February 1949. Like the JCS they wanted a minimal commitment but were not
prepared to rely on a particular interpretation of the relevant clauses.
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Rather than taking the view that the draft pledge was really about the
restoration and maintenance of 'the security of the North Atlantic area',
the Senators wanted specific changes made so that the resulting pledge
would be weaker than that of the Rio Treaty. They recommended that the
drafted pledge should read: the signatories 'will assist the party or
parties so attacked by taking action, individually and in concert with
other Parties, as may be necessary to restore and assure the security
of the North Atlantic area'. There was, in short, to be no mention of
'such military and other' action, nor that it should be taken 'forth¬
with'. The State Department minutes recording the response to this
announcement to the negotiators make clear how perturbed the West
Europeans now were. In a private conversation with his Canadian
colleague, Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador, reportedly said
that this new development was 'disastrous'. During the Ambassadors'
discussions with the U.S. Secretary of State he was more circumspect
and analytical. Reflecting the gentlemanly, European approach to dip¬
lomacy, he suggested that the substance of the Treaty was what mattered,
the words being of secondary importance only. However, because a
certain degree of public discussion had already occurred, expectations
had been raised about the Atlantic Pact in Western Europe. Public
opinion there, he implied, would require something much stronger than
that being now proposed
Vandenberg and Connally had become unofficial members of the U.S.
negotiating team. Although this was regretted by some European partici¬
pants, and by some on the American side (such as George Kennan), this
was natural and inevitable. The U.S. Constitution stipulates that the
President may only ratify treaties on the advice and consent of the
Senate; in practice consent is most readily given if advice has been
asked for beforehand. Marshall and Lovett had respected this in 1948;
their successors, Dean Acheson and James E. Webb (from the Bureau of
the Budget), followed suit after they took office with the new Admin¬
istration in January 1949. It was largely this which led Escott Reid to
recall that while Acheson was not 'present at the creation' of the
Atlantic Pact, the new Secretary of State came in on the sixth - and
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last - day of creation, that day being a particularly busy one.
Acheson reported to his first meeting with the Ambassadors' Committee
on 8 February that little preparatory work had been done to acquaint
leading Senators with details of developments in the second half of
1948. This allowed him to buy time, thus reducing West European
pressure for an early completion of the text; he explained that
'regulating progress depended more upon the Senators than upon himself'.
This was a useful device for the State Department. It allowed the
Department's own reservations to be presented as the Senators' own
objections, against which the West Europeans could not argue as
negotiating equals. The stratagem had a certain disadvantage in that
it suggested criticism of Lovett: the inference being that he should
have sought close contacts with Tom Connally on the subject. In
fact there had been little or no occasion to do so, following the
passage of the Vandenberg Resolution in June 1948. No copy of the
Washington Paper treaty draft of September 1948 was supplied to the
Foreign Relations Committee, partly because the document had no
official status, and partly because it included the State Department's
clear preference for a Rio Treaty-type pledge, which fell well short
of what the Vandenberg Resolution could, if liberally interpreted, be
said to permit. Negotiations had not been reconvened until early
December when Senators were out of Washington during the Congressional
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Christmas break. When Acheson finally did meet the two Senators, on
3 and 5 January 1948, it was for all practical purposes the earliest
that this could have been done.
The reaction of Vandenberg and Connally, respectively the former and
present chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the
Ambassador's draft was consistent with their earlier involvement in
transatlantic diplomacy in mid-1948. Although political rivals, both
had been in agreement over the purpose of the Vandenberg Resolution:
it was to help create an environment in which the West Europeans would
begin to act, in security terms, according to the dual principle of
'self-help and mutual aid'. If the United States ever were to avail
itself of the opportunity created by Resolution 239 to associate with
regional, collective arrangements in Western Europe, then it would do
so on a quid pro quo basis, as a response to the kinds of political,
economic and especially military development that senators had been
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looking for in Western Europe for some two years. Acheson's biographer,
David McLellan, has argued that the new Secretary of State and some
senators 'sensed the utility' of a North Atlantic Treaty which would
persuade the Europeans, especially the French and Germans, 'to bury
their quarrels and collaborate in producing a stronger, more unified
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front to the Russians'. All of this is demonstrably true (although
McLellan does not extend the point to cover the European unity issue)
and in the context of the guarantee clause or pledge it reinforces the
point that the Senate and Acheson both had an interest in a weak commit¬
ment. A strong, unambiguous guarantee would have lessened the pressure
on the Europeans to take such action. In the earlier words of George C.
Marshall, it would have 'taken the heat off' Western Europe, thereby
lessening the chances of radical change.
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The problem with this approach was that it presented the temptation to
reduce the commitment below the level acceptable to the West Europeans.
An impromptu and intemperate debate on the Senate floor on 14 February
1949 epitomised this; Acheson recalled that it 'set off a land mine
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under our feet'. The isolationist Republican from Missouri, Forrest
Donnel, read into the Congressional Record an article published two
days previously in the Kansas City Times, which reported the Secretary
of State to have said that the treaty would be a moral commitment to
fight, even if the sole right of Congress to declare war would still be
respected. In a speech which would have been unexceptional in the
1930s, Donnel complained bitterly against this. He challenged Connally
and Vandenberg to disassociate themselves with the thrust of Acheson's
reported remarks. Connally caught the mood and asserted in reply that
he did not believe in giving carte blanche assurances to anyone, least
of all the West Europeans. Americans would not be blindfolded, he said
'and make a commitment now to enter every war that may occur in the
next 10 years, and send our boys and resources to Europe to fight'.
Americans were not Sir Galahads, he concluded. It was left to
Vandenberg to put the case for the proposed treaty. The Atlantic Pact
would prevent a third world war, he argued, and be written 'within the
four corners' of the U.N. Charter. He added the historically dubious
but politically expedient remark that the Pact would be 'the outcome
and implementation'of the Resolution which bore his name and which
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fellow senators had approved so convincingly the previous June.
On hearing of the unscheduled debate Acheson, together with Charles E.
Bohlen, the State Department Counselor, went up to Capitol Hill to
talk to Connally and Vandenberg. Their discussion centred on various
drafts of the obligation clause, now known as Article 5. Acheson's
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minute of the meeting states: 'Both Senators were even more strongly
than heretofore of the opinion that it must be made clear in Article 5
that there was no obligation, moral or otherwise, to go to war'.
Connally even suggested that the formula first used in the Rio Treaty -
that an attack on one would be considered an attack against all - was
inappropriate. Vandenberg was less insistent but did stress the need
to omit the word 'military'. His colleague strengthened the point
by proposing the phrase 'as it may deem necessary' to be inserted to
qualify any obligation undertaken and reserve final judgement to the
national governments. Acheson pointed out the virtues of the planned
pact as a deterrent to an aggressor but did not apparently seek to
change minds. It was agreed that he appear before the Senate Foreign
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Relations Committee later the same week.
Developments now unfolded swiftly. A group of high level officials in
the State Department - led by Bohlen and Hickerson - produced a draft
«
of Article 5 which represented 'in substance the minimum commitment
which could be embodied in this Article and achieve from the point of
view of foreign policy the purposes of the North Atlantic Pact'. It
included the Rio Treaty idea of an attack on one being an attack on all,
but it also incorporated Connally's phrase about the signatories taking
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the measures they deem necessary. Sir Oliver Franks was shown the
draft informally to get his views on the likelihood of the acceptance
by the West Europeans, including the British. Apparently on his advice
a crucial phrase - 'including the use of military force' - was included.
The text now read:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all; and consequently
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that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them,
in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, will take, forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties,
the measures it deems necessary, including the use
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security
of the North Atlantic area.
President Truman read and approved this and, following Acheson's
suggestion, agreed to put pressure on Tom Connally, Truman's fellow
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Democrat, to accept this Article as drafted. With slight - and
insubstantial - amendments, this draft was discussed by Acheson with
the Foreign Relations Committee meeting in executive session on 18
February 1949. The Secretary of State skilfully defended the wording
of this (and all the other Articles) but it was Vandenberg who made
the really telling point in answer to suggestions for changes: 'the
worst thing that could happen to us is to take this treaty on the
floor of the Senate in a form where it is not eloquently adopted, and
I would rather have an overwhelming approval of this sort of statement
than a grudging approval of something stronger, because I think it
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would be weaker in the end.'
This did not conclude discussions on the final text of the treaty -
there were a number of minor issues, and the major ones of Italy and
Algeria, to be settled - but an Atlantic Alliance was now clearly
about to be established. Prior to this, there was a real doubt,
particularly in American minds, about whether the idea of such an
alliance - mooted in 1947 by St. Laurent and Ernest Bevin - could be
given political substance. As it was the West Europeans and Canadians
could congratulate themselves on what Escott Reid termed 'a partial
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victory'. The North Atlantic Treaty would not include a guarantee
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but it would have a pledge stronger than the one in the Rio Treaty.
This was reason enough for celebration but real achievement had been
an American one. Article 5 was a masterpiece of diplomatic draughts¬
manship (to which Europeans made an indispensable contribution). It
reconciled domestic U.S. inhibitions and West European constraints
by the simple yet hard-to-achieve method of being virtually all things
to virtually all Americans. Like the U.S. Constitution, it could be
interpreted either strictly according to the letter, which appeased
the latent but real isolationist impulse; or more loosely by addressing
the ill-defined but potential usefulness of the Atlantic community
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to the United States.
The Alliance had been made but the actual commitments - political,
military and moral - had been minimised. In this form, the Truman
Administration could claim legitimately that - as Lovett had insisted
in mid-1948 - the treaty 'had the backing of the vast majority of the
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American people'. In December 1948, the National Opinion Research
Center reported that some 75 per cent of the U.S. public approved some
form of Atlantic Pact. Opinion was evenly divided on whether an
explicit commitment to go to war could or should be made. The figures
changed very little in the period up to and beyond the signing of the
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treaty. There were many Americans - in government as well as outside -
who would have liked to leave matters there. But just as the Marshall
Plan had to be supplemented by an Atlantic security arrangement, so
the North Atlantic Treaty had to be bolstered by yet more evidence
of American goodwill and largesse, this time in the form of a military
assistance programme.
The notion of supplying Western Europe with materiel was far from new
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when the treaty neared completion. The National Security Council had
reported to Truman as far back as July 1948 on the detailed pros and
cons of providing military assistance to the non-Soviet world, especially
Western Union.It was therefore developed in parallel with the North
Atlantic Treaty, following the progress of the Western Union military
organisation based in London and monitored by the Americans, and it
reflected the same U.S. concerns which have been the theme of this
thesis. The young historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., writing in
November 1948, made the relevant points:
We are confronted with a situation in which
European governments are bound willy-nilly
to build up their defenses... The only
solution is for the United States to assume
part, at least, of the burden of rearmament
and this can be done best by resuming lend-
lease .
The second main reason forcing us into a
policy of military aid is that the American
objective of a European federation cannot be
achieved without an American decision to under¬
write such a federation strategically...A
European federation can make military sense
only if it is backed in principle and in fact
by American military might and unless it
makes military sense it will have overall
appeal for European governments changed with
the problem of protecting their people in an
epoch of insecurity.''-^
He added that military staff talks were needed to relieve the Europeans
of their 'profound fear of American isolationism'. Another historian,
Lawrence S. Kaplan, with the hindsight of a quarter century looking
back on his own personal involvement in the military aid programme,
embellished Schlesinger's observations. Acknowledging that there was
a strong strain of self-interest in the Marshall Plan and military
version of ERP, Kaplan also noted the altruism: the United States still
felt it had a mission to he lp others achieve the Americans' state of
happiness and prosperity. This mission could be realised not only in
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granting economic and military aid, it could also be achieved 'by
conferring the advantages of America's unified economy and society
upon divided allies. To many Americans this was an imperative under¬
lying American effort to persuade Europeans to cooperate among them-
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selves on behalf of a future United States of Europe'.
Because the final form of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program - as
passed by Congress - began to take shape in the latter end of 1949,
a full description and analysis falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Furthermore, Kaplan has provided a major study of the detailed work
which went into the U.S. military assistance plan for Western Europe
and elsewhere. Still, in spite of such prior attention, the supply
of materiel was considered by Americans and Europeans from mid-1948
onwards as an indispensable element in any future Atlantic security
arrangement. The reasons which led the United States to make military
supplies available were the same as those which animated and conditioned
U.S. responses to West European proposals for a multi-national, trans¬
oceanic security alliance. Some comment here is therefore necessary,
especially as the American input to the earliest stages of the military
aid programme's formulation serves to confirm the interpretation of
NATO's American origins contained in this thesis.
On 10 July 1948, Truman approved the National Security Council's report
on giving military help to the non-Soviet world (NSC14/1). It
stipulated that any assistance given must not jeopardise the materiel
needs of U.S. armed forces and should be consistent with existing
strategic concepts. Replacements, spare parts and ammunition would be
provided for as long as U.S. security requirements dictated. And the
programme had to be in accordance with the aims, purposes and adminis-
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tration of Marshall aid. If there had to be some partial rehabilitation
of the American arms industry, this was not to unbalance the effort to
return the United States to full peacetime economy. NSC 14/1 spelt
out what this meant for the West Europeans: they had to integrate
their armaments industries so as to become rapidly self-supporting.
Where this was not possible standardisation of equipment should be
achieved with U.S. models. The recipients of aid should provide
strategic raw materials in return for supplies and that compensation
should be forthcoming to the United States 'whenever and to what extent
feasible 1
By December 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had built these ideas into
their calculations. Initial doubts that the economic burden of trying
to rearm the United States and Western Europe simultaneously would be
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insuperable had been overcome. In September, Air Force General
Hoyt S. Vandenberg suggested that America's security interests might
be best served if the United States curtailed its own requirements
in order to make larger contributions to the revitalisation of the
military power disposed of by the Western Union countries. Army
General Omar Bradley agreed, saying that it 'would seem a great mistake
•*>
to concentrate our entire resources on a United States rearmament
program in the belief that such action alone will contribute most to
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our security'. By December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached a
consensus: they recognised that to pile military assistance on top
of the requirements of the old emergency war plan HALFM00N, including
its expensive mobilisation and legistical elements, would risk the
economic, and therefore the military, security of the United States.
They were thus thrown back on the irreducible minimum for the nation's
defences later to be incorporated in OFFTACKLE at Eisenhower's insistence.
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The minimum requirement was, in the words of the historian of the JCS,
'to acquire and support forces for an atomic offensive, to meet
occupation commitments, to provide a "platform" for mobilization, to
maintain lines of communications, and to provide initial air defence
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of the United States'.
This established the criteria by which 'spare' capacity could be devoted
to the West European rearmament effort. No-one concerned with develop¬
ing the aid programme in late-1948 and early-1949 underestimated the
difficulties involved, particularly the fact that such help as could
be supplied was small in relation to what the Europeans themselves had
to supply. Officials in the State and Defense Departments, as well
as Congressmen, were evidently clear - and satisfied - that on the basis
of 1948 figures the United States would supply only one-seventh of the
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total Western Union military build-up. Testifying before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1949 on the programme before Congress,
General Lemnitzer stated: 'The hard core of ground power will come
from Europe'. Politically this was acceptable to the U.S. Government
and public opinion; militarily, as General Vandenberg pointed out, the
aid proposed was 'a very minute drop in the bucket' compared to what
was required and to what would have to be forthcoming from European
economies and resources. General Bradley summed up: 'No one of us has
any idea that the arms furnished in this program would be enough to arm
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enough forces to stop [a Soviet] aggression'.
On the American side this caused little anxiety. As Bradley put it, what
the United States was to supply was 'a very small part' of the West
Europeans' needs:
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We think that in general they should furnish
most of those needs themselves to build up their
security, and that this is a small part which we
think will help start them toward building up
their security by increasing the morale of the
troops who receive this.
Remember, these are forces which are already
in being and are provided for in this year's
budgets by the nations. We feel it will
increase the morale of the nations with the
will to resist and a desire to build up their
security to a point where they can really
defend themselves
As with the North Atlantic Treaty, this was a primary purpose of the
exercise. Neither the administrative nor legislative branches of the
U.S. Government felt that more needed to be done by the Americans.
Considerable comfort was taken in the fact that this 'aid-for-self-
help' formula had forced Western Union to embark upon a programme of
military integration, with a commonly-agreed strategic plan and properly-
assigned wartime roles and missions. According to Lemnitzer, the
requests for aid would have been much greater than they turned out to
be had it not been for the degree of integration already achieved at
the military level in Western Union. Without that, the United States
'would have been confronted with each nation attempting to have a
complete army, navy and air force to carry out all roles'."'""'"^
There was a double benefit for the United States in this state of
affairs, which coincided precisely with the motives which had led the
Truman Administration into the talks on Atlantic security from the
outset. The first was that a degree of military collectivisation had
been forced on the West Europeans which materially reduced the relatively
unproductive burden of defence expenditure on economies on both sides
of the Atlantic. Following the processes established under the Marshall
aid programme, American officials had been able to ensure that requests
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for assistance were, in Robert Lovett's words, 'authentic and realistic'.
The requests did not sacrifice economic recovery in Western Europe; nor
did they strain Truman's spending limits. The presence of U.S.
observers at Western Union conferences had paid handsome political
dividends. As Lovett pointed out to Averell Harriman in December,
'The psychological effect on the West Europeans of the knowledge that
a program agreed by their military leaders could not be met might be
disastrous'. He added that such knowledge would be 'a boon to the
USSR' . ^ The second advantage for the United States was that in
helping to create conditions in which West Europeans could themselves
begin to operate a set of defence arrangements, that were truly collec¬
tive in origins and practice, the Americans could limit their involve¬
ment to joint activities with a unified West European effort. ' This
minimised 'entanglement' and provided the basis for a diminishing
participation as the Allies proceeded on the path towards robust
economic health and political unity.
As ever the West Europeans did little to point out that progress towards
political and military unity was more apparent than real. In a major
address in New York in mid-November 1948, Eelco van Kieffens, the
Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States, said that if such
'massive realists as Churchill advocate the idea [of European federation],
it must be not only desirable but also capable of execution'. He
suggested that Western Union already contained the notion of in¬
tegration 'already a single Western European general staff is in
operation' and in daily contact with its political steering group, the
Consultative Council established by the Brussels Treaty. He emphasised
that federation had not yet arrived but was on the way. He asked for
American tolerance: the argument that Western Europe's failure to take
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rapid steps amounted to a refusal 'to pull its weight' was strongly-
rejected: even the original thirteen American colonies had taken time
to develop their federal arrangements. He asked for patience. Americans,
he said, should 'give those who labor there your trust and a real
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chance to accomplish what cannot be accomplished overnight'.
The Dutch Ambassador remarked that 1948 was in any case not 1776:
Alexander Hamilton's difficulties were comparatively minor when com¬
pared with the contemporary problems in Western Europe. Although the
American popular press and some Congressmen did not always recognise
this, senior U.S. policy-makers were well aware that military assistance
would not eliminate all the problems which confronted European federal¬
ists. If Marshall aid and an Atlantic Pact failed to create confidence
then yet more would have to be done, in the phrase quoted earlier of
the Marshall Plan Administrator, Paul Hoffman, to get Europe back on
its feet and off America's back. Furnishing military equipment was the
obvious next - and possibly last - source of influence the Americans
could tap.
It was not only the West Europeans, however, who asked for military
grants-in-aid. By the end of 1948, over 50 countries had asked for
varying degrees of help. American resources could not satisfy all
and so the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked in November to prepare
a list of priority countries. European countries - neutral and non-
neutral - together with Canada hes.aed the list, while China and
countries in Southwest Asia, Latin America and Africa appeared further
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down. While this reflected Western Europe's strategic importance
to the United States it did not solve matters. Within Western Europe
there were significant differences in what was required. These
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differences in part reflected some European countries' continuing
colonial responsibilities and the United States, as it had indicated
over the Atlantic treaty, would not allow itself to be seen to under¬
write European imperialism. The natural sensitivity was reinforced
by the need to match the Soviet Union as the champion of decolonisation.
The issue could be contained in an Atlantic context simply by defining
the treaty area accordingly. With the military assistance programme
things were more problematical. They came to a head two days before
the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, in a heated session during
which the European Foreign Ministers, gathered in Washington for the
ceremony, defended themselves against charges brought by Dean Acheson
against the Netherlands in particular but which had a wider
application.
The problem arose over anti-Dutch rebellions in Indonesia. The United
States, while not itself involved, supported in general terms the
Indonesian ambition to re-establish an independent republic. The
U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Averell Harriman, advised
Acheson in March that any Dutch Government which agreed to restore the
republic in the East Indies would almost certainly fall. He had been
told by Dirk Stikker, the Dutch Foreign Minister, that the Netherlands
wished to remind the United States of a pledge given to Western Union:
'that Dutch soldiers who will be drafted in April will be devoted to
Western Europe and defense'. Harriman wrote that Stikker added that
'arms and supplies would be urgently needed if these troops were to
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play any useful part'. Acheson found this unacceptable.- If Western
Europe needed defending then Dutch soldiers and their equipment should
be brought home for that purpose. To that end, he announced on 2 April
1949 to his West European counterparts that no military assistance
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could go to the Netherlands. The United States wished, wherever
possible, to adhere to the principle of equality of treatment as to
whether supplies were to be forthcoming for all Western Europe. But,
Acheson insisted, the United States 'must have the legal right to say
no' to a particular nation, though it hoped that such a situation
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would never arise.
The European response was fierce. Acheson's linkage of Western Europe's
security and colonialism touched a raw nerve. Appropriately Ernest
Bevin led the counter-attack. It is worth quoting his reply in full
from the verbatim report of the meeting.
Bevin: Suppose we have plans to hold at the Elbe,
with troops and armies from Holland, Belgium, France
and Great Britain. Then there is a dispute going
on - leave Ireland out of it for the moment - say
with Great Britain and on Malaya, or some part of
Africa - we have great territories overseas - and
the U.S. Government on quite other grounds didn't
like what we were doing in Africa or somewhere
else, yet we are faced with planning, the drilling,
the inculcation of the spirit among our people to
defend this line. Then they are left in uncertainty
whether America will give us the arms on quite another
issue. Well I suggest to you: how would you feel if
on other grounds arms were witheld? Now I admit your
troubles with Congress; I admit all you feel about
imperialism, and about insurrection and rebellion
against the dear old powers in Europe. Well, I
don't mind you feeling like that. It may be a grand
idea to have quite the missionary zeal to free
everybody in the world, but it's not a very good
answer when the Russians are coming down with a tank
corps. We shall have a Russian tank [attack] because
we have trouble on the Gold Coast. That is the sort
of fundamental thing we are worried about and can
you give us the answer to that?-'--'-®
He added later the same meeting: 'It leaves you the authority under
your suggestion as I see it to take absolute unilateral action because
you are supplying money....We on the other hand have got to persuade
our parliaments virtually to go right in without reservations and
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questions'. The issue was eventually shelved at a West European
suggestion that results be awaited from a high level Dutch mission
which was due to visit Indonesia.
Bevin's outburst indirectly reveals much about American foreign policy -
and by extension transatlantic relations in general - at the end of a
thirteen month period during which appeared the treaty which created NATO.
On a personal level, the British Foreign Secretary showed, on the one
hand, how desperate the Old World had become for the security now
within the gift of the New; on the other, he demonstrated what has been
called 'the common English resentment of American power', in fact shared
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by many Europeans. On a military level, Bevin's remarks exposed yet
again the European fixation about the Soviet Union's unreliable intentions
and vast military capabilities. On a diplomatic and political level,
Bevin demonstrated that the North Atlantic Pact did not solve the basic
European security problem over which he had striven for the past year.
His recognition that neither the treaty nor the associated military
assistance programme, nor yet the defence planning exercises which
accompanied both, had really dented the American freedom to act
unilaterally meant that he could not claim, with Canning, that he had
called in the New World to redress the balance of the Old. All that the
United States had done was to put on paper what had been obvious in two
world wars: Americans had a vested interest in ensuring that no single
power dominated all Europe, but that the United States reserved to
itself the right to etermine when and how that objective would be
achieved. Managing the foreign policy of a superpower with global
responsibilities, the American diplomats felt they could do no other.
* * *
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The five Western Union countries, the United States and Canada, together
with Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy, signed the North
Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. They also issued the same day a
declaration reaffirming support for Greece, Turkey and Iran. Thus
was NATO born.
American policy-makers liked to remind the West Europeans that this
step was unprecedented for the United States. (It was, of course, an
equally novel development for Western Europe.) Historians have picked
up this theme, including the formation of the postwar Atlantic Alliance
in the process begun with wartime doubts about Soviet intentions and
brought to fruition with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. That
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process is often called 'the American diplomatic revolution*. From
the evidence presented in this thesis it is clear that such a view is
inappropriate, or at best relevant only in the context of Soviet-
American Rivalry. As regards Western Europe, it would be more accurate
to say that the Truman Administration as a whole intended the North
Atlantic Treaty to prevent a diplomatic revolution of a kind which
would jeopardise America's freedom of manoeuvre. The treaty per se
did not entangle the United States in the affairs of Europe: in 1949
all American diplomatic options remained open. To Washington, the
new Alliance was a set of political arrangements which had a military
expression. Nothing in the treaty compromised the traditional U.S.
preferences for minimal standing forces, rapid mobilisation at the
eleventh hour, and thorough demobilisation the moment hostilities
ceased. Possession of an atomic monopoly reinforced those preferences.
The difficulty with America's otherwise uncomplicated approach - and the
source of future changes in U.S. policy - was that almost everything
342
depended on a positive reaction in Western Europe. It was the West
Europeans who had to become the self-sustaining counterforce to commun¬
ism. For Americans in the late-1940s this meant some form of economic,
military and political unity in Western Europe, to be brought about
probably in that order and sooner rather than later. As encouragement,
Marshall aid was forthcoming; military assistance was on its way: and
the fact that a security pact had been concluded - which was of greater
value to the recipients of aid than the donor - helped improve the
political climate. Lovett's instructions to Harriman, quoted earlier
in this chapter, bear repetition in this context. The Atlantic Pact,
he wrote, 'should be considered a supplement to and in no sense a
replacement for the efforts towards European unity'. The Brussels
Treaty system would continue to operate as 'the nucleus of a Western
European union' which had not been imposed on its members from without^
That was Europe 's first and best hope; the American pledge was the last.
This was the application to Western Europe of the strategy of contain¬
ment, as revealed in the documentary record covering U.S. relations
with Western Europe - between 1947 and 1949. In domestic American
setting it was a policy with much to recommend it: nobody in the United
States was required to do very much to make it a success. Additional
demands were not to be made on the U.S. Treasury or taxpayer. Industry
could continue the increasingly profitable production and export of
non-military goods to the growing markets in Europe. The military
establishment was left free to develop war plans and procurement
programmes which conceded little in practice to the security needs
(as interpreted by West Europeans) of the new Allies. Additionally,
popular support was forthcoming - according to opinion polls in
April 1949, almost 80 per cent approved the Atlantic Pact - because
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something was being seen to be done about communism but not by the
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United States alone. Congress looked to the day when much of the
economic and military burden would be carried by the rejuvenated West
Europeans. The unformulated ideal of a West European union pervaded,
strengthened and seemingly justified this optimism.
Events external to the United States - principally, the advent of the
Soviet bomb and the Korean War - soon exposed the fragility of this
concept of containment. The emphasis on a new Western Europe shifted
to military integration across the Atlantic area. What had been
designed to facilitate withdrawal became the device which ensnared.
It is this change which has obscured from contemporary historians the
original American motives for signing the North Atlantic Treaty. As
this thesis has shown, the United States had satisfied itself by the
end of 1948 that an Atlantic Alliance would be an inexpensive way of
bridging the gap between America's global commitments, thrust upon it
at the close of World War II, and the economic, military and political
resources which could be devoted to them. The world's most strateg¬
ically important region, Western Europe, was the main focus for
concern but the founding of Western Union encouraged the United States
that the West Europeans were beginning to control their own destiny
with minimal reliance upon transatlantic friends. As the State
Department put it in a explanatory statement for the American public:
'The North Atlantic Pact is made possible by the strides the Western
nations of Europe have taken toward economic recovery and toward
economic, political and military cooperation....Lines of action to
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increase cooperation through 1952 have been prepared'. The Pact
and West European integration were interdependent elements of the one
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concept: the treaty improved the chances of integration in the short-
term; full West European unity would render the Atlantic Pact unnecessary
in the long-run. In the American grand strategy of the late-1940s, NATO
was seen as a holding measure. That is why the United States signed
the North Atlantic Treaty. What happened thereafter does not call
that conclusion into question.
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